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Thread: Economics and Irregular Warfare

  1. #61
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    H/T to Bill...

    PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal

    Historians have often used a 1966 Army report nicknamed PROVN
    either to cast aspersions on the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam
    between 1964 and 1968, General William C. Westmoreland, or to
    praise his successor, General Creighton Abrams. This interpretation is
    simplistic and inaccurate. Although the report criticized aspects of the
    war under Westmoreland, its target was really the U.S. and Vietnamese
    governments. Moreover, PROVN’s conclusions were less radical
    and its remedies less novel than observers have tended to admit. A
    fresh look at PROVN reveals significant continuities in thought between
    Westmoreland, the report, and Abrams.
    If the importance of security was well understood by the Army, so, too, was the notion that political and socioeconomic reforms were also necessary. The U.S. Army had a long tradition of making institutional reform a part of its counterinsurgency, nation-building, and constabulary activities, and it had readily accepted Walt W. Rostow's thesis that socioeconomic change was a key weapon in the fight against the spread of communism in the third world.21
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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    H/T to Slapout

    Rand Monograph R0462, Rebellion and Authority, An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts by: Nathan Constantin Leites, Charles Wolf, Jr.

    Economic reasoning applied to an analysis of rebellion and authority yields some new conclusions about both. Fundamentally, the struggle for popular support is not exclusively or primarily a "political" contest as these terms are usually understood. People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population. One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point. (Also published by Markham Publishing Company, 1970.)
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    People act rationally, calculate costs and benefits, and choose sides accordingly. Successful rebels act on this assumption, applying discriminate force, coercing the populace into cooperation or compliance, and "proving" authority to be not merely unjust, but a certain loser. Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique. It can be countered, but not with rhetoric aimed at winning hearts and minds, and not necessarily with economic pump-priming. What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.
    We have ignored the wisdom in this post for years, and I don't recall our COIN/FID doctrine adequately addressing this. To conduct effective COIN you must employ an effective (situation specfic) population control measures and methods to mobilize (counter organize) the populace, and "eliminate" negative influences (don't compete with them, this isn't a legal political contest) instead of blindly building schools, roads, and spreading messages of good cheer, all the while leaving the political warfare victory to the enemy.

    The caveat is equally important:

    One major caveat: authorities are not invariably worthy of support from within or without, and careful calculation of ultimate interests should guide U.S. policy on this point.

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Talking And happy holidays to you...

    In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.

    Private schools flourish in Hawaii, even though families take on substantial debt (along with the associated risks), because parts of the public school system are unable to provide their charges the skills necessary to compete in and among a global workforce. The cost/benefit equation used by parents in Hawaii includes a time variable which is greater than 12 months.

    In Iraq how many packs of kids did we both see roaming the streets and seeing and participating in things that kids should not see or do? Will these kids be constructively competing with our kids in the global workforce or will our kids be seeing them on future battlefields?

    In short, focusing upon only the violence or school variables does not solve the multivariate cost/benefit equation associated with war.

    Rand Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations By: Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Nora Bensahel, Derek Eaton, S. Jamie Gayton, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Jeffrey Martini, John L. Nasir, Sandra Reyna, Michelle Parker, Jerry M. Sollinger, Kayla M. Williams

    This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-20-2009 at 06:43 PM.
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    Wink Bah Humbug

    Surferbettle,

    And a Merry Christmas to you and yours. Promise I'll read your enclosed study before the New Year.

    Don't disagree with anything you wrote (seriously); however, my point has been and remains that building schools doesn't counter active insurgencies. Over a longer time line (assuming they're well managed and have adequate teachers) they will enable more capable socieities by developing the human potential (I'm a believer), but ss we both know it is hard for kids to go to school when there is still a shooting war going on, it is bad enough when there is simply gang warfare in the vicinity of the school (Chicago, Miami, LA, etc.).

    Let's focus first on how to deal with the active insurgency. From your previous post,

    What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.
    IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization. To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.

    Dr. Kilcullen obviously explains it much better in his book, but his example of building a road in one province as a tool to actively organize the people against the Taliban (I need to review my notes, but in general it was more than building a road, there was a reason behind it beyond economics). He demonstrates it can be effective. In short I think you can be effective with your approach if you connect all the dots and tie those efforts to the greater cause. Bill

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Rebellion is a system and an organizational technique
    Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.

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    Default Upcoming anniversary

    In a week, some folks will be celebrating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Propaganda Unit for National Liberation. This armed unit was set up on 27 Dec 1944 and consisted of a picked group of some 34 officers and soldiers. It was commanded by one Vo Nguyen Giap.

    Starting as an armed propaganda unit, its purpose in life was to train and educate local cadres and guerrilla units in both the political and military efforts. It also dabbled in targeted killings. It later developed into PAVN.

    Bill Moore (with whom, John McCuen would agree) sets out the counter to such as the PUNL, as this:

    Let's focus first on how to deal with the active insurgency. From your previous post,

    Quote:
    What is needed is organizational techniques to match the rebel drive--effective intelligence coupled with a discriminating use of force capable of obtaining compliance from the population.
    IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization. To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.
    In the essence of methodology, this is fighting fire with fire. The political narratives will differ in substance.

    Do we need an elaborate system to do this ? E.g., while I recognize the ideal suggested by Steve:

    from Steve
    In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.
    I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

    The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

    1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

    2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

    3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

    Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.

    No quick fix suggested - it took the PUNL 10 years to develop into PAVN which won at DBP in 1954.

    My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.

    No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos. )

    Mike

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    First, Leites and Wolf is a classic. The old Rand Corp set the bar high for think-tanks, and they provide great work on small wars. When I have a chance, I'll see if I can find their piece on the Malaya Emergency for posting. In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intevention points when accurately defined. An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them), but they need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive. With that said, on to Surferbeetle's points...

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    In Surferbeetle's ideal world a single school is part of a larger educational system or chain in which long-term concerns about an adequately educated populace, academic standards, teaching standards, dependable funding, building codes, safety codes, etc. have a place. Schools are a resource intensive activity which require timelines greater than 12 months.
    Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close). So, what do we do with the denied areas while Surferbeetle is revamping the protected areas? Five current options:

    1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
    2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
    3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
    4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
    5. Do nothing.

    The first three options have high potential pay-offs, but come with high risks/costs. The fourth option may disrupt over-time, but the results are hard to measure. The fifth option is very dangerous IMO.

    Mike

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    Default More economics...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Surferbeetle, And a Merry Christmas to you and yours.
    Same to you Bill

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    …however, my point has been and remains that building schools doesn't counter active insurgencies.
    We were in Vietnam for ~30 years. Compulsory education in Vietnam appears to consist of the first five years of primary school. If the compulsory requirement was indeed five years during the conflict it then follows that both sides had a crack at influencing 6 cohorts of potential insurgents. I do not know of any sources which examine the capture rate of students by the two ideologies but is an interesting point to consider.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    …IMO we need to focus on this first, then rapidly shift into infrastructure development as security conditions permit, and infrastructure development must be tied to political mobilization.
    Bill, here is what I have lived:

    1. During my year in Iraq, OIF1, we executed the 'three block war'. 24/7 security operations attempted to blanket the AO as me and mine ran seven day a week assessments and coordination meetings focusing on governance and economics issues for the first half of my war. During the second half of the war we dropped down to six days a week. We provided our own security throughout.
    2. During my time in Central America me and mine ran six day a week assessments and coordination meetings. We provided our own security with augmentation throughout.
    3. During my international engineering work we usually provide on our own security.

    All of it is dangerous to some degree, but the need for security, governance (politics, electricity, clean water, etc.) and economics (business) does not stop just because some armed folks are fighting in one of the three blocks. Simultaneous lines of operation in economics, governance, and security will be provided by one side or the other; if we abdicate the field under fire how does this advance our objectives?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    …To defeat an insurgency, which is political warfare at the grass roots level, you have to organize the populace at the grass roots level to counter the insurgents. Building a school and a road or giving out jobs without tying it to actively counter organizing politically against the insurgents is, again IMO, in COIN is simply a neutral activity at best.
    I agree.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    …In short I think you can be effective with your approach if you connect all the dots and tie those efforts to the greater cause. Bill
    Like you, I am more than willing to play team.


    I posted this one in another thread, but for completeness I will post it here. The ideas are pretty interesting and the math is mostly confined to the appendix.

    The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development by Fali Huang of Singapore Management University

    This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.
    This one does not pull too many punches regarding our reconstruction efforts. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience
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    Default Thanks...

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Been saying this since my first day here....it is the COG and the Enemy is a system......not a country. If you read the document you will find a quote where he says a criminal/bandit organization operates exactly the same way as an insurgency only their motive and final goal is different.
    Slap,

    I appreciated the study. It was an interesting read and provides a number of ideas to consider...my pdf library grows ever larger.
    Sapere Aude

  11. #71
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    Default Stone soup

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

    The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

    1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

    2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

    3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

    Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.
    Mike,

    We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

    1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.
    2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.
    3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.
    4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

    Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.

    Let’s also briefly touch upon an organizing and operating principle of Civil Affairs-bubbas.

    According to the story, some travelers come to a village, carrying nothing more than an empty pot. Upon their arrival, the villagers are unwilling to share any of their food stores with the hungry travelers. The travelers fill the pot with water, drop a large stone in it, and place it over a fire in the village square. One of the villagers becomes curious and asks what they are doing. The travelers answer that they are making "stone soup", which tastes wonderful, although it still needs a little bit of garnish to improve the flavor, which they are missing. The villager doesn't mind parting with just a little bit of flour to help them out, so it gets added to the soup. Another villager walks by, inquiring about the pot, and the travelers again mention their stone soup which hasn't reached its full potential yet. The villager hands them a little bit of seasoning to help them out. More and more villagers walk by, each adding another ingredient. Finally, a delicious and nourishing pot of soup is enjoyed by all.
    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    My suggestion boils down to KISS - and work from the lower level upwards.
    I agree.

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    No snow yet today (6 feet fallen since 2 Dec, which means about 2 feet of settled ground cover - here, the benches would have to be in igloos.
    Gaaahhhh!!!! I would need chains to ride my motorcycle...
    Sapere Aude

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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    In terms of insurgency as a system, one failed assumption Laites and Wolfe made was assuming that the system is closed. In practice, as with many human endeavors, the system is open, and this distinction allows intervention points when accurately defined.
    The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

    Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    An insurgency holds an information advantage against the host nation (they can see us, we can't see them)…
    The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    …they [an insurgency] need people, guns, money, and silence from the populace in order to thrive.
    Agreed.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Intuitively, I agree with you if I understand you correctly (shore up the rear/protected areas); however, this action neglects the safe-havens, denied areas, and hinterlands. Given enough time unhindered, the insurgency can continue to grow in their protected areas to the point where they can mass effectively against the host nation (Pakistan last summer was getting close).
    The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.

    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    So, what do we do…

    1. Big Army/Big Hammer Approach. Clear, Clear, Clear
    2. Jim Gant "One Tribe" Approach. Bottom-up FID/micro-COIN
    3. Greg Mortenson Approach. Build schools in the hinterlands. Over time, education trumps grievances and the insurgent's message fails.
    4. Man-hunting. UAVs, airstrikes, hyper-infantry raids
    5. Do nothing.
    Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-21-2009 at 03:59 AM. Reason: Clarity...
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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.
    That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.

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    Default Bench improvements & real stone soup

    Hi Steve,

    You've managed to bring in the techie factor (which I omitted since I was focusing on my current areas of interest) as well as pointing out that there is a spectrum of efforts dependent on the situational environment:

    from Steve

    We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

    1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.

    2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.

    3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.

    4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

    Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.
    No disagreement as to any of this, which depends on how primitive or advanced the systems are - and on capabilities (scarce resources) that are available.

    If you are so lucky as to have an intact civil administration (as in Malaya), the task (besides providing security) is to enhance what is already there - as well as the colonial power (UK) being willing to provide a nationalistic Narrative (Malayan independence taking into account the three major ethnic groups, Malay, Chinese and Indian) acceptable to the vast majority of the People.

    If you have a society that is more urban and modernized - as well as used to centralized control - such as Iraq, more conventional methods (more similar to what we would use here at home) can be successfully applied. Both you and Steve the Planner have pointed that out.

    With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

    You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.

    ---------------------
    Real Stone Soup

    Great story. Giap's PUFL teams did just that, but the soup resulting was political. That is, the first step was to infiltrate the community (preferably with former residents) and determine what the gripes were - and what little non-muscle things could be done. After developing the local Narrartive (which had nothing to do with Communism), the teams would then subvert the community and radicalize it against the local government factors and symbols. Of course, that meant killing off unpopular landlords, local officials and teachers, etc.; but only after the local community was more or less ready for those more drastic measures. From our standpoint, it was a Devil's Soup.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Hi Steve,

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    The study (Rand # R0462,186 pages) referenced by Slapout provides an interesting analysis of insurgency using Algeria, Cuba, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, the US, and Vietnam among other countries as examples. How endogenous and (cross border) exogenous factors influence an insurgency are discussed beginning on page 22 (34 of the pdf document). Figure 1 on page 35 (page 47 of the pdf) provides a succinct pictorial summary of the open system of an insurgency.

    Fali Huang’s paper provides another vantage point in which the clash of interests of a King, Elites, and Workers are examined. Depending upon how one defines the locations of each participant it seems possible to use his model to examine a non-Westphalian system i.e. one which is not confined by national borders.
    Thanks for the links. This thread is becoming a treasure trove for good reading. I'll get to them as time allows.

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    The enemy is skilled, but they are not invisible to us. The reach and grasp of our global kill chain is a very long one, however no one has an absolute understanding of the battlefield. We could significantly increase our understanding if we focused upon language/culture/people skills for each of our soldiers but there would still be a delta between us and absolute understanding of the battlefield. To steal a phrase, people are more important than hardware and I would argue that Iraq and Afghanistan have taught many of us that it is cost effective to for our military to increase it’s collective language/culture/people skills.
    I need to clarify that statement (and it's a direct quote from Dr. Gordon McCormick not my original thought). In the beginning of the insurgency, the insurgent IS invisible, and the one comparative advantage they have throughout the struggle is an information advantage. That advantage may not last long if the host nation is effective. So, one of the key task for a counter-insurgent is to find the enemy. The easiest/most accurate way is gaining the information from the populace.

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    The concept of FEBA – aka Forward Edge of the Battle Area (or False Enthusiasm and Bull#### Attitude for cadet veterans ) no longer applies to warfare as presently practiced. Instead we have the creeping amorphous horror that currently plagues parts of our world.
    I partially disagree. The current small wars may not be linear, but the enemy controls pockets of territory. In a big city, it may simply be the "bad" neighborhoods where the police don't venture.


    Oil spot theory is an interesting way to look at things. All geographic and financially interested stakeholders are able to provide spheres of influence…which stakeholders are we empowering and involving? Is this our fight alone?
    Agreed, and my first three COAs could be derivatives of Oil spots depending on how the ground commander viewed the situation. I'd probably recommend this approach, and the areas chosen must be considered based on conditions.

    From Slapout:

    That is the most critical part of the study. It provides a model of a living/adapting/open system. There is a difference between what was called The General Systems Theory which is based upon biology vs. a Systems Engineering approach which deals with closed/non-adapting systems. Both have their place but whenever you deal with any living system you are best to stay in the realm of General Systems Theory. It has one main rule.....the side that adapts to the situation the fastest is probably going to survive.
    Exactly, and brilliant post by the way. In a small war, adaptation is a competition for information for the host nation and mobilization for the insurgent. Whoever adapts fastest wins.

    From JMM:
    With the benches, I was looking at a more primitive rural situation in what could be called a failed or largely failing state. In all three situations, the folks have to be "educated, vetted, paid, and supplied"; but what those quoted words mean will differ greatly.

    You (engineer) and I (bio-chemist in a former life; and lawyer in present life) would be over-educated for the roles needed in a very basic situtation. We could adapt (I suspect), but we would need to adapt to the very basic conditions and problems presented.
    Mike, I have no doubt that you and Steve could adapt and thrive.

    Best,

    Mike

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    Default To add to the information overload ...

    I happened on the following 2008 theses, which seem to bear on aspects of what we are discussing - especially how insurgencies and counter-insurgencies differ dependent on the environment and adaptations to it:

    Michael R. Wilcheck, Risen from the Ashes: Phoenix and the Struggle against the Viet Cong Shadow Government.

    The Past in the Future: Phoenix Applications for the Present and Tomorrow

    It has been said that those who do not learn from history are destined to repeat it. In studying Phoenix, the author believes that its story holds several important lessons that still remain applicable in today‟s world. There is no formula for fighting an insurgency that can be universally applied, nor will one ever exist. The very nature of an insurgency is unique to a specific time and place and specific to a people and their culture. Thus, when conducting counterinsurgency in foreign countries, it is essential that policymakers be well educated on the country where it is taking place. As was the case in Vietnam, a lack of understanding between Western-educated policy makers and a non-Western culture on which those policies are thrust can hinder counterinsurgency efforts from being as effective as they could be.
    ....
    Robert Wall stated, “Phoenix represented the strategy that could have won the war.” Yet, it did not win the war. Although one may argue that Wall‟s statement may have greatly oversimplified the reasons for South Vietnam‟s eventual defeat, it is important that the United States learn from Phoenix so that America does not once again repeat Wall‟s words substituting another program in another insurgency. By learning from Phoenix and applying the universal lessons made evident through it, America can take positive steps to ensure an effective strategy does not once again fail.
    Edward A. Brady, Urban and Rural Insurgencies: A Comparative Analysis.

    Chapter 4
    Conclusions

    A victory is not [just] the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. It is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population. - David Galula

    The four historical examples studied in this paper display many of the traits commonly associated with insurgent warfare. Winning requires a political solution, not simply a military one. These struggles are protracted in nature. The ultimate goal of the insurgency is replacing the existing government. And both the insurgents and counterinsurgents battled for legitimacy throughout the various conflicts. Both the Anti-Huk campaign and the Battle of Algiers can be viewed as government victories. While important, France’s political defeat in Algeria came about by factors beyond the scope of this study. The Afghan insurgency is at a stalemate, which favors the insurgency. The Baghdad insurgency was tipping steeply toward an insurgent victory during the period studied. Based on this bag of mixed results, we will now review the most essential aspects of the four insurgencies here studied, to determine the similarities and differences of the underlying dynamics of urban and rural insurgencies.
    ....
    This thesis historically analyzed two rural insurgencies and two urban insurgencies to determine the underlying similarities and differences between the two types of insurgencies. A systematic analysis of these four cases revealed two similar dynamics and two divergent dynamics. The first similarity is that insurgents must be able to hide in order to expand in the beginning and middle stages of an insurgency. The second similarity is that the ability to hide and grow depends on the relative capabilities between the insurgents and counterinsurgents to operate in insurgent base areas. The divergent dynamics are that the criticality of popular support to the insurgent and the density of high-impact targets for insurgents to strike vary between urban and rural insurgency.

    Implications

    Although the underlying dynamics of rural and urban insurgencies are very similar, there are also some important differences. These differences do not require diverse conceptual approaches. They may, however, require modifications in technique that current doctrine fails to address adequately. Therefore, the insights developed in this thesis should be carefully considered by doctrine writers to validate, refute, or amend existing COIN doctrines.
    Best

    Mike

  17. #77
    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

    The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

    1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

    2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

    3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

    Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.
    These are all excellent and useful ideas, but they all hang up on one of the basic realities of our current COIN problems: we're not fighting our insurgencies, we're fighting someone else's. Most communities are not comfortable with the idea of furriners setting up schools or holding influence over what is taught, or setting up courts and holding influence over decisions, or setting up councils and holding influence over who sits on those councils and what is debated. Even if we try to be impartial, the perception that these institutions represent foreign influence is bound to be present. To the extent that resistance to foreign influence is a part of the insurgent narrative, this sort of activity may actually support that narrative.

    Of course it's best if this sort of organizing is done by the Government we're supporting, but it often isn't... or if it is, it is aimed less at building durable institutions with popular support than at supporting individuals or groups that suit the convenience of the governing elite.

    It's easy to say that the governments we support need to govern effectively, but that falls into the "good morning, Captain Obvious" category. If they had the will and the capacity to govern effectively they probably wouldn't be facing insurgencies in the first place.

    This is the hole we have dug for ourselves: we are heavily invested in Governments that cannot stand, but that we cannot allow to fall. If we try to govern in their place, we undercut their vestigial authority and credibility. If we allow them to govern on their own, they won't. If we try to assist them, we come up against the reality that our agenda (development of effective institutions) is generally very different from theirs (personal gain).

    It's a gnarly problem. The only solution I can think of would be to not have gotten into this position in the first place, but it's a wee bit late for that.

  18. #78
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    Default Not hung up ....

    As to this:

    from Dayuhan
    These are all excellent and useful ideas, but they all hang up on one of the basic realities of our current COIN problems: we're not fighting our insurgencies, we're fighting someone else's.
    I see no "Made in USA" label on what I wrote:

    from JMM

    I suggest that a less elaborate approach to civil affairs is more feasible.

    The following could be realized by using a few benches sitting in the shade of a pleasant grove:

    1. A school, where the important factors are who the teacher is and what the teacher teaches.

    2. A court, where again the important factors are who the judge is and what the judge decides.

    3. A council, where again the important factors are who the elders are and what they legislate in accord with what the local concept of governance is.

    Since we are dealing with a semi-permissive environment, the folks who assist in establishing these very basic local institutions have to be an armed political action team capable of self-defense. And, since we'll posit the presence of larger groups of bad guys, that team needs its own set of protective Dobermans cruising the neighborhood.
    or on what Steve added:

    from Surferbeetle

    We could also discuss a five-year master plan for the AO on those same benches. Lets consider the demographics of who will be participating in these four separate events upon the multi-use benches.

    1. Teachers/Teachers Assistants who are educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to educational system.

    2. Judges/Lawyers/Police who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to judicial system.

    3. Politicians who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to political system.

    4. Engineers/Tech’s/Blue Collar Workers who have been educated, vetted, paid, and supplied by an agreed to engineering system.

    Capacity building (aka raising/training a local technocrat army) allows us to focus scarce resources upon the systems which sustain benches or buildings as the situation dictates.
    Strictly a generic framework for one portion of a civil affairs program.

    Unless the foreign armed political action workers happen to have solid language and cultural training and education, as well as considerable in-country experience, I can't see how they could execute very well at the very basic level I'm talking about.

    Taking Steve's four systems (educational, judicial, political and engineering), I'm positing those systems to be indigenous, which would require foreign "assisters" to learn the local systems and to adapt to them - not the other way around.

    You hit the problem for external intervenors (goes beyond GOs and includes NGOs), with this:

    from Dayuhen
    Of course it's best if this sort of organizing is done by the Government we're supporting, but it often isn't... or if it is, it is aimed less at building durable institutions with popular support than at supporting individuals or groups that suit the convenience of the governing elite.
    It is often in the enlightened self-interest of "governments" in failed or failing states - also applicable to the various armed groups that may well be roaming around - to preserve what we (liberal democracies) see as instability and insecurity; and to use what they see as a rational distribution of instability and insecurity to serve their own ends. Credits: Marc Legrange.

    The fundamental issue is whether to intervene or not, which is a basic policy issue for Politik. Frankly, we (US) have intervened over my lifetime in a number of situations where the governments we supported were greater or lesser mutts - and where FID assistance sometimes morphed into much larger GPF commitments. In a number of those situations, the narratives of the insurgents have had greater appeal to me than the narratives of the "host governments" - realizing that the folks behind insurgents had their own agendas which did not correspond to the narratives that were being propagated. In short, in many cases, a Third Way would have been the more preferred solution to me - not really feasible since then we (US) would have been waging unconventional warfare against both the "host governments" and the insurgents.

    For Politik, the reason for intervening will determine the initial desired end state and also the parameters of the Political Struggle and the Military Struggle to reach that end state. The possible reasons for intervention are not likely to be totally consistent with one another. For example, in SOCOM's 2008 Strategic Appreciation, we have for Africa this (p.23):

    U.S. INTERESTS

    The group viewed the dynamics of Africa through the prism of United States national interests. Specifically:

    - Maintaining access to African resources

    - Ensuring homeland security (with a particular focus on disease; violent extremist organizations [VEOs]; transnational criminal organizations [TCOs]; and weapons of mass destruction [WMD] proliferation and transportation)

    - Supporting human development (political, economic, and social) as a means toward establishing stability in Africa

    The United States must review its African selective engagement policies in light of national interests. Simply stated, the United States cannot effectively engage all the challenges that exist across the entire continent.
    It is easy to posit a situation (or find one in existence) where the first interest (access to resources) might well be better or more easily secured by support of a "government" that does not support "human development" or "stability".

    Once Politik decides to intervene, the civilian and military subordinates of Politik don't have the luxury of reversing the decision, but must try to make the best of what may be a bad situation.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 12-22-2009 at 06:46 PM.

  19. #79
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    Hi MikeF,

    Meant to post this one here the other day, OBE. Merry Christmas.

    From the WSJ by Ann Marlowe, Fighting a Smarter War in Afghanistan

    No substantial business sends its sales force out to sell a product without supplying them with market research. But we are doing just that to our troops in Afghanistan. We've spent an estimated $173 billion in fiscal year 2009 selling a product to Afghans—cooperation with their government—without much idea why some people buy it and others don't.

    On the platoon and company level, where American troops conduct ground-level counterinsurgency (COIN) in the Afghan Pashtun belt, we're fighting a good war. During five embeds with the Army from 2007 to last month, I've seen lieutenants and captains survey their area of operations, collecting information on the economy and patterns of work and travel. They regularly sit down with local elders to collaborate on development and security measures.
    The problem is that valuable data are collected, but then aren't analyzed, or not at the level where the rubber meets the road. What's more, experienced soldiers leave. So most of our soldiers are operating with bare guesses about where the leverage points are in their local populations.
    The good news is that more sophisticated methods are now being introduced in Afghanistan. Col. Pamela J. Hoyt heads the first team tasked with analyzing data in Afghanistan for the generals who set policy.

    "What we have found, as you state, is that data is not in one repository with easy access," Col. Hoyt wrote to me in a Dec. 15 email. She's developing a database using previous surveys as well as "a model to evaluate if the Afghan National Army can achieve their growth objective given historical recruiting, attrition, and re-contracting rates, and increased recruiting levels."
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-24-2009 at 12:25 AM.
    Sapere Aude

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    From the Nov 12th 2009 Economist: Iraq's mobile-phone revolution Better than freedom?

    During recent years of civil strife, when many stayed indoors, mobile phones were the lifeline. They also became a tool of commerce. Reluctant to risk their lives by visiting a bank, many subscribers transferred money to each other by passing on the serial numbers of scratch cards charged with credit, like gift vouchers. Recipients simply add the credit to their account or sell it on to shops that sell the numbers at a slight discount from the original. This impromptu market has turned mobile-phone credit into a quasi-currency, undermining the traditional informal hawala banking system.

    The market’s growing size is making some bankers wonder if phone credit should be traded on a public exchange. This may not be practical, but more regulation would be welcome. Criminal rings are among the parallel currency’s busiest users. Kidnap gangs ask for ransom to be paid by text messages listing a hundred or more numbers of high-value phone cards. Prostitutes get regular customers to send monthly retainers to their phones, earning them the nickname “scratch-card concubines”, while corrupt government officials ask citizens for $50 in phone credit to perform minor tasks. Viewed as cash substitutes, scratch cards have also drawn the attention of armed robbers. In one case, a gang emptied out the card storage of Iraq’s biggest mobile operator, Zain, which is based in neighbouring Kuwait.

    Not to be left out of the bonanza, Iraq’s cash-strapped government now says it will sell a fourth mobile-operating licence, after raising $1.25 billion from each of the last three. That is less than its vast oil reserves promise to put into the state’s coffers but a lot easier to negotiate. And Baghdad is not the only place where mobile-phone commerce thrives. The UN says it has plans to deliver aid to Iraqi refugees in Syria in the same way.
    From the Feb 22nd 2008 Economist: Bringing the poor online, It won't be as easy as providing mobile phones

    THE mobile-phone industry returned from its mammoth annual trade show, 3GSM, held earlier this month in Barcelona, gloating over its successful year. More than 3 billion (almost half the world’s population) now have mobiles, and the price of a phone has sunk as low as $25. There are now more mobile-phone subscribers in poor countries than rich ones. That would have been unimaginable a decade ago.

    Mobile phones have improved poor people’s lives tremendously, from providing political news and health-care information in remote areas to fuelling commerce. Enthusiasm over bringing technology to the world’s poor has been matched in the computing industry, with many companies now selling low-cost laptop computers (so far around $200, but poised to drop much further). But the next digital hurdle—providing internet access—will be much harder to surmount, for both economic and geographical reasons.
    Mobile-phone usage is inexpensive because the networks are cheap and easy to build. Equipment is priced low due to rabid competition (particularly from Chinese makers). The capital expenditure differs, too: coverage is built piecemeal as subscribers swell, bolstered by generous vendor financing. And almost all subscribers are on pre-paid plans, so operators collect money before the first call is connected.
    Sapere Aude

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