How to handle "insurgencies" - what I've learned so far are that there are two main branches (the second with two sub-branches):
1. Employ the Military Struggle, with or without diplomacy, argument and discussion (which to me suggests dealing with leaders, not the masses ) - as per Wilf.
2. Employ both the Military Struggle and the Political Struggle and reach down to the people in either of two ways:
2a. Population-centric, which looks more to the physical separation of the population from the insurgents, and control of the population; along with a large number of TTPs which look to reinforcing the legitimacy of the HN government - as in FM 3-24 et al.
2b Populace-centric (the term coined by Bob Jones, but what follows is not claimed as a summary of his theories), which is more a reverse-Mao approach using such concepts as "from the masses, back to the masses" (as to the Narrative) and "mobilization of the masses" (turning them into active strugglers, either military or political, against the insurgents). Basically, this follows the concepts from the 1960s of John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (good book; reprint available from Hailer Publishing).
As to 2a, a problem exists if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads cuz the HN Narrative (if truthfully framed) is not likely to gain purchase among the masses; and if not truthfully framed, its contradictions will cause it to sink. So, in the absence of a valid Narrative, population-centric COIN is left with the Military Struggle and a bunch of TTPs. The problem is multiplied where third-party COIN is involved cuz the Assisting Nation has to not only swallow the HN Narrative without puking, but also prepare and sell an AN Narrative acceptable to its own population - a difficult task if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads.
As to 2b, the HN Narrative will be acceptable to the masses cuz that where it came from ("from the masses, back to the masses" - an interactive process of the masses, the HN government and the AN government if on scene). But, if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads, the narrative from the masses is not likely to be accepted. E.g., the masses say we want an anti-corruption, anti-feudal and anti-foreign agenda. The HN government cannot grant that agenda if it is corrupt, controlled by vested interests and in bed with a foreign power. If the AN government takes up the causes of the masses, it in effect would be mounting a revolution against the incumbant HN government.
In any event, those are the three major counter-insurgency strategies which I have learned here (albeit as I see them). All of those strategies are subject to Bill Moore's caveats about the spectrum of conventional and unconventional warfare.
There is a fourth strategy not much discussed here (given the overwhelming emphasis on COIN[*]), which is that of Peace Enforcement, whose doctrine is found in Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Chap III), and in a host of other publications.
That strategy is quite flexible and can be very robust and conventional (e.g., the Korean War). The advantage to the Assisting Nation is that it can frame its AN Narrative in peace enforcement terms; and it can call both sides knuckleheads and attribute fault and harm where it is deserved; and direct its big bores and small bores at whichever side needs knocking.
Perhaps, we (US) should be looking at Peace Enforcement as a primary option when we are deciding on the COA to take in our foreign interventions (or force projections, if that term is preferred).
Credits to Jon Custis for the term "knuckleheads" - I like that.
Attached is a chart illustrating my view of the Political Struggle and Military Struggle:
Politics-Military Struggles.jpg
It is strategy-neutral (the law follows the strategy selected).
Regards
Mike
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[*] To this civilian, COL Gentile's concerns (valid in part) seem overkill - a type of argument worthy of a lawyer's brief - e.g., emphasis added:
Really; is it "really nothing more" ? I don't get that from the myriad of Joint publication; and I believe that our Soldiers and Marines will get it right, despite everyone's inability to predict what the "next war" will look like.But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from the new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy. Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of COIN principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the media, emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians. The result is a strategy of tactics and principles.
Anyway, the proper mix of conventional and unconventional training and readiness is not my province; but an issue for the Army and Corps to resolve.
See this thread started by Cavguy.
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