The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[Steve the Planner]

Michelle:

Agree that we are probably reaching a word (and concept) limit without further input.

By now, I suspect we are debating an early draft that has already cleaned up a lot.

I'm actually looking to understand more about how it deals with the future.

Unspoken in a lot of the discussion is, in fact, how much we are seeking to adapt past solutions to current and future problems. It is both a human and organizational foundation.

My best guess is that when we are in a place with a confused mission, we are always vulnerable. No matter how big or how many resources are committed.

The one question which I feel confident about as a future scenario is neither winning nor losing in long-term festering problems that we, as a nation, will not commit so abundantly to as to pursue a definitive end, but for which we have some minimum objectives that do not fully encompass controlling the people, land and resources, psychologically or physically.

Is that a realistic scenario for the future, and how does the Army prepare for that?

Steve

[slapout9]

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf



The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.

I posted that article when it first came out because of his discussion of action theory although he says the theory is not well known any Cop will tell you the motive comes first....even crazy people have a motive. He discusses some of the drawbacks of thinking of Strategy as Ends,Ways and Means. Really Good Stuff in there.

[William F. Owen]

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf

There are so many things wrong with that article, I hardly know where to begin. Prominent among the errors is the assertion that the Luftwaffe bombed London to force a capitulation. - Completely untrue.

The author also says,

We can avoid the logical error of instrumentalism (that which may work in practice, but not in theory) only by disclosing our paper trail of reasoning.

WHAT? If he seriously believes that, then how does he define the purpose of Strategy? Surely Strategy is INSTRUMENTAL! - It is used to get something done!
If the secret of SOD is merely holding reasoning and assumption to rigour, then why not say that. Theory you cannot put into effective practice or use to inform practice is utterly useless.
The role of "theory" in military thought is to check the relationships between intentions, practices and actions. The primary source of useful military theory is history. - which SOD seems mostly to ignore.

1.) There is no evidence that SOD is any better or more valid an idea than Manoeuvre Warfare or EBO - there is simply no reason (body of evidence) to believe this.

2.) I hate to rain on the author's parade, but there is substantial evidence that the flow down effects of SOD were very much responsible for problems in the Lebanon. He talks of "Israeli SOD Theorists" - I know of only one, and his standing is not high, except in the US SOD commercial consultant world.

3.) There are no "ethics" in military theory. The ethical dimension is merely how well or poorly a course of action sets forth the policy! Killing civilians generally undermines political objectives. - More over this is a bizarrely "White Christian" view of the world. Many many folks in the world consider killing civilians to be the heart of their strategy.

So yes, the article is nice convoluted wordy romp through various philosophy and theory, but so what?

[Null Hypothesis]

From page 16: "Consistent Messages and Actions. Because future operation will occur in and among the people, under the unblinking eye of the media, and against threats savvy enough to present competing narratives, Army actions and messages must be congruent with and consistent with policy and objectives."

Redundant because the Army should be acting within policy and objectives in the first place (commander's intent?).

Confusing because it addresses the obvious with an air of presenting a unique solution.

When was the last time the Army presented a congruent and consistent message in a timeframe useful to the maneuver commander that didn't take thousands of staff hours to produce, let alone in an environment where there is an enemy actively trying to kill them?

Recommend fixing the title to something less wordy. Perhaps, "War."

nh

[SJPONeill]

I just finished working my way through the draft. I hope that it is as has been said previously an early draft that has been polished up since. It definitely reads like a document that has a number of drafters who have worked in isolation and then complied the document. While I believe that the intent for this capstone publication is admirable, from it's current form it still has a long way to go.

If there is one single recommendation, I would make, it is that it needs to be placed in the hands of someone who really knows how to write. Its written structure is horrible with massive sentences and paragraphs that mix ideas and concepts in a most unuser-friendly manner. There is some great content in it but extracting it is just too hard - as it is I doubt you could get too many troops reading a publication that should be as well-thumbed by junior leaders as by senior ones.

My notes file is too big to upload here so will forward it back via our TRADOC LNO.

[Bill Jakola]

In furthering the Army's emphasis on developing leaders to succeed in the complexities of the operational environment, now and in the future, TRADOC produced a strategy that DA officially released, on 25 November. I wanted to ensure you all received this Leader Development Strategy. Additionally, we will publish an annex to this strategy for each cohort—NCO, warrant officer, and officer—in a portfolio of initiatives that will provide specific implementation detail. What do you all think about this strategy?

[RTK]

In furthering the Army's emphasis on developing leaders to succeed in the complexities of the operational environment, now and in the future, TRADOC produced a strategy that DA officially released, on 25 November. I wanted to ensure you all received this Leader Development Strategy. Additionally, we will publish an annex to this strategy for each cohort—NCO, warrant officer, and officer—in a portfolio of initiatives that will provide specific implementation detail. What do you all think about this strategy?

Where is this officially posted? Thanks.

[Bill Jakola]

The Army website should have it up, but I did not see it there yet. I will track it down and get back to you. Also, the TRADOC website should have a News Story and link up as well.

[Rob Thornton]

Such an environment demands that we develop leaders who understand the context of the factors influencing the military situation, act within that understanding, continually assess and adapt those actions based on the interactions and circumstances of the enemy and environment, consolidate tactical and operational opportunities into strategic aims, and be able to effectively transition from one form of operations to another. We seek to develop leaders who will thrive in this environment.

It has been my observation that when the next echelon of leaders understand the mission in terms of the task and purpose, and by understand I mean they really understand all the supporting collective, leader and individual tasks that go into it, it is then that they feel free to allow greater subordinate decision making and initiative. That is how they weigh and assume risk, and develop their own risk mitigation measures (bigger reserve, alternative COAs, etc.)

To support this shift in the next higher leader echelon during training and operations which supports our leader development goals, the defining of the tasks (and their supporting tasks) in conditions where the standard tactical tasks are inadequate is needed. At the experiments, AARs (of all types), and theater collection efforts I’ve participated in, reviewed or seen, I’ve not seen more than a skin deep attempt to document or create the list of tasks individuals and units have done (or would be required to do in the case of experimentation).

Part of this may be where we catch people in theater or upon their return, part of it also may be the way we collect – I’m not completely sure. Those interviewed may not have deemed it critical for one reason or another, they may have assumed it was something that someone else should have done but could not, or it could just be that because we caught them at the end of their tour, the tasks that stood out were those that were strongly rooted in emotion.

With respect to experimentation it may just be due to resources, and the way seminar war games, and other forms of experimentation are structured. It would take a great deal more time, and detailed information about the environment that really replicates the frictions that impose the types of unanticipated tasks on us that actual operations do. It would also require an increase in analytic capacity I think to be present in the experiment so more than just the big rocks are captured.

I think until we can identify the range of tasks that we expect individuals and units may have to do (either because it is part of the identified mission, or because the other folks we’d prefer to be doing those tasks are not present or able) in the COE, then we won’t be able to really look at what individual or unit capabilities are required, and we will not be able to look at how training, education, assignments and other leader development opportunities, etc. need to be tweaked to support it. We will not be able to tell ourselves what we want leaders at each level to be capable of doing, and we won’t be able to allow them to stretch their authorities and initiatives to develop them. After all, just because the right, or identified person, unit or agency is unavailable to do a task does not mean the requirement goes away. However, I do think not understanding the tasks, and not knowing which capabilities are required to do those tasks conflicts with our leader development goals as stated in the paper.

While some work has been done in task analysis, from what I have seen it has largely been limited to work groups which convene for a 2-3 day period somewhere, and because of self imposed constraints have been somewhat limited to looking at how existing identified tasks might fit somewhere else vs. looking at the a problem or objective and describing the over arching task(s), and then doing the difficult and time consuming work of task decomposition that produces the type of supporting collective, leader and individual tasks that we have in our list of “tactical tasks” and which we have spent years developing training strategies and resources around.


Ken's recent comments (ref. Niel's article) raised another related question: what artificial constraints do we impose into the environment that either facilitate this, or hinder it?


Best Rob

[marct]

Ken's recent comments (ref. Niel's article) raised another related question: what artificial constraints do we impose into the environment that either facilitate this, or hinder it?

Some great comments, Rob. Since I'm tied up with other stuff, I just want to address your last question which, IMHO, is really a crucial one.

As far as "artificial constraints" are concerned, for the purposes of this answer, I want to define "artificial" as "systems constructed by humans", just to avoid the possible understanding of it as that+ an emotional connotation of wasted resources .

Okay, probably the most important and easily observable system is the HR / personelle system. This is intimately tied in with leader development and pretty much every aspect of training and operations. This system controls both the day-to-day lived reality of most people in terms of extra paperwork, boxes that have to checked for promotion, etc., etc., ad nauseum. It is also crucial in defining the status system the Army is operating under or, to be more accurate, the formal status system. It does absolutely no good, and quite a bit of long term harm, to develop, say, an excel;lent junior leader program and then not have that impact their career paths positively both formally (e.g maybe a merit pay raise for excellent performance) or phenomenologically (i.e. they still see useless twits commanding them).

A second system is really cultural at the policy level. Leadership, as with most things, is a composite of a skill set that can be taught and a talent that is inborn. If you've got a really good talent, the training should bring that out and enhance it. having said that, the model I assume exists (and there is a lot to support it), says that any one-size-fits-all policy model will encourage the pursuit of mediocrity. This basically means that recognized and supported career paths have to include what might be called "excellence in place"; this avoids the Peter Principle. It also means that you have to have parallel career paths defined by talent groups.

At any rate, that's where my thinking is running at the moment.

Cheers,

Marc

[Bill Jakola]

Okay, the Combined Arms Center will post the ALDS on their website, on 10 December. Here is a link to the CAC website.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

Also, the TRADOC website should have a story out soon.

http://www.army.mil/info/organizatio...ucture/tradoc/

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Marc,

Good comment, and you are right, I did mean artificial as man made - more specifically - not necessarily required for the system to operate, and possibly contrary to the system to operate at its best (more/most effective).

Constraints could be to the benefit (looking for a specific tolerance) or the detriment of the desired outcome (wrong tolerance and/or out of tolerance relative to the needs). The ability to affect these constraints (policies, biases, etc.) could be within a service's or organization's ability while others (in this case particularly those that are legislated and politically sensitive) may be beyond its ability to affect. They could also be hard to root out, but I think begins with developing an understanding of how the system really operates relative to how we desire it to operate, and what the effects are of our constraints. Then leadership can take better steps in modifying the system - hopefully adding some kind of measure to see if its now producing within the desired tolerances, and if in fact the new tolerance fits the actual requirement.

I'm sure that sounds mechanistic, but it is a "production system", and the bigger the system (be it PME, recruiting and assessment, universities, training programs,etc.), the more the output is going to look like a "product". The smaller the system (e.g. down at a company or BN level), the more control you have over the output, and the more it can be tailored to specific conditions - even to do as a mentor of mine recommends "putting round pegs in round holes".

The question is how good do you want that product to be relative to the requirement? - again, in this case I think that means defining the tasks you want your people to be capable of executing to reasonable standard at a specific time (position and/or grade) - the product in this case is individual leader capability. If you cannot name and define the tasks then the output (capability) probably does not vary much from where you were - and you are probably limited on your ability to affect the constraints and provide rationale for change.

I also needed to make a clarification on what I meant by identify and mitigate risk - I was referring to the ability to see the broader range of implications or outcomes associated with an action and then consider if it is the right or best possible action, and if it is, then to prepare to deal with the outcome. I bring this up because I have seen "mitigation" used to mean "avoid" which is not what I had in mind, and often results in greater risk to mission and those conducting it.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

Constraints could be to the benefit (looking for a specific tolerance) or the detriment of the desired outcome (wrong tolerance and/or out of tolerance relative to the needs). The ability to affect these constraints (policies, biases, etc.) could be within a service's or organization's ability while others (in this case particularly those that are legislated and politically sensitive) may be beyond its ability to affect. They could also be hard to root out, but I think begins with developing an understanding of how the system really operates relative to how we desire it to operate, and what the effects are of our constraints. Then leadership can take better steps in modifying the system - hopefully adding some kind of measure to see if its now producing within the desired tolerances, and if in fact the new tolerance fits the actual requirement.

I'm sure that sounds mechanistic, but it is a "production system", and the bigger the system (be it PME, recruiting and assessment, universities, training programs,etc.), the more the output is going to look like a "product".

For a while now, I've been fascinated by how we, as a species, reify (aka "turn into as 'thing'") our interpersonal interactions and ascribe characteristics to that reification. What truly fascinates me is not that we do this but, rather, that as part of the process of doing it, we have to forget that we have done it. I would really love to see an MRI-based study on the neurological effects of becoming part of an organizational culture, since I suspect that there are actually reflections of that process in brain re-wiring.

That, BTW, is not a tangent - it is directly related to your comment about this sounding 'mechanistic". What I am getting at with it, is that whatever socio-technical systems (STSs) we create, they will have physical (and neurological) effects on the people who are part of them that will condition the probabilities of those systems being able to "produce" people capable of performing certain types of tasks. In effect, these STSs act as additional boundary criteria for natural selection.

The smaller the system (e.g. down at a company or BN level), the more control you have over the output, and the more it can be tailored to specific conditions - even to do as a mentor of mine recommends "putting round pegs in round holes".

Yup, and one of the reasons is actually tied in to the "span of control" problem, which is a sub-set of communications restrictions. Think about it this way: if I know the men under my command from having lived and worked with them, I have a much more nuanced understanding of them that if I only have their service records.

But, in any organization over a certain size (~1-2k), I have to use an exceedingly sparse and formalized system (service records) in order top "know" them. This "knowledge storage/transmission system", in turn, is designed to highlight minimum factors that, earlier in its life cycle, were deemed to be "important" (there's always a time lag, sometimes decades or even centuries long in this). Now this type of system is designed to abstract perceived "core information" about a person and use a standardized form to do so; it is a "mechanistic" system in the sense of interchangeable parts, and it really cannot guarantee "production" of anything more than satisficing behaviour (i.e. minimal standards; they haven't failed - yet).

But if we are talking about producing highly adaptive perceptions in people and rapid problem solving in messy problem space, that is not amenable to a system designed to produce satisficing behaviour in a "clean" problem space. If we want to do this, then we have to use a system that is differently designed, and that is where I was tagging into the strategies discussion of using "mentors". Now, a mentorship model is based on an apprenticeship system that derives out of para-kinship systems. It is much more flexible, generally has much higher minimal standards and, at the same time, tends to be much more labour intensive simply because a lot of time has to be spent working with an individual rather than an amorphous group. BTW, this ties back in to that span of control and communications problem thingy.

The question is how good do you want that product to be relative to the requirement? - again, in this case I think that means defining the tasks you want your people to be capable of executing to reasonable standard at a specific time (position and/or grade) - the product in this case is individual leader capability. If you cannot name and define the tasks then the output (capability) probably does not vary much from where you were - and you are probably limited on your ability to affect the constraints and provide rationale for change.

I'd have to say yes and no. Defining tasks and desired standards is a crucial capability, but that defines what is considered to be satisficing behaviour. In that sense, yes it is crucial, since it is defining the minimum acceptable level of accomplishment in a standardized form. Okay, that works well enough, but it can only capture the predictable, and about half of what the strategy implies it wants to develop is reactions to the unpredictable. See the problem ?

Now there certainly are ways of defining tasks, broadly construed, to capture the, hmmm, let's call it the "predictable unexpected"; that, after all, is one of the reasons for having wargames. But how do we "train" people for this? Standardized training only works with standardized problem spaces so, ideally, we use a melding of standardized training and highly individual education / experience. From some of the stuff I have done, I would estimate that about 80% of the required changes lie in the individual student's head; their perceptions and knowledge of themselves - sort of a "know thyself" on steroids.

In the strategy document, "mentoring" is used as a rhetorical silver bullet to get around this problem, which is why i can only comment in general terms on the document until I start to see some operational details.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

So many things are wrong with this it's hard to know where to begin

....and on our assessment that the future operational environment will be even more uncertain, complex, and competitive as hybrid threats challenge us across the full spectrum of operations.

More uncertain? More complex? Where's the evidence and so what? This is drivel and it gets worse:

Our enemies – regular and irregular – will be well armed, well trained, well equipped, and often ideologically inspired. We must overmatch their training with our training and with the development of our leaders. We must counter their ideologies with our history and with a sustained commitment to our values.

When was not being well trained an option, and ideology IS POLITICS!!! History is not one the problems.

All this paper had to do was say why good leadership HAS ALWAYS BEEN CRITICAL in ALL WARFARE and how the US was going to fix the problem. Instead it decided to invent a set of reasons as to why the problem didn't need fixing before, but now... SUDDENLY... it does!

Basically it starts bad and gets worse. I could go on, but I see little point.

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Sure does set the bar low on the intel and expectations side.

Assume we go into each future complex problem set without a clue or goal, and that our opponent (who sometimes didn't graduate an equivalent of high school and controls no satellites or PhD farms) knows everything.

Where is the challenge to get ahead of background understandings, to develop responses, including non-military ones, before the problem, whether military or not, is dumped in DoD's lap as the agency of last resort for actions beyond US borders?

If I agreed with the above, I would, as an organization, start thinking about defining my enemy as internal, and beginning to understand how to out-game them before they game me.

At that point, none of it is about anything within a reasonable scope of a Department of Defense.

Steve

[William F. Owen]

Wilf:

Sure does set the bar low on the intel and expectations side.

If you cannot get the high bar then set the bar low

Assume we go into each future complex problem set without a clue or goal, and that our opponent (who sometimes didn't graduate an equivalent of high school and controls no satellites or PhD farms) knows everything.

Complex problems? I think you mean conflicts or wars, don't you? What does history show you? How did the US Army fail in Vietnam, Korea, and Mogadishu? Those alone are reasons for upping the bar... and it never was. So why now?

Where is the challenge to get ahead of background understandings, to develop responses, including non-military ones, before the problem, whether military or not, is dumped in DoD's lap as the agency of last resort for actions beyond US borders?

The challenge is the job. Nothing is more difficult than warfare. Non-military responses should not be something done by the military.

Seriously, the paper is predicated on a series of mythical problems. I know why it is doing this, but its a bad thing to do. Why invent a whole range of imagined complexities when the evidence shows the normal everyday conflict is in fact the problem most are finding very hard to imagine and this cannot prepare for.

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Right. I just got finished jotting a response to one of Tom Ricks' Iraq the Unravellings re: a briefing at USIP by MG Caslen who just returned from MND-North en route to Tradoc.

No sense from him that he was confused or overwhelmed by any complex problems. I was very comfortable that he knows what he is looking at, and how to approach/learn/respond to what comes along.

Here's my post:

"Today, MG Caslen, who just left command of my old stomping grounds, MND-North (Northern Iraq), gave a very good account of things.

He explained that at first he was highly reluctant to back out of Ninewa, seeking a SOFA Waiver. Odierno convinced him to try, and he was very pleased with the result---Iraqi Army did step up, proud to take responsibility for their country.

Is it perfect? No. And it wasn't before June 30. In fact, last week, Salah ad Din's lead anti-terrorist investigator was blown up in Tikrit with his deputies.

But, according to MG Caslen, the provincial election made a big difference in the effectiveness of governance in the North. The post-2005 provincial governments were weak and ineffective (the Sunni Boycott impact), but, according to the American guy most likely to know, the new officials are more focused, engaged, and respected; side-benefits? Violence down.

Diyala has been a substantially unstable place since.... the days of the Silk Road. Many confluences that persistently result, over time and history, in periods of substantial instability. Iran border. A gateway in the Qom to Mecca religious path. Mixed populations: Sunni, Shia, Feehly Kurds, Kurds, Turkomen.MEK.

The KRG issue remains unresolved as it has since the 1920's when the idea of a Kurdish State emerged in advance of the organization and resources to establish/maintain it. Times always change, but historical opportunities only come and go.

Beyond Iraq, the influence of neighbors can be a curse and a blessing, but Turkish/KRG relations are strengthening, according to the General, with good results.

Tom's pictures from Diyala hit anyone in the gut, and they are, in most instances, intended to have that effect. But, behind the radicals, there are 28 million moms, dads and kids who just want to get on with life. Maybe their odds will improve AFTER the next elections...

Not perfect, but my enjoyment of Iraqis I met, and respect for their challenges, leads me to continue to cross my fingers for them (and sometimes hold my breath)."

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

One of the first things I discovered in December 2007 was that the provincial boundary maps were all screwed up, and the brigades were aligned to battlespace, and not provincial boundaries.

Might be fine for war, but a real problem for peace-building. Salah ad Din, for example was split among four different brigades---and each was getting into civ/mil stuff like provincial budget execution. Needed valet parking for all the mil leaders who wanted to get into the provincial governance building.

I spent six months figuring out the actual boundaries, and, by the time MG Caslen came in in Oct 2008, the brigades were redeployed by province.

So I sat at his brief looking at the slide that showed the Ninewa Brigade including Mahkmur, which the US thought for a long time was actually and formally a part of Irbil.

All I could think was that if you fight long enough for something, and it makes sense, the Army will do it, even if only in the last year. And a little quiet pride in my small contribution.

How does the saying go? Try everything until, at last, trying the right thing.

Steve

[William F. Owen]

Steve the Planner

Mate, all fascinating, but with respect, so what? Seriously, what is the big problem? Seriously, the agenda here from the "WOW-COIN" generation is to try and say that today A'Stan and Iraq are more "complex" than was Vietnam, the Lebanon and/or even Mogadishu.

Really? Does anyone really believe that?

[PhilR]

Steve the Planner

Mate, all fascinating, but with respect, so what? Seriously, what is the big problem? Seriously, the agenda here from the "WOW-COIN" generation is to try and say that today A'Stan and Iraq are more "complex" than was Vietnam, the Lebanon and/or even Mogadishu.

Really? Does anyone really believe that?

I would extend it to say that we have a generation that think WWII and Korea, etc. was also "simple." I don't think our histories, or how we teach them, necessarily do those conflicts justice. We have created a strawman of "conventional operations" which makes a convenient foil for Irregular/COIN, etc.
I really reject complexity arguments of scale--"more complex", etc. Each conflict is different and each has its own characteristics and distinct complexities.