Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
You have to understand your presence patrols (or any other type of military activity) send a message that will be perceived by the populace, and if you shape your message correctly (and most importantly, the message is supported by your actions), you'll start achieving success through a number of unintended positive consequences.
Bill,

I agreed with your entire last post, but I wanted to address "the message." In the long run, the question is who is patrolling? If the US floods an area in mass, then there is a perception that we are in charge, and the locals expect us to be in charge and solve problems. IMO, that's one of the big things we missed when we invaded Iraq. The Iraqis expected us to fill the security vacuum in the wake of Saddam's removal, and we expected them to fill it. On the operational level, military leaders tried to fix massive, complex problems (electric grid in Baghdad, flow of oil, reinventing an Army and Police force, re-establishing national governance). On the local level, company commanders assumed responsibility for governance, economics, and security.

Some will hand-wave my comment by stating it's a matter of expectation management, but IMO, that's discounting how the locals perceive us.

If the US sends ten advisors (SF or MTT team) to assist a HN BN or BCT, then the responsible remains on the HN. You stated that sometimes we must intervene in mass if the HN is incapable and it's relevent to our national security. I don't disagree with that statement, but I will caution that we should use discretion and discernment due to the unforecasted, unintended consequences that arise with being in charge. Iraq (2006-2007) is probably a good example of when we had to go unilateral, but we did so to stop a civil war and localized genocide.

I've summed this up with the phrase in small wars, sometimes less is more.

Thoughts?

Mike