Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
Outstanding post from Zenpundit on the weakness of the historic analysis method. Which goes to the very heart of this thread,few facts,many assumptions and opinions.

http://zenpundit.com/

If CvC came back from the grave he would be laughing at a lot of people. I will stick with Systems Analysis.
I think that most historians (good ones, at least) would be the first to acknowledge that what they produce is not some absolute "truth", but an interpretation of events based on the sources available. That is why history is part of the liberal arts.

I'm struck by your reference to "systems analysis" because, as far as i can discern, systems analysis, when applied to the human dimension in conflict (which is what really matters) relies on what I would consider as "history." Cause and effect, and other relationships, unless observed in real time, need to reference to the past to make any sense. Our ideas of how people with react to anything that is done to them (outside of direct physical effect), is all guesswork. We derive what we think will happen based on what has happened in similar situations. This can be applied to models or other operations research. Unless it applies to just physical issues, what I see as systems analysis of conflict, is really just translating history into standardized, if not quantitative, form.

I agree that Clausewitz would be laughing because, if you read Book Two of On War he pushes something called “critical analysis” of historical events as the best way, outside of actual experience, to learn about conflict. Jon Sumida, in his recent book Decoding Clausewitz (2008) provides a better explanation than I can in this short space (you can get a good idea from his recent article in Army History "The Clausewitz Problem" pg 17 Fall 2009. Its 8 mb; you have download the whole magazine: http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH73(W).pdf)).

Building off of some of Robert Jones’ points, I think there is something to be said about the difference between Clausewitz’s contemporary conception of People’s War, and what we are wrestling with in Insurgency. I believe that when Clausewitz described the “trinity” of emotion, chance and reason, he was thinking of how all three of those variables existed within each opponent. Thus, in effect, each opponent, with its own unique balance of the trinity, was attempting to bend the will of the other (through violence or threat of violence). I think this applies in an insurgency—each side, Gov and its supporters vs. Insurgents, and their supporters, reflects a certain balance of emotion, chance and reason.

In Clausewitz’s day, these variables were defined by the state: thus the equations of emotion=people, chance=military, and reason=political leadership/government. I think Clausewitz equated “People’s War” with a rebalancing of these elements based on using guerilla or irregular methods against an attacker—but the idea remained that the people, the military and the government were tied together in common cause against an external foe.

Today, however, we are thinking in terms of two rival political leaderships: insurgent and government, and two rival military forces: irregular and regular, with the people reduced to being the “objective” or the “terrain” being fought over. I am struck that we no longer can conceive of a people opposing us. Somehow, either insurgents or other political and military entities rise to oppose our actions—not as an expression of popular will, but in spite of it. Thus we feel if we can just shield (protect) the people from the depredations of the insurgents, the “popular will” will naturally fall our way. There’s a sense, dangerous in my mind, that, if given a fair chance, we will always get support. I don’t think that is a safe assumption. There are areas where we will go and governments we may seek to support, where the people will oppose us, regardless of how secure we can make them.

Phil Ridderhof USMC