It is a good read and it makes you think. But I don't think he is exactly right or exactly wrong.
One of the things he says is that because GEN Petraeus says - although Afghanistan is not Iraq, some of the principles wrt COIN learned in Iraq are applicable in Afghanistan - that this means those principles now drive our thinking on Afghanistan, and by extension drive all our operational thinking. For me, and for many I know, the idea expressed by GEN Petraeus is similar to other principles, or fundamental things you want to consider given conditions and objectives. There are similarities between the two operational environments I think when you consider we are the most foreign element there and that the enemy is using that to their advantage, and we may want to make it a disadvantage, or at least contest it. The desire to contest it or deny it to the enemy support multiple ways, however in light of political objectives (stated, inferred or likely to be acceptable) those ways are at least somewhat constrained for better or worse to an approach which secures the population and isolates it from the enemy - it is perhaps just who we are.
A second thing I disagree with is that COIN has become the issue which will define us as a military or an an army. While it may be the one which occupies a significant amount our current efforts this seems appropriate given that it has been the constituted the bulk of the chosen operational approach by the commanders charged with achieving some sort of political objective tolerable to the United States. This is the generating force responding to the operational requirements described by those CDRs - theaters which consume the bulk of our ground force structure, and drive force generation. COL Gentile can make the argument that their operational approaches are flawed, but he does not have the responsibility to solve the political problem that they do.
I'm not sure how much journalists and think tankers really drive operational thinking either. I believe to some degree they may believe they do, but I think generally they pick up on what they hear, or see being done and do a good (sometimes no so good) job at describing and articulating it. For those not in uniform, it may appear they have significant influence, but most of the ideas I've read from them I can trace back to some man or woman in uniform who was confronted with a problem and either started doing something that worked, or kept saying it loud enough till someone listened. What they do provide is a means to get things out to people who would not listen because they believe if it came from the military it can't possibly be right. To wit, innovation and adaptation are alive and well in the ranks - after all, platoon sergeants still teach lieutenants that in some cases its better to ask forgiveness than permission.
I'm not sure but I don't think there is a task breakdown for COIN that walks you from an overarching mission task to supporting collective tasks, leader tasks and individual tasks. If there is not I'm not sure we can really measure what COIN capabilities we have, or what capacities we have in those capabilities. So, I just don't see the evidence that that it has reshaped our thinking and our force management practices to a point where we are posturing to be a Pop-Centric COIN force to support nation building.
What I have seen is a push to ensure we plan for the range of things we may have to do because: we planned to do them; were told to do them; or created conditions which required us to do them. I've been seeing it in our experimentation, and in our PME - which I think is a good indication of how we are posturing for the future. I think our other DOTMLPF processes are following suit - and I believe this supports a more capable force.
Now - where I do agree with COL Gentile's argument. I have grown tired of hearing, "its the hardest thing we've ever done, or will ever do", and "its the graduate level of war". Really, so events like the amphibious landings in WWII and Inchon or even Grant's Wilderness campaign simply don't compare? WWII was a real cake walk right? "Hard" is a relative term. It may be the hardest thing we've done in a while, or the hardest thing we've done this year - it may even be harder than comparative operations - but it is a relative term. How about crossing the Zagros - would that be hard? How about fighting in N. Korea - would that be hard? Truth is I think its all hard, and I think war as opposed to training is the graduate level - meaning you've graduated from training and now your doing the work you trained for. Every man and woman who serves in combat gets a graduate degree in war.
I thank COL Gentile for continuing to stress our thinking on this issue, even while I disagree with him. The greatest danger may be that we get to comfortable with the status quo, and get intellectually lazy.
Best, Rob
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