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Forum Organization? | Main / All | Participant Communities | Conflicts | Military Functions | Small Wars COI | Members Only |
| Historians The practice of history, and historical analysis. See FAQ for where to discuss history relevant to other forums. |
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#21 |
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Registered User
Join Date: Oct 2009
Posts: 3
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I share the frustration of the other participants. it is difficult to agree on a common vocabulary & definitions, to ensure we clearly communicate the precise ideas we want to discuss, without ambiguity. Adding new buzzwords to our vocabulary further complicates matters.
Since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, humans have banded together to secure the needs & wants of one community against the needs & wants of other communuties. Some of these bands evolve into sophisticated cultures & societies, with robust economic, political & military institutions. Some remain relatively unsophisticated, or allow their sophistication to evolve in different directions. When an "advanced" society tries to intervene in a less advanced society, the "tarbaby effect" can generate an unpleasant surprise. blindly assuming our own superiority, we blunder in & snatch up the tarbaby, intending to bring order out of chaos. It's hard to look dignified, sophisiticated & in charges when you're covered in tar, mud, fur & feathers. I agree with the earlier commenters that we have much to learn from history. I encourage my children - and other students - to learn from what worked, first, and then to learn from what did not work. After allowing them a few minutes to think about those overly simplified concepts, I remind them that the hard part is figuring out why something did or did not work. I suspect that we may learn as much about how to succeed in attaining a worthy goal by studying the techniques and practices used to pursue a goal we would not approve, as we could by studying for example, archaic techniques used to pursue less controversial goals. I think we should draw rational distinctions between different war environments, bearing in mind that all such classifications are at least partly artificial. Sometimes geographic factors are important in analyzing the nature of a conflict. Economic factors, and their impact on social factors, are almost always at the heart of the nature of the conflict. I think anyone who studies human conflict can identify scores of differentiating factors that could be used to classify conflicts. I also think the same serious students of conflict can identify several recurrent themes that cut across any classifications we might devise. We can rationally differentiate according to the strenght of each belligerent, as well as their relative strength. The political status of the parties may be relevant. Religious, ideological and ethnic/nationalist factors may also shed light. That's not to say the classification is worthless; to the contrary, I think it helps us break down the individual cases into their component parts, but also allows us to bring those parts back up in a different context, so we can better understand which factors affect each other, & how they do so. Each conflict cited in this discussion thread should offer valuable lessons to us. The question is whether we can find them & apply them. What were the participants trying to accomplish? Did they rationally weigh the costs & benefits of pursuing their goal? What course did they pursue to attain the goal? What barriers did they encounter? How did they adapt? Did they attain the stated goal? Did they regret the price they paid? I can't speak for other scholars on this point, but I try to separate my personal feelings about colonialism & imperialism from my examination of the history. It is hard to avoid tainting analysis with emotional or moral judgments. I am trying to remind myself that the moral analysis can be done after the facts are studied and the utility of the actions are analyzed. It strikes me as possible (and undesirable) to reject out of hand a morally and ethically defensible technique that was employed to achieve a policy goal I regard as immoral. Without diminishing my moral standing to criticize the abhorrent policy goal, I should try to remain open-minded enough to recognize a technique that appears to be effective, and which could be put to use pursuing a more worthy goal. Of course, the more moral baggage associated with an event in history, the more difficult it is for us to achieve this elusive objectivity. At the same time, we don't want to slide down the other slope & pretend that morality & ethics have no light to shed on our studies. The more I learn, the more I see that I need to learn. I have been learning much over the past few months as I read the thoughtful insights of the contributors to these discussions. I expect to keep learning, as long as I live. Thanks for contributing to my learning. |
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#22 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 2,450
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"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, forward to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#23 |
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Registered User
Join Date: Oct 2009
Posts: 3
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All human endeavours are highly context specific. I was trying not to wander too far off the reservation with a philosophical treatise, but sometimes, one's own thoughts can seem overly fascinating.
To more directly address your comment & question, I think it is important to weigh the morality of both goals and techniques. Ideally, we would hope to have a clearly moral goal to pursue, and a toolbox full of clearly moral techniques to choose from as we pursue that goal. I think it would be overly cautious to reject a course of action with no inherent moral fault, just because it appears to have been "tainted" by another's use of that technique to pursue a less acceptable goal. Colonialism is a good example of what I have in mind. Please read in any appropriate caveats; like most human activities, colonialism was fueled by mixed motives. However, I think it's fair to say that modern society, both East & West, are uncomfortable with the colonial heritage. There are sound moral arguments to be made against the exploitative nature of colonialism. Since I haven't walked in the shoes of those who colonized the less developed continents, I won't try to weigh the selfish factors against the generous factors that may have motivated them. I simply note that times have changed, and the older colonial model is not acceptable today, especially when it involves subjugation of both the people and the wealth of the colony. That goal is not acceptable today, and you can use the terms "ethics" and "morality" to describe that fact. However, I have observed that some colonies developed habits of representative government, respect for the rule of law, respect for individual liberties, and other habits & institutions that helped them form relatively stable governments as they became independent. Naturally, the citizens of these former colonies merit our respect for governing themselves effectively. My curiosity, however, causes me to wonder what actions by colonial governments encouraged or discouraged this development. There may be lessons here to learn as we seek to help other unstable societies build the institutions & habits that will allow their citizens to enjoy stability and liberty. I can imagine an otherwise intelligent person saying that we must not copy the policies & procedures of the British Raj, because the goal of exploiting India's wealth was clearly wrong, and therefore, any activity that contributed to that goal is inherently wrong, so we should not use those policies or procedures, even to accomplish a wholly different goal. I will now confess that I know much less than I want to know about colonial administration. There is at least one other thread extant on this topic, & I'm learning from it. Since I know less than I need to know, I can't be very specific about which practices could be adapted to the modern nation-building environment. In the point you questioned, I was alluding to the possibility of using the experience of the India Office & the Foreign & Colonial Office to inform the efforts of modern statesmen to assist residents of unstable countries in developing stable institutions. My concern was that the "taint" of colonialism would keep us from asking whether there is a specific moral concern about whichever specific procedures we are examining. If the (hypothetical) procedure is not inherently wrong, it makes sense to me to use it to further the goal of assisting a nation in building a stable state capable of protecting the lives, liberty and property of its people. Thanks for commenting. Questions make us think more clearly. If it didn't lead me to write more clearly, I apologize. I should have been asleep before I started writing. |
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#24 | ||
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: In Barsoom, as a fact!
Posts: 126
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This is the perception the military has of the NGO. NGO position is less and less clear and orthodox on that particular point. Many would like to find a Leviathan to protect them (first) and the populations (when they are secured). The real question being which political power is found legitimate by NGOs to be respected as a legitimate user of force. I was once discussing the very same issue with a friend from MSF. He came with this comment: “we (MSF) love the rebels. We do not like the official armies of any countries but we love the rebels.” This, for me, resumes all. The main problem with NGO is not they do not like force and the use of force. They want to rebel against any form of authority. But if this is what you see on the ground, this is far from being what you see in the HQ. In all HQ of the world, NGO are doing what governments are telling them. NGO are quite a traditional actor into war. They will be on the side of legitimate power and the more they criticize it, the more their actions are supporting it. Well, in some cases, as in Israel may be, it would not be the case. But otherwise, what you discribe is almost enterely due to NGO/military love/hate relation. |
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#25 | ||
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 2,450
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EG:After Israel evicted the Jordanians from the West Bank in 1967, they became the "occupying power." Occupations can be legitimate, as can protecting yourself by all and any means.
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"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, forward to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#26 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: In Barsoom, as a fact!
Posts: 126
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NGO are the best allies of military power nowadays. They are looking for someone to protect them from weapons carriers or fighters who do not respect their neutral status. The only thing being their legal status in war zones are asking you to be more subtile than brutal. (I even saw mormons funding muslim NGO in Afghanistan.) What is important is the psyop you conduct with. Not against NGO work but to integrate NGO and to win hearts and minds. By definition, for NGO, occupying powers are the bad guys. All you have to do is making sure that you control their funds sources and then NGO have an open position against you but do the job for you. But coordination of aid and harmonised approach is may be the most difficult to achieve. |
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#27 | |||
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 2,450
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I don't want to. I may have to. Especially those who are using NGO status to mask military activity.
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__________________
"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, forward to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#28 |
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Council Member
Join Date: May 2009
Location: Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
Posts: 183
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Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder, is it not? Most actions are seen as legitimate by those doing them, otherwise they wouldn't be taken. Those to whom they are done might have a different perspective, as might the neutral observer. I think one might also find an example or two in history of actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security that actually degraded security in the long run. Military action is often initiated in the name of self-defense or protection; it's a claim that deserves to be scrutinized.
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#29 | ||||
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: In Barsoom, as a fact!
Posts: 126
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As an example I will use a US NGO in Lebanon, in cities under Hezbollah administration. They use to fund huge projects implemented by Hezbollah NGOs and administration. Who was doing masked military activities? The difficulty of using NGO as a weapon is basically found in the fact you cannot destroy your enemy and even less its effects. Social services delivered by the enemy to its population, whatever is the political back ground, will always have better publicity than yours. So you have to turn it in your advantage. It’s by the funds you can do it. Quote:
Your approach of NGO management is too direct. The bargain has to be apparently invisible. NGO will not do what you want for protection. Protecting them is your obligation. What you look at is having NGO doing what you want as part of their general activities. The dichotomy military and civilian has to be respected. (NGO are contesting your moral legitimacy in who is regulating war.) So you have to show that it is you who integrates their network. Quote:
This is as important than to know what the population thinks. In recent conflicts, as Iraq, what has been undermining all is the delay of reinstallation of basic social services and order. The longer you wait before addressing those simple issues, the larger you open the door to insurgency and, if you’re lucky, to civil war between all the factions who are trying to contest you the power vacuum. Civilian will go for the one who will protect them in a large understanding of protection. Occupation is not limited to hold. Hold is a transition phase which has to integrate the roots of build. In my opinion, hold and build are mixed. Separating them is what leads to insurgencies. In somehow, I find ironic this re invention of colonial warfare under new names. ![]() Camps are another issue by the way. They have a different legal status than an occupied land. They also fall under a different organization of political power. Would recommend Michel Agier On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today (http://www.amazon.fr/Margins-World-R...8632871&sr=1-1) and his new book but I do not know if it is available in English: gerer les indesirables des camps de refgier au gouvernement humanitaire. (Managing the unwelcomed, from refugees camps to humanitarian government). |
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#30 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Monterey, CA
Posts: 726
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I was taught to call it METT-TC.
From M-A Lagrange Quote:
The true irony is that we may be paying for others freedom while assisting our economic competitors. So Strange. |
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#31 | |||
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 2,450
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What looks good on day one doesn't look good 3 years later. You can't tell the future and violence is instrumental to what it is used against, not things that have not yet occurred, or may be flow down effects. If folks new their wives would divorce them they wouldn't get married.
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"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, forward to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition Last edited by William F. Owen; 1 Day Ago at 03:08 PM. |
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#32 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: The State of Partachia, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean
Posts: 2,450
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Sorry, nice try and putting their case, but I see no reason to assume that folks not doing exactly what I tell them, are anything more than a major problem, just the same as media folks who are not embedded with me and under my control.
__________________
"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!" ![]() - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya. - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya. Sir Gerald Templer, forward to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition |
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#33 |
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Council Member
Join Date: May 2009
Location: Latitude 17° 5' 11N, Longitude 120° 54' 24E, altitude 1499m. Right where I want to be.
Posts: 183
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Wilf, that approach is likely to earn you a lot of enemies and alienate any friends you have. That's fine if you have the capacity to control everyone around you, all by yourself, all the time, forever. Those of finite capacity might want to consider the possibility that their ability to control may eventually erode to the point where that kind of control is no longer possible. That's especially true of those who need external support and who require the regular consent of their own populace.
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#34 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: New York, NY
Posts: 1,298
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As far as mineral and oil exploitation think that is because both Iraq and Afghanistan represent risk profiles far outside that for most Western corporations. The Chinese, OTOH, are known for their willingness to go to marginal places on marginal contracts, often with thin to nonexistent profit margins in the Western sense. Iraq, for all the progress, remains far more violent and politically unstable than Nigeria, for instance. |
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#35 | ||
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Council Member
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: In Barsoom, as a fact!
Posts: 126
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And please, look at history. Part from Rome (with various success), when did an occupation have good press? Every time someone from outside comes to occupy a land, you can be sure the population will fight to quick the strangers out. This works everywhere, anytime and all the time… It is one of the few things that never change in war. Quote:
Also, colonization was first based on economical relations. Colonial wars were primally used to reinforce dominant positions. Cf Portugese in West Congo, French in West Africa... We first made trade then invaded the place. May be that is the key. One of the calculations of Bush administration was to boost economy through war economy (Invading Iraq). 29 economic crises were solved by WW2. The main difference being the body count (dead do not look for employment). |
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