Economics and Irregular Warfare

[MikeF]

Hi Steve,

The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

Thanks for the links. This thread is becoming a treasure trove for good reading. I'll get to them as time allows.

The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

I need to clarify that statement (and it's a direct quote from Dr. Gordon McCormick not my original thought). In the beginning of the insurgency, the insurgent IS invisible, and the one comparative advantage they have throughout the struggle is an information advantage. That advantage may not last long if the host nation is effective. So, one of the key task for a counter-insurgent is to find the enemy. The easiest/most accurate way is gaining the information from the populace.

The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

I partially disagree. The current small wars may not be linear, but the enemy controls pockets of territory. In a big city, it may simply be the "bad" neighborhoods where the police don't venture.

Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?

Agreed, and my first three COAs could be derivatives of Oil spots depending on how the ground commander viewed the situation. I'd probably recommend this approach, and the areas chosen must be considered based on conditions.

From Slapout:

That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

Exactly, and brilliant post by the way. In a small war, adaptation is a competition for information for the host nation and mobilization for the insurgent. Whoever adapts fastest wins.

From JMM:

With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

Mike, I have no doubt that you and Steve could adapt and thrive.

Best,

Mike