Economics and Irregular Warfare

[jmm99]

What I speak of (and probably also MAJ Albrich) is the need for a civil legal system (property rights, contract rights, family & inheritance law, and dispute resolution of the same) to allow operation of a functioning economic system.

We take much of that for granted in our organized society. We get the morning newspaper from the box at the end of our sidewalk ("our's" because the property lines are established by deed and plat; the newspaper because the paper carrier has been invited onto our property to deliver it; contract made and performed because we subscribed to the newspaper).

In our society, the vast bulk of legal events are part of the civil legal system, which operates fairly seamlessly without need for lawyers and courts.

In the Astan of 40 years ago, the civil legal system on a local village level was a triangular arrangement of village elders (shura or jirga - language dependent), the local mullah and the local "big man" (malik, district officer or local warlord). In the chaos of two generations of armed conflict, the traditional tribal legal system disintegrated in many areas, along with whatever educational system existed.

As nature abhors a vacuum, so does law. So, various legal systems developed: those of the Taliban, regional warlords and drug lords. Now, we do not generally look at these as "legal systems" (often not that much in writing, but rules nonetheless). The villagers probably would have preferred their age-old traditional local institutions; but, in chaos, power and law flow from the barrel with the largest bore. In effect, the villagers have to select the best kind of insecurity that will allow their economic survival, which is often at the subsistence level or below (credits: Marc Legrange).

Now, the police power obviously has something to do with all of this - if the police power carries the largest bore cannon, and if it is going to remain at the village level to enforce its own brand of security or insecurity. Add to that, the development of locally-based security forces as a necessity.

The question then becomes whether the police power is going to impose its own brand of law (civil and criminal), as well as its ideas of economic and educational development; or whether it will seek to restore, as much as possible, the once stable traditional legal institutions; and to assist that economic and educational development needed to raise the villagers above the subsistence level (which to them would be "security") with minimum manipulation of their normal lifestyle (credits: Jim Gant).

STP is right on point with his Iraqi examples. Astan is a much more primitive case; and the less sophistication imposed, so much the better.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

JMM:

True. True.

But in Iraq, the civilian side spent far too much time on writing US federal things like national banking and stock market laws years before they were really ripe and needed.

Instead, the majority of our daily lives are defined by small scale regulations and complex webs of "agreed" standards (sometimes enforceable).

Personally, I spend a tremendous amount of time in my private consulting practice on regulatory and finance/budget compliance issues. And its these little, yet standardized practices and regulations, that are what keeps our society functioning without having to have a lawyer in everyone's speed dial.

Whether styled as formal or informal systems, they are the Rules of Law that we commonly understand.

In Afghanistan, it seems logical that the systems JMM described really are the current functional norms, but as he notes, these are not the systems that governed things before. They are the aberations resulting from war, and stable replacement systems have not yet been established or applied.

What good is a properly recorded deed if you can't occupy "your" house?

[Surferbeetle]

H/T to Bill...

PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal

Historians have often used a 1966 Army report nicknamed PROVN
either to cast aspersions on the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam
between 1964 and 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, or to
praise his successor, General Creighton Abrams. This interpretation is
simplistic and inaccurate. Although the report criticized aspects of the
war under Westmoreland, its target was really the U.S. and Vietnamese
governments. Moreover, PROVN’s conclusions were less radical
and its remedies less novel than observers have tended to admit. A
fresh look at PROVN reveals significant continuities in thought between
Westmoreland, the report, and Abrams.

If the importance of security was well understood by the Army, so, too, was the notion that political and socioeconomic reforms were also necessary. The U.S. Army had a long tradition of making institutional reform a part of its counterinsurgency, nation-building, and constabulary activities, and it had readily accepted Walt W. Rostow's thesis that socioeconomic change was a key weapon in the fight against the spread of communism in the third world.21

[Surferbeetle]

H/T to Slapout

Rand Monograph R0462, Rebellion and Authority, An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts by: Nathan Constantin Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr.

Economic reasoning applied to an analysis of rebellion and authority yields some new conclusions about both. Fundamentally, the struggle for popular support is not exclusively or primarily a "political" contest as these terms are usually understood. People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population. One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point. (Also published by Markham Publishing Company, 1970.)

[Bill Moore]

People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.

We have ignored the wisdom in this post for years, and I don't recall our COIN/FID doctrine adequately addressing this. To conduct effective COIN you must employ an effective (situation specfic) population control measures and methods to mobilize (counter organize) the populace, and "eliminate" negative influences (don't compete with them, this isn't a legal political contest) instead of blindly building schools, roads, and spreading messages of good cheer, all the while leaving the political warfare victory to the enemy.

The caveat is equally important:

One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point.

[Surferbeetle]

In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

Private schools flourish in Hawaii, even though families take on substantial debt (along with the associated risks), because parts of the public school system are unable to provide their charges the skills necessary to compete in and among a global workforce. The cost/benefit equation used by parents in Hawaii includes a time variable which is greater than 12 months.

In Iraq how many packs of kids did we both see roaming the streets and seeing and participating in things that kids should not see or do? Will these kids be constructively competing with our kids in the global workforce or will our kids be seeing them on future battlefields?

In short, focusing upon only the violence or school variables does not solve the multivariate cost/benefit equation associated with war.

Rand Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations By: Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry M. Sollinger, Kayla M. Williams

This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.

[Bill Moore]

Surferbettle,

And a Merry Christmas to you and yours. Promise I'll read your enclosed study before the New Year.

Don't disagree with anything you wrote (seriously); however, my point has been and remains that building schools doesn't counter active insurgencies. Over a longer time line (assuming they're well managed and have adequate teachers) they will enable more capable socieities by developing the human potential (I'm a believer), but ss we both know it is hard for kids to go to school when there is still a shooting war going on, it is bad enough when there is simply gang warfare in the vicinity of the school (Chicago, Miami, LA, etc.).

Let's focus first on how to deal with the active insurgency. From your previous post,

What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.

IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization. To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.

Dr. Kilcullen obviously explains it much better in his book, but his example of building a road in one province as a tool to actively organize the people against the Taliban (I need to review my notes, but in general it was more than building a road, there was a reason behind it beyond economics). He demonstrates it can be effective. In short I think you can be effective with your approach if you connect all the dots and tie those efforts to the greater cause. Bill

[MikeF]

First, Leites and Wolf is a classic. The old Rand Corp set the bar high for think-tanks, and they provide great work on small wars. When I have a chance, I'll see if I can find their piece on the Malaya Emergency for posting. In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intevention points when accurately defined. An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them), but they need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive. With that said, on to Surferbeetle's points...

In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close). So, what do we do with the denied areas while Surferbeetle is revamping the protected areas? Five current options:

1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
5. Do nothing.

The first three options have high potential pay-offs, but come with high risks/costs. The fourth option may disrupt over-time, but the results are hard to measure. The fifth option is very dangerous IMO.

Mike

[slapout9]

Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

[Surferbeetle]

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

Slap,

I appreciated the study. It was an interesting read and provides a number of ideas to consider...my pdf library grows ever larger.

[Surferbeetle]

I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

Mike,

We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.
2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.
3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.
4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

Let’s also briefly touch upon an organizing and operating principle of Civil Affairs-bubbas.

According to the story, some travelers come to a village, carrying nothing more than an empty pot. Upon their arrival, the villagers are unwilling to share any of their food stores with the hungry travelers. The travelers fill the pot with water, drop a large stone in it, and place it over a fire in the village square. One of the villagers becomes curious and asks what they are doing. The travelers answer that they are making "stone soup", which tastes wonderful, although it still needs a little bit of garnish to improve the flavor, which they are missing. The villager doesn't mind parting with just a little bit of flour to help them out, so it gets added to the soup. Another villager walks by, inquiring about the pot, and the travelers again mention their stone soup which hasn't reached its full potential yet. The villager hands them a little bit of seasoning to help them out. More and more villagers walk by, each adding another ingredient. Finally, a delicious and nourishing pot of soup is enjoyed by all.

My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.

I agree.

No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos.

Gaaahhhh!!!! I would need chains to ride my motorcycle...

[Ross Wherry]

Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

Slapout sums it up neatly.

Whether it's Colombia, Sinaloa, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon. The motive is acquisition of power, and that power rests on finances/economics, discriminate use of force, and acquiesence by the population to the rules and benefits adminstered by the insurgent or criminal. The unworthy government that RAND would have us beware of, too often looks similar to the black hats when viewed from the village level.

Many billions later, we seem to be arguing which of the three legs is themost important. Unfortunately, the insurgent/criminal seems able to stand on only one leg if he has to.

[Steve the Planner]

Ross:

I read a few Rand Studies on COIN/CIVMIL stuff. I don't think they even know how to begin to understand the problems---so they just throw jargon at them and keep moving.

No doubt, you've seen you share of that klind of advice.

Steve

[Rex Brynen]

The unworthy government that RAND would have us beware of, too often looks similar to the black hats when viewed from the village level.

Indeed, even a "worthy" government --which we're light years away from in Afghanistan--can still look rather unappealing to populations who (while wanting greater access to resources) also rather prize their current local autonomy.

Many billions later, we seem to be arguing which of the three legs is the most important. Unfortunately, the insurgent/criminal seems able to stand on only one leg if he has to.

Plus they don't have to sit through endless facile powerpoints about "3D", all-of-government approaches. That prospect alone would be enough to get me to join the Taliban