COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Steve the Planner]

For comparison, here is a map of Ninewa using the district and sub-district maps from the legislatively adopted maps (through 1976).


Steve

[Wargames Mark]

...Amen.

[slapout9]

For comparison, here is a map of Ninewa using the district and sub-district maps from the legislatively adopted maps (through 1976).


Steve

STP,need a map of the water and irrigation system. Where would you put the system control points? They are going to control the water which controls the food and the drugs and the people......which gives you the country........In theory anyway

[Steve the Planner]

I have the systems for Iraq, but not for Afghanistan.

I believe some of the reachback folks have screen shots of some bits and pieces, but there is no systemic analysis or plan, to my knowledge.

Can put you in touch with some folks if you have a particularly focused purpose. PM

Steve

[slapout9]

I have the systems for Iraq, but not for Afghanistan.

I believe some of the reachback folks have screen shots of some bits and pieces, but there is no systemic analysis or plan, to my knowledge.

Can put you in touch with some folks if you have a particularly focused purpose. PM

Steve

No, it was just for general dsicussion. Everything is online so I figured it was out there in Cyber-Space along with the list of Tiger Woods X-Girlfriends

[Steve the Planner]

You'll have to check with Tiger's HR department about the girlfriends. I understand it is quite a large operation with lots of staff and long-term pension obligations.

Steve

[Bob's World]

Had to chuckle at the title of this thread.

If we could have strategy of logistics in Iraq ('the surge"), why can't we have a strategy of tactics ("pop centric") in Afghanistan?

Hell what was WWII, a strategy of politics (Ok boys, Europe first, then everyone get on line and frontal assualt our way from Normandy to the Rhine to avoid anyone looking like they are any more effective than anyone else)?

I guess strategy can manifest in a lot of seemingly silly ways, that are typically rooted far more in policy/politics than in what is most effective on the ground.

[William F. Owen]

Had to chuckle at the title of this thread.

If we could have strategy of logistics in Iraq ('the surge"), why can't we have a strategy of tactics ("pop centric") in Afghanistan?

Hell what was WWII, a strategy of politics (Ok boys, Europe first, then everyone get on line and frontal assualt our way from Normandy to the Rhine to avoid anyone looking like they are any more effective than anyone else)?

I guess strategy can manifest in a lot of seemingly silly ways, that are typically rooted far more in policy/politics than in what is most effective on the ground.

All jokes aside Bob, you point indicates that most folks do not understand the relationship between "Strategy" and "Tactics" or even what they are-

....and don't even get me started on "Operations."

The problem in Afghanistan is the tactical feasibility of the strategy, not helped by the very variable emphasis on so-called COIN.

[slapout9]

Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan


http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/new...rge_in_one.php

[MikeF]

Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/new...rge_in_one.php

Slap,

You found the matrix. One problem with causal loop diagrams such as this is the 'so what' question. Yes, it defines the problem, but it can confuse and complicate more than it helps.

Mike

[Hacksaw]

OK...

I have developed some really messed up stuff that only I understood...

But this is the epitome of just how far we've lost our way...

If you want to claim that the real value was the journey that resulted in the creation of this "thing" - I'm underwhelmed...

I think they'd be better off pasting together a whole bunch of unit status and contact reports and doing a wordle...

I know there is a whole community of thought out there about the earth shattering emergence of Design...

But in the end... this has to be translated into orders and logical tactical action... and while the development of something like this doesn't flip my switch

Live well and row

[slapout9]

But in the end... this has to be translated into orders and logical tactical action... and while the development of something like this doesn't flip my switch

How about the SBW 7 S's-Strategy.

1-surround the village
2-search the village
3-secure cooperation from village leaders
4-separate the bad buys form the good guys
5-shelter the good population
6-safeguard them from future attacks
7-speedily integrate into a national village system

[Hacksaw]

good enough...

[MikeF]

How about the SBW 7 S's-Strategy.

1-surround the village
2-search the village
3-secure cooperation from village leaders
4-separate the bad buys form the good guys
5-shelter the good population
6-safeguard them from future attacks
7-speedily integrate into a national village system

Slap,

A year ago, I would have agreed with you. SBW worked in portions of Iraq, but it worked b/c most of the ethnic/sectarian cleansing was already complete. In Afghanistan, I fear that you're approach will cause more unintended consequences than intended consequences.

1. Surround the village. Two issues. First, when massive amounts of coalition or Taliban forces descend into an area, civilians will flee in order to avoid the inevitable violence. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, these displaced persons move to refugee camps. These camps are underesourced, undermanaged, and underfunded, and they potentially become breeding grounds and recruitment centers for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Plus, even if we're successful in clearing, then we have to deal with the displaced persons on the back-end. Extremely messy business particularly when the educated middle-class decides not to stay in country anymore and the meager intellectual capital of the area leaves. Second, when armed foreigners surround a village, some men will rebel to defend themselves. It happens. Dr. Kilcullen calls them the Accidental Guerilla.

2. Search the village. We simply break too many of the cultural norms of privacy in our searches causing feeling of broken honor and resentment. These emotions equate to additional grievances often producing more guerillas.

So, what do we do? I like Jim Gant's idea. It starts with SBW #3.

1. Secure cooperation from village elders. Do this through messengers, hold a jirga, and drink lots of tea.
2. Secure treaties with the Tribes.
2a. Establish paramilitary force for self-protection through SFA and FID.
2b. Bring in the Greg Mortenson's to build the schools.
3. Speedily integrate into national village system. Probably won't be speedy, but it is feasible.
4. Work with centralized gov't to integrate tribal govt's into big gov't. Hold centralized gov't and tribes accountable for treaties and promises.

If we work in a manner similar to this, many of those circles and lines will go away.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

Are you suggesting that there needs to be more of a strategy, or just a collection of more adapted popultion-oriented success tactics?

Steve

[slapout9]

MikeF, surround was probably to strong a word. Probably should have used surveillance.

Starting with leadership is always the best approach but I was assuming that we may not always have that option, so I thought it would be better to surround and conduct surveillance and try and figure out what is going on before going into the village.

Searching is always a problem but somehow I think you would have to do it. It could be done slowly as in have the village leader show you around the area....maybe build up to more detailed searches later with the local villagers in the lead.

Leadership again, if you had or new of relatives from other secured villages it would be helpful to be introduced into the village.....instead of going in cold. But again I wrote this from a worst case scenario. Sometimes you just have to start somewhere. Thoughts?

I probably shouldn't have numbered them, the order needs to be more flexible based upon the situation.

[MikeF]

Are you suggesting that there needs to be more of a strategy, or just a collection of more adapted popultion-oriented success tactics?

Steve,

Neither. I'm almost finished with Stones into Schools, and I am putting together an Afghanistan training package for my former platoon leaders who are now company commanders likely to be deployed during the A'stan surge.

Their questions are:
- What will we be doing?
- What should we be doing?
- How is this different from Diyala?
- What should we hope to accomplish?

I responded to Slap's comments as I thought they applied. In Diyla circa 2006-2007, I used SBW with a high degree of success. In A'stan, I think we're better off doing less. If I only submitted 3 critical tasks regarding villages, I would suggest:

1. Build Relationships
2. Build Relationships
3. Build Relationships

Slap added:

MikeF, surround was probably to strong a word. Probably should have used surveillance.

Starting with leadership is always the best approach but I was assuming that we may not always have that option, so I thought it would be better to surround and conduct surveillance and try and figure out what is going on before going into the village.

Searching is always a problem but somehow I think you would have to do it. It could be done slowly as in have the village leader show you around the area....maybe build up to more detailed searches later with the local villagers in the lead.

Leadership again, if you had or new of relatives from other secured villages it would be helpful to be introduced into the village.....instead of going in cold. But again I wrote this from a worst case scenario. Sometimes you just have to start somewhere. Thoughts?

I probably shouldn't have numbered them, the order needs to be more flexible based upon the situation.

Emphasis added mine.

Slap,

I think you nailed it. First, start with what works or as Surferbeetle would say, work with the wave not against it. Exhaust all measures of the ink-spots theory to establish working relationships with the tribes. Expand your control and sphere of influence through jirgas and tea not JDAMs. Arm them and allow them to defend themselves. Assist them with education and employment. Integrate them into a national tribal system.

Once you positively identify irreconciliable tribes that refuse to work with the gov't, then you go kinetic with SBW and become the biggest tribe forcing the enemy to a breaking point.

This is grassroots, decentralized. It's also the most efficient and cheapest approach.

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Mike:

I have an arab speaking friend---had dinner last friday as he was on his way back to A.

He has two advantages. Mostly can be understood, and wears civ clothes.

As part of his pitch to get me to join him, he assured me that if you can break through all the bull####---to make friends---the folks he meets will give him the clothes off their backs. That comparison is the same with our mutual experience in Iraq.

But he pointed out what you did. If the troops go in too big, everybody scatters and its is down hill from there. Plus, their reasons for staying aloof and away are far deeper than in Iraq, so it takes more work.

Sounds the same from your more kinetic side.

Steve

[Rob Thornton]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map, and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.

Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Here is a........Mind Map of the A'stan Plan

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/new...rge_in_one.php

Slap,

You found the matrix. One problem with causal loop diagrams such as this is the 'so what' question. Yes, it defines the problem, but it can confuse and complicate more than it helps.

Mike

[slapout9]

Slap, I found the rules to your mind map, and maybe reinforces Mike's point - see specifically rules on: elimination, and playing with out a ref.

Rob, thanks it is all so clear now