Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[Bob's World]

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community. If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration.

WWII was conceived in Versailles, not some Munich beer hall; and GWOT was conceived in the US policy decisions not to roll back Cold War controls in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War as it did in Europe; and not in some cave in Afghanistan. Conception isn't evil, often it is just ignorance or negligence; but those arguments won't relieve one from a judgment of a duty to deal with the consequences in the world court any more than they will in family court. Far easier to blame it on the bastard child that emerges for being born, but that won't truly solve the problem as it ignores the roots of it all.


Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail. But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

My personal quest continues.

[Firn]

Before moving back to the topic, I will just want to bring an example in CvC's timeframe to show just how difficult it is to divide the phenomenon war into clearly defined elements.

During the Napoleonic wars the Austrian crownland Tyrol was ceded by Austria to the French ally Bavaria. It has been the ambition of many a Bavarian ruler and the largest part of it's population spoke a similar German dialect, a large part an Italian dialect and a relative small one Raetoroman (Ladin). All shared the same catholic faith, and the rural population had a similar way of life.

However liberal reforms and Austrian victories brought up the whole country and to a differing degrees the different communities against the French and their puppets which were the legitimate rulers of the land. Due to the strong will of the population, political organisation, widly dispersed and famous skill in markmanship, good armament and the mountains the insurgents were able to inflict very severe defeats on the forces of the government and their French allies. The Austrian Empire aided their former crownland little, but used of course their will to fight to their advantage. After new defeats the Austrians would cede Tyrol again which would rise up and drive the new rulers out again after having found the right occasion. This would repeat itself 4 times in a single year, until the fourth times only part of the leaders and the militias would meet head on with the main body of the enemy, as many felt betrayed by Austria. (The last three times an open battle against the main force had worked just fine).

So how can we define this wars? COIN, counter-counter-revolutionary wars, (multi)nationalist uprising, (defensive) people's war, a (small) war to support the main effort ?

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The link provided by Slapout provides some very interesting insights. The need of organisations skilled in the techniques employed by law enforcement and the secret services to operate effectively against the (more political) moves of the enemy is obvious. While the military has, due to the situation on the ground to shoulder most of the weight it is difficult to swallow that perhaps far more suited and experienced members and organisations have seemingly not been used in sufficiently intensive and skilled manner.

With the combat outposts and the efforts of their personnel under constant enemy watch there is a glaring need to have also more covert elements working to create a huge and yet fine net to recruit, observe, identify, filter, control, target, and so on. There are many ways and possibilities to aid this efforts, many of them are most likely already already in field, some not, but so far the effort to counter the infiltration and subversion seems to have been not strong enough. This is especially true when it comes to the cooperation between the coalition and the Afghan government/leaders/organisations.


Firn

P.S: It certainly surprised me how strictly the insurgents in the mentioned case study devided the military and political organisations and tasks.

[marct]

Hi Bob,

2 points, then I am signing off to focus on more pressing items.

1. Yes the movement in Thailand is an insurgency. The percentage of the populace is small, but the issues of poor governance that are perceived by the geographically concentrated Muslim populace are pervasive in that community.

Personally, I think this is playing definition games. I have no problem with that, but it's always a good idea to be up front about it since I have a feeling that definitions, and how they are constructed and used, are at the heart of much of the apparent "disagreements" with your model.

Broadly speaking, there are three major types of definitions:

1. "Crisp" definitions of the either / or type. Usually based in some form of nomonological-deductive model, they are "certain" or "yes/no" types. As a note, people tend to us this form most often even if they have no idea if it is the correct form for when and where they are using it. Take a look at the accuracy of eyewitness testimony for an example of this .
2. "Fuzzy" or probabilistic definitions. These are usually presented either as probabilities - e.g. "I'm pretty sure it's an insurgency; say 80% - or, much less likely but more accurately, "it has certain characteristics in common with accepted definitions of insurgency, but several that are either not there or only in minimal form".
3. Plausible definitions. These tend to be used when people are trying to figure out concepts, constructs and just what they should be looking for. So, for example, if you were to look at the case of various and sundry national liberation movements in Quebec during the past 50 years, why didn't an open insurgency develop? All of the hallmarks were there: a distinct culture, poor governance, a different language and religion (on the whole), popular support for separation, etc.

Normally, all of these definitions tend to be used together but towards different ends so, for example, when you are talking about the Thai insurgency

If 5% of a county's populace perceives it is not receiving good governance and they are dispersed across that country, you don't have much likelihood of insurgency. Note also that the Thai insurgency is what I would classify as a separatist insurgency. They don't want to change the entire country, they recognize that is unlikely and want to be released. If the Thai government wants to resolve it they need to either annex of that chunk of land and resident populace; or address the issues giving rise to the perceptions of poor governance.

What this indicates to me is that you are dealing with a whole slew of different concepts. Pulling them apart, you've got

1. a rough model relating to the likelihood of an insurgency happening that draws on size of the group and dispersion of the group at a purely geographic level.
2. you switch levels between a nation state and a local community, and
3. you ascribe motivation back to perceptions of poor governance.

Now, the issue of governance is, as I think we would all agree, tricky. My suspicion is that the motivation is only partly related to the quality of the governance and much more related to the perception of the legitimacy of the governance. Key point here is that you appear to be conflating "good", which is qualitative and probabilistic, with "legitimate" which tends to be more "crisp".

Quirky little movements rise and fade, or persevere in their quirky little communities, but never burst into insurgency regardless of the strength of ideology or the dynamicism of leadership when embedded within a populace that is generally experiencing good governance. These things are ever present in all societies. It is only when governance fails that the medium is created within a populace for such sparks to ignite into a conflagration. (emphasis added)

Now, that "never" is a crisp definition. Really? How about the American Revolution? What it comes down to again is definitions and you appear, to be using a tautology on "good" where if an insurgency happens then it must have been due to "not good" governance.

Lastly, while I have fielded several "I don't agrees", a few "I don't think sos" and a couple of "what about's"; no one to my knowledge has put on the table a single example of a single insurgency that does not fit within my construct. I've been looking for such examples diligently myself, but to no avail.

If you are looking for an example, try Algeria which had a very low initial support for the insurgency there. If you want another example, check out the various Jacobin revolts; the motivation has to do more with legitimacy than with effectiveness of governance structures. I would also strongly urge you to look at cases where they have crappy governance, and yet don't have a continuing situation of insurgency. Basically, what I am getting at is that you need a really good definition of "governance" that is probabilistic rather than crisp.

But I'm not here to argue, I have been here in the pursuit of thinking that will help preserve my nation and aid it in the pursuit of its interests in a manner that are not perceived as onerous to those around her.

No worries, Bob . Some day, we need to get a bunch of us together in a convivial intellectual setting (aka a bar or brew pub), and really try to thrash out a decent "fuzzy" model of this - I'll buy the first round .

Cheers,

Marc