Quote:
but I can't really think of any major multilateral actions that stand out.


INTERFET and the resultant UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor are probably about the best case studies that show an intervention force turning a broken society into a functioning, relative stable one. Feel free to dissent.

Comparative to the ethnic cleansing that was going on in East Timor at the time of INTERFET's intervention, Saddam's Iraq at the time of the invasion was relatively stable (aside from the totalitarian oppression - I'm referring to general liveability). This begs the question why did East Timor go up in terms of liveability while Iraq went down after the applicable interventions?

Of course, I'm aware that this question cannot be answered with black-and-white, Manichean answers because the reasons are diverse and complex. But I think its fair to say that widespread global approval will help any occupation and the way that the nation at the head of an intervention approaches international opinion can be very important.

The way that Howard dealt with the world pre-East Timor and the way the coalition dealt with the world pre-Iraq are substantially different.

The reality is that any military force in a foreign country must find a way to legitimate its presence there. If the occupier appears to be employing a policy of exceptionalism (regardless of whether the motives for this policy are benevolent) it can't hope to garner support from the locals. Without legitimacy, you can run the risk of turning a finite enemy that can be measured empirically (eg: Iraqi Republican Guard) into an infinite enemy that acts within and draws support from perceptions of an illegitimate occupation (eg: various former Ba'athist insurgent groups).

One of the ways I think the US might be able to improve this legitimacy problem is by increasing engagement with the ICC as it says to the world and enemies of the US: "Here's proof of our awesomeness. We are the good guys and we are accountable to somebody other than ourselves."

The point I'm trying to make, and I think the point Kilcullen is trying to make with the above quote is that it is only useful to target an enemy's strategic apex if there is certainty that the individual at the top will not be replaced (eg: OBL being martyred) as quickly as he is eliminated. The difference between the US bringing OBL down in a US court, and the world bringing him down in front of the ICC, could be key in eliminating the "AQ myth" as Kilcullen calls it.

The reference you make to the clash between the American democratic project and international law is interesting and I think these points are important for understanding the hows and the whys. Despite this, however, I still fail to see why it is that the US' arguably "equally-democratic" Western allies have been able to find room for both "submission" to international law and political and judicial autonomy.