They emphasis on Alokozai structures may have the most merit indeed. I wonder at the same time though, if coalition forces might be forced nonetheless to adopt enemy-centric approaches in the wake of successful population-centric approaches. If we subscribe to the Sexton model of how the Taliban take over a village (yup, that piece has gained a ton of traction with me ), I think we could expect to see the Taliban exert effort to regain control if the district/area in question is truly worth it.As for the Naylor article, I suspect that the situation is more complicated than presented in this piece, but I also wonder if there is too much of an enemy-centric focus. The Alokozai in the Arghandab District did have an intelligence net and a militia force that seemed to be somewhat effective in 2006-2007, at least to the point that the Taliban was not actively challenging control of the district. Maybe the priority should be placed on strengthening the Alokozai and assisting them in regenerating these capabilities?
This makes me wonder what made Arghandab District worth it to the Taliban; to the point that they employed an IED campaign on that scale to defend their interests.
An excellent IO target if I ever read of one. Siting patrol bases, either temporary or HESCO-based, is potentially critical enough that we need to get past those reservations somehow.In addition, there is strong local resistance to having a patrol base as a neighbor because of the belief that such bases are IED and RPG magnets, a sentiment that I heard expressed at several shuras in the Arghandab District in 2007-2008.
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