The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

I recently studied Clausewitz more closely, especially the chapters which are not very well known. Here is the chapter on "Volksbewaffnung" or "Arming the Nation". This chapter has to been seen as part of the strategic defence integrated in his overall concept of war. Given that the Prussian court and a great part of the establishment feared that arming the people could result in anti-royalist revolutions and Clauswitz pressed for such a strategy one should not be surprise that this influences the way he presents this topic. It didn't certainly prevent Lenin and Mao from learning.

The chapter is here


Given the political background, now wonder he starts like that.




He continues and describes how warfare changed forever with the inclusion of the popular masses:




Then he broadens it and explains why the people's war is a special case:




Sic, keep in mind the various guerilla wars as in Spain, Napoleonic Russia, the Sovietunion in WWII, China during and after the WWII and Afghanistan. But so far it can still be still be seen in the prism of the industrial wars (WWI, WWII) to come. But as it is part of the book on defense, it increasingly focuses on the effects of the resistance of the agitated people against an invader.





A very important part comes than:



To which the politcal context - fear of popular revolution, similar the French one - influenced the last sentence is unknown. (As said before, CvC's idea of an militia was considered dangerous by Prussia's ruling class.) It is a very interesting statement and especially interesting when used to analyse the situation in Afghanistan. To which extent the safe tribal areas in Pakistan and the flow of ressources and money substitute the "regular army" is quite a question. Note also that Allies play a very important part in the strategic defense according to other Chapters.

Interestingly Mao warned the guerilla leaders in Latinamerica to accept his specific strategy, which relied to a great deal on the huge and difficult terrain of China and the support of the large rural majority as dogma.

While he limits the power of the unsupported "guerilla war" he then up with this.




Very hard not to think about Afghanistan, or China in WWII, isn't it?




... or Afghanistan

What follows shows that the writer has experienced and studied guerilla war very carefully.




Surly on of the most interesting descriptions written on the topic. Take away "National Levies and armed peasantry" and use "Insurgency" and it becomes rather "modern".

I will continue later to comment it.

What he is talking about goes far more to what is commonly called "The American Way of War." Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships. Then came the American and French Revolutions, and Napoleon really capitalized on what I call wars by/between nations. Now capturing a King, his capital, or his purse may win it for you, but only if you had also defeated the will of a national populace. This changed warfare in a major way, Napoleon capitalized on it to make France the dominant NATION on the continent. Later, in the American Civil War, I believe Grant was the first General to understand strategcially that in a war between nations it was critical to target and defeat the national will of ones opponent.

There are related phenomena in Insurgency, but I don't believe he was talking to insurgency. But then I freely admit, I am one of the 99% who have never endured an extensive study of CvC.

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, 99% of Clausewitz proponents have simply never read him either.

Maybe true, but they are generally less prone to attributing things to him, which he never said.

Its just so damn hard to muddle ones way through his ramblings, and also to sort out what is an early thought on a topic, and what is his final assessment.

Really? I know folks get easily put off, but I persevered because I knew it was important. Thank G*d I did, because from this, all else flows.
To my mind, the real problem is not actually understanding what he writes, but junking the baggage that stops most folks understanding it - eg: the hold overs from the abysmally low quality of modern military thought.

bIs there any good, highly abridged with insightful commentary (both pro and con) version of CvC? Such a product would go a long way to clearing the air, and be far more helpful than tossing a 5 lb tome to a LT and asking him to read and understand what it ultimately means.

Sure there are! Many. Some better than others, but here's a few.

Smith
Samida
Echevarria
Heuser
...and that's the short list!
I would also strongly recommend anything by Colin S. Gray as being one of the most useful demonstrators of CvC in practical terms and also a very good critic as to the things CvC simply never mentioned or just assumed.
Having that, I would argue that is actually a strength as well as a flaw - how's that for duality!!

[Firn]

Some corrections

a) France was arguably already the most prominent military power in Europe before the French Revolution

b) "The American Way of War" is in my humble optinion a misnomer. There are plenty of examples even before America was rediscovered of the concept of a nation. Switzerland may be the most famous one.

c) What changed with the French revolution was the scale of the recruitment united with a new fevor for to new form of government of the state and a more widespread sense of nation. Note that already in the medieval period quickly raised militias could prove to be an enthusiastic and steady force in defense of their homeland, and sometimes beyond it's borders. See the Battle of the Golden Spurs or the one of Sempach. Not only in such instances the will of the populance played a very great role. But as said before the scale and depth of it's importance was more present in the Napoleonic wars.

d) From the Peninsular War to the Invasion of Russia Europe witnessed many insurgencies and many instances of guerilla warfare. The Freikorps and the Tyrolean Uprisings were major events in the German-speaking areas. The influence of all of them can be seen in many parts of his work.


I already made most of my arguments in the post above. CvC discusses the concept of militias, popular uprising, their place in the overall concept of war and the strategy and tactics used in the small war (Kleinkrieg, Le petite guerre, Guerilla) only in the book of the defense. This is hardly surprising when you consider the political climate of his state.

While I have not enough time to answer in depth it seems to me that the employment of IEDs does handily fit CvC's conception as well as the general strategy of some of the insurgents in Afghanistan.

Just take a closer look at him.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships.

That's not true. Wars were concluded for exactly the ways CvC describes wars being concluded.

This changed warfare in a major way, Napoleon capitalized on it to make France the dominant NATION on the continent.

Changed Warfare or War?

Later, in the American Civil War, I believe Grant was the first General to understand strategcially that in a war between nations it was critical to target and defeat the national will of ones opponent.

So he managed to do what Hannibal had tried to do and failed to do to Rome - which had no King, by the way - and citizen based Army. Grant was doing nothing new. He was treading a well worn road.

There are related phenomena in Insurgency, but I don't believe he was talking to insurgency.

Why did he need to? How are so-called "Insurgencies" different from Rebellions? Why differentiate when it comes to War. (not warfare!) It's all about the same thing.

But then I freely admit, I am one of the 99% who have never endured an extensive study of CvC.

The evidence supports your assertion as being correct.

[M-A Lagrange]

a) France was arguably already the most prominent military power in Europe before the French Revolution

France was the most populus country in Europe before the revolution and after. Napoleon used to say: A night of Paris will cover my losses... That does play a large role into the "game". Especially at that time.

Originally Posted by Bob's World
Europe for centuries had been fighting wars between Kingdoms, where victory or defeat was in either capturing a King, his capital, or his purse by killing expensive soldiers or sinking expensive ships.

That's not true. Wars were concluded for exactly the ways CvC describes wars being concluded.

For once I agree with Wilf. What Napoleon changed or introduced (with the Tsar of Russia if I am not mistaking) is the Westpalian Consensus.
After defeat borders would remain and countries still exist despite being conquered. Before, kings could be killed or alive, it was their kingdoms which died by being integrated into another country. Poland is a good example of that. There was a king of Poland without country and even less kingdom.

I can see where Bob is coming from. The independance war in America and the opposition between France and UK. Louis 16 heritated from the past glory and power from Louis 15 and specially Louis 14.
In somehow, Louis 16 was in advance, he delocalised war from Europe to America and was looking into reducing UK power by a war of economical exhaustion. (And it's France he brought financially to her knees)
But still, he was looking to impose by force a peace at his profite to his ennemy. Just like CvC stated.

[Firn]

Perhaps I will take once a bit more time to analyze (in very rough form) the current conflict on the basis of CvC. Nothing fancy, nothing revolutionary, nothing which hasn't been done before. But it always helps to clear up one's mind.

Firn

[wm]

WM. Interesting, thought provoking comments. However, I would question the Taliban's technique of suppressing the will of the people as, in fact, an end to a political means....arguably a religious end. I agree with your ideas of the trinity, and contend they need to be tweeked for insurgent context. Obviously religious objectives create ambiguity.

John,
I was going to respond that at some level religious motivations actually are political ones but the next post after yours by Intel Trooper made that point. We could probably tussle a while about what we mean by religion and religious, but I think I'll let Marc T chime in on that first, if he is of a mind to do so.

Instead, I'll just suggest a couple of interesting struggles between church authority and state authority for consideration that religious struggles can really be political struggles in disguise:
Consider Bishop Ambrose of Milan threatening to excommunicate Roman/Byzantine Emperor Theodosius I in connection with the effort for suppressing Arianism, or
Hildebrand of Sovana (AKA Pope Gregory VII) actual excommunicating (twice) Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV and Henry's response by installing the "anti-Pope" Clement III. This last initiated what we could easily call a "civil war" in the Catholic Church.

If we choose to define politics (as found in Clausewitz) as the process of conducting inter-state relations, then insurgency may well fall outside the pale of politics so defined. I say this because an insurgency usually is a matter of intra-state relations (returning to my point that an insurgency is really a struggle between two different parties for control of at least one of the three parts of Clausewitz' trinity). But at some point, an insurgent party may garner enough support that it may have its own trinity within the geographical boundaries by which we normal refer to nations as political entities. At that point, we might consider the struggle to be inter-state with the application of CvC now appropriate.

[William F. Owen]

If we choose to define politics (as found in Clausewitz) as the process of conducting inter-state relations, then insurgency may well fall outside the pale of politics so defined. I say this because an insurgency usually is a matter of intra-state relations (returning to my point that an insurgency is really a struggle between two different parties for control of at least one of the three parts of Clausewitz' trinity). But at some point, an insurgent party may garner enough support that it may have its own trinity within the geographical boundaries by which we normal refer to nations as political entities. At that point, we might consider the struggle to be inter-state with the application of CvC now appropriate.

For emphasis.
CvC does not differentiate between Politics, religion or even "power". His analysis even stays good for the Mafia or any criminal gang that seeks to compete as a political, religious or any other form of entity that influences the conduct of a society. He talks about war between societies/political groups, not just nations. He was very aware of all the types of actors we see today.

[wm]

For emphasis.
CvC does not differentiate between Politics, religion or even "power". His analysis even stays good for the Mafia or any criminal gang that seeks to compete as a political, religious or any other form of entity that influences the conduct of a society. He talks about war between societies/political groups, not just nations. He was very aware of all the types of actors we see today.

Wilf,
I was not suggesting tht CvC differentiates between politics and religion. I agree that we may well find them in the same family as ways of understanding political action.
So a theological struggle for power across two elements (Arians and Athanasians for example) that may conjoin to form a community (Catholics) is war, but a struggle within the community (the electoral process for replacing a Catholic Pope, e.g. ) probably is not. A struggle between the Gambino family and the Genovese family over who drives garbage trucks in the South Bronx is a war. A struggle between Pete and Junior Gotti for leadership within the Gambino family is a little tougher to classify I think.

[slapout9]

A struggle between Pete and Junior Gotti for leadership within the Gambino family is a little tougher to classify I think.

Not really it is just on a micro level as CvC said it all goes back to The Original Motive for the War. As I have said CvC would be a pretty good Cop. However I think he also created the Run On Sentence as my English Teacher used to say, which can make him hard to follow sometimes. He had a poor understanding of what periods are for.

[wm]

Not really it is just on a micro level as CvC said it all goes back to The Original Motive for the War. As I have said CvC would be a pretty good Cop. However I think he also created the Run On Sentence as my English Teacher used to say, which can make him hard to follow sometimes. He had a poor understanding of what periods are for.

Maybe so, but defining something as a war by depending on a description of original motives, which is part and parcel of the definition of war versus other means of conducting politics, seems just a little bit too circular for my logic. (And that is a criticism of CvC which would get us way outside this thread I suspect.)

[slapout9]

Maybe so, but defining something as a war by depending on a description of original motives, which is part and parcel of the definition of war versus other means of conducting politics, seems just a little bit too circular for my logic. (And that is a criticism of CvC which would get us way outside this thread I suspect.)

So long as the element of force/violence is used as opposed to other political means I would say you are in the war framework of CvC again just on a micro scale.

[Bob's World]

So long as the element of force/violence is used as opposed to other political means I would say you are in the war framework of CvC again just on a micro scale.

I just can't get on board with those who focus on how the opposition chooses to act out as the primary means of determing what one must do to resolve the problem.

To me, it is far more instructive to understand why an opponent is acting out, and design my counter to address his purpose for action rather than his choice of tactics.

For example, MLK or Ghandi could well have opted for violent rather than non-violent methods to address the purpose for their operations. Similarly AQ could have and still could, adopt non-violent tactics to address its purpose. The tactics chosen are important, as the shape the activities employed. But it is the underlying purpose that must be understood to shape how those activities are designed and employed so as to actually affect the root causes of opposition rather than simply flogging away at the symptoms.

Often, in fact nearly always, in insurgency, the failures giving rise to the purpose that is the causation for the insurgent movement lie on the part of the government, and not the populace writ large, the disaffected segment of the populace, nor the outside actor conducting UW to incite and enable the insurgency. Thus the tendency to flog at the symptoms; it allows the F'd up government to hold itself harmless and sustain its victim status while deploying the military to put a WWF beat down on the "symptom", i.e. that segment of the populace that dared to stand up and cry "foul." This, IMO, is why most COIN efforts are so long and drawn out, and why most insurgencies, like weeds in your yard, are merely suppressed for a time and rarely resolved through military action.

To merely apply CvCs thoughts on war and warfare to such internal expressions of dissatisfaction with poor governance by ones own populace is far too common. I just don't see where it is very effective. And many a faded empire speaks to that fact, that was disassembled one COIN "victory" at a time.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World

To merely apply CvCs thoughts on war and warfare to such internal expressions of dissatisfaction with poor governance by ones own populace is far too common. I just don't see where it is very effective. And many a faded empire speaks to that fact, that was disassembled one COIN "victory" at a time.

To simply and blindly embrace anyone's thoughts on anything crosses the line between intellectual reasoning and theology. Clausewitz was a genius in his time and much of what he wrote continues to resonate true today, but he didn't write about our times or our wars. His writings are insufficient to solve the security problems are faced with now. There are no decisive battles, no centers of gravity that can be defeated in battle, etc. instead it is political warfare at the grass roots level, war/conflict based on infiltration and subversion. CvC wrote about that on page?? I know I saw it (or I believe I saw it), since his devoted followers tell me he wrote about everything relevant to conflict, you simply have to believe. Like all good Taliban, I mean CvC followers, we'll burn any books, attack any pundits that dare criticize our lord.

On the other hand, perhaps, just perhaps most people who win (even that means something new now) conflicts in the world today don't read, or if they did, they don't follow CvC's philosophy on war Just maybe they embrace other ideologies that are counter to CvCs, and yet somehow manage to do well against our seasoned officers who embrace CvC theology?

What happens if a CvC follower all the sudden rejects CvC? Is there a CvC hell for former CvC followers? Maybe it is being forced to reside in a library full of writings on asymmetric warfare, 4th GW, revolutionary warfare, and theories on the employment of special operations. The Taliban, I mean CvC devotees are opposed to all forms of modernization and learning. The Koran, I mean "On War" is the only truth.

[Bob's World]

You had to go and kick the hornet's nest...

[slapout9]

For example, MLK or Ghandi could well have opted for violent rather than non-violent methods to address the purpose for their operations. Similarly AQ could have and still could, adopt non-violent tactics to address its purpose. The tactics chosen are important, as the shape the activities employed. But it is the underlying purpose that must be understood to shape how those activities are designed and employed so as to actually affect the root causes of opposition rather than simply flogging away at the symptoms.

CvC's fundamental definition of war is wrong IMO it isn't just the use of Force to obtain the objective but The use of Force or Fraud (Subversion)to obtain your objective. That is where CvC breaks down in trying to apply it to Modern Warfare/UW.

[Firn]

I think that there are quite a few fallacies in the last posts, but I wonder how much sense it makes to discuss them. It seems that some positions are quite entrenched, perhaps including mine, and this makes an open discussion quite difficult, especially if a constructed strawman is attacked.

I think that arguments like the following do little to help the debate, and I might have erred in the same way.

On the other hand, perhaps, just perhaps most people who win (even that means something new now) conflicts in the world today don't read, or if they did, they don't follow CvC's philosophy on war Just maybe they embrace other ideologies that are counter to CvCs, and yet somehow manage to do well against our seasoned officers who embrace CvC theology

First it should be clear that war is, but not only a battle of wits and wisdom. If one side has the greatly stronger advantages over the other wits and genius can only go so far. While the coalition in Afghanistan has so many advantages in training and technology the enemies have their own in time, commitment and ressources due to particular circumstances (toss in demograhics, geopolitical situation, culture, religion, politics).

Lenin, Mao and part of the Vietnamese leadership studied and lauded him. It worked very well for them and helped them to win, aided by the circumstances, by shaping their strategy. That it was not their only important influence is obvious. There is much fertile ground for scholarship to work on in both cases. Actually a quick google gave this results:

Clausewitz: Eastern and
Western Approaches to War

Vietnam, Mao and Clausewitz


The sharpest sword: Compellence, Clausewitz, and Counterinsurgency


Anyway it seems naive to hinge victory only to a good education in strategy, or in a reading CvC. It seems equally naive to for some examples do not take into account the very same influence.

While the leaders of enemies in Afghanistan might not read CvC (although I'm not that sure about that concerning a few) they can draw on rather large basin of information and experience, with the operations against the Soviets being most likely the biggest one.

Secondly, if you have read the chapter by CvC above and have the main points of him in mind and toss some (seemingly not so well views) you understand why by trial and many errors and blunderings the enemy is sadly on the right strategic route.

The third, by far the most important, from the great number of cases which it embraces, is the wearying out the enemy. We choose this expression not only to explain our meaning in few words but because it represents the thing exactly, and is not so figurative as may at first appear. The idea of wearying out in a struggle amounts in reality to a gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will produced through the long continuance of exertion.

This wearying out is of course mostly directed against the coalition forces and is a sine qua non to win over the country again. Of course this only part of the overall strategy, which might be not have been spelled out for a paper. Other than that they try to first sustain themselves both by levying contributions and using foreign money and remote inhabitated areas and inflict upon their enemy trying to do him most harm. The latter is of course more political, as CvC said, and is all about (political) control (or power) over the population. Give the chapter 2 of book 1 further a look.

Besides these two means there are three other peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy's force. The first is invasion, that is the occupation of the enemy's territory, not with a view to keeping it, but in order to levy contributions there, or to devastate it. The immediate object is here neither the conquest of the enemy's territory nor the defeat of his armed force, but merely to do him damage in a general way. The second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode of speaking we should say that the first is more military, the other more political.

We see then that there are many ways to the aim in war; that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in every case, that the destruction of the enemy's military force, the conquest of enemy's provinces, the mere occupation of them, the mere invasion of them—enterprises which are aimed directly at political objects—lastly a passive expectation of the enemy's blow, are all means which, each in itself, may be used to force the enemy's will just according as the peculiar circumstances of the case lead us to expect more from the one or the other. We could still add to these a whole category of shorter methods of gaining the end, which might be called arguments ad hominem. What branch of human affairs is there in which these sparks of individual spirit have not made their appearance, flying over all formal considerations? And least of all can they fail to appear in war, where the personal character of the combatants plays such an important part, both in the cabinet and in the field. We limit ourselves to pointing this out, as it would be pedantry to attempt to reduce such influences into classes. Including these, we may say that the number of possible ways of reaching the aim rises to infinity.

To avoid under-estimating these different short roads to the aim, either estimating them only as rare exceptions, or holding the difference which they cause in the conduct of war as insignificant, we must bear in mind the diversity of political objects which may cause a war,—measure at a glance the distance which there is between a death struggle for political existence, and a war which a forced or tottering alliance makes a matter of disagreeable duty. Between the two, gradations innumerable occur in reality. If we reject one of these gradations in theory, we might with equal right reject the whole, which would be tantamount to shutting the real world completely out of sight.

As I said before the understanding of the whole makes all the difference and so it does in this case. Thus I also might give up this struggle because just in Afghanistan it is difficult to win over the people, especially considering the low level of (digital) force and political influence at my disposal. Ultimately only the can make the decisive steps


Firn

[slapout9]

Outstanding post from Zenpundit on the weakness of the historic analysis method. Which goes to the very heart of this thread,few facts,many assumptions and opinions.

http://zenpundit.com/

If CvC came back from the grave he would be laughing at a lot of people. I will stick with Systems Analysis.

[Steve Blair]

It's an interesting post, but it also misses the point that any method has its limitations. Bashing history (or academics) is a favorite pastime for some folks (and I'm not saying that Zen is doing that), but it misses the same point. The trick is to come up with a blended approach. Systems analysis is an interesting component, but I personally don't like relying on the "one method to rule them all" idea.

[PhilR]

Outstanding post from Zenpundit on the weakness of the historic analysis method. Which goes to the very heart of this thread,few facts,many assumptions and opinions.

http://zenpundit.com/

If CvC came back from the grave he would be laughing at a lot of people. I will stick with Systems Analysis.

I think that most historians (good ones, at least) would be the first to acknowledge that what they produce is not some absolute "truth", but an interpretation of events based on the sources available. That is why history is part of the liberal arts.

I'm struck by your reference to "systems analysis" because, as far as i can discern, systems analysis, when applied to the human dimension in conflict (which is what really matters) relies on what I would consider as "history." Cause and effect, and other relationships, unless observed in real time, need to reference to the past to make any sense. Our ideas of how people with react to anything that is done to them (outside of direct physical effect), is all guesswork. We derive what we think will happen based on what has happened in similar situations. This can be applied to models or other operations research. Unless it applies to just physical issues, what I see as systems analysis of conflict, is really just translating history into standardized, if not quantitative, form.

I agree that Clausewitz would be laughing because, if you read Book Two of On War he pushes something called “critical analysis” of historical events as the best way, outside of actual experience, to learn about conflict. Jon Sumida, in his recent book Decoding Clausewitz (2008) provides a better explanation than I can in this short space (you can get a good idea from his recent article in Army History "The Clausewitz Problem" pg 17 Fall 2009. Its 8 mb; you have download the whole magazine: http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH73(W).pdf)).

Building off of some of Robert Jones’ points, I think there is something to be said about the difference between Clausewitz’s contemporary conception of People’s War, and what we are wrestling with in Insurgency. I believe that when Clausewitz described the “trinity” of emotion, chance and reason, he was thinking of how all three of those variables existed within each opponent. Thus, in effect, each opponent, with its own unique balance of the trinity, was attempting to bend the will of the other (through violence or threat of violence). I think this applies in an insurgency—each side, Gov and its supporters vs. Insurgents, and their supporters, reflects a certain balance of emotion, chance and reason.

In Clausewitz’s day, these variables were defined by the state: thus the equations of emotion=people, chance=military, and reason=political leadership/government. I think Clausewitz equated “People’s War” with a rebalancing of these elements based on using guerilla or irregular methods against an attacker—but the idea remained that the people, the military and the government were tied together in common cause against an external foe.

Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC