My answer is even the wisest of heads would have found it terribly difficult to steer Afghanistan toward a state fitting the (differing) political intention(s) of members of the coalition with so meager ressources and so great challanges. As a matter of fact "rebuilding" was the buzzword of 2002 and onwards, as the Taliban were widly considered to be beaten. At least that was the impression in West and that impression greatly influenced the amount of ressources at the disposal of the commanders. One can wonder how important that rebuilding really was for the politicians in power. Maybe they were just happy to have done a "great job" at hammering the Taliban and AQ - a very understandable political goal. Maybe they were buMaybe some had grander projects for their (military) might than to use it for rebuilding...The rhetorical question...if CvC is so great why are we still fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan? My answer is that a monotheistic belief in CvC and that one great final Fulda Gap battle still clouds a significant part our collective sight.
Lauding and blaming a single imagined factor (in this case CvC) for success or defeat seems a bit simplistic, to say the least. Especially as CvC did consider leadership an important element, but one of a great many. Overall I think that I'm mostly of the same opinon as PhilR.
Firn
P.S: Interesting views on the motivations of Lincoln and on the circumstances leading to the war.
To me it seems that the states in the South had a stronger motivation to fight as many felt their way of life and perhaps their very existence threated by the policy changes of Lincoln. Their rapid (military) mobilization of the population could have surprised the latter and given the dubious and far-flung nature of the Army and the not too great interest in the North he might have ruled out a quick intervention.
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