Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.
David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.
Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.
Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Well stated, but the message must include.
Let's work for peace. Let us not work against each other. Let's cooperate for our children's sake not our own personal interest. If you choose the latter, if you attack us, then we will push every asset to destroy you. Please choose peace. The moment is ours to decide. Let us pray together.
Our nation has and continues to benefit from an steadfastly apolitical military skilled at the various ways of warfare.
Although we must at certain times and places, outside of our nations borders, walk, wade, or swim in the waters/solvent of politics with all of their unseen currents and various questionable additives it is not wise to drink of the same, nor foolishly conflate our role with that of politicians, native or otherwise.
In the spirit of gaining some understanding about the waters currently roaring through the floodplain and applicable/non-applicable TTP's....
The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq by Rory Stewart
In August of 2003, Rory Stewart (known to the Arabs of southern Iraq as Seyyd Rory) "took a taxi from Jordan to Baghdad to ask for a job from the Director of Operations". This was four months after the Coalition invasion. Shortly thereafter Stewart wound up as deputy governate coordinator of Maysan. He became, at age 30, the de-facto governor of a province of 850,000 in southern Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the war. This is his story"I had never believed that mankind, unless overawed by a strong government, would fall inevitably into violent chaos. Societies were orderly, I thought, because human cultures were orderly. Written laws and policy played only a minor role. But Maysan [province] made me reconsider."
Sapere Aude
Bumping this with an edit to the main list in post #18. I was reading a Kimberly Kagan piece in Foreign Policy and began to think about the insurgent's use of shape-clear-hold-build (or some other similar flow) as a continuum to organize his efforts.
We probably need to understand where he is in the process, as there are certain nuances to our approach based on that.
CNAS, 4 Jan 09: Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan by Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, Paul D. Batchelor, DIA and discussed in greater detail here at SWJ.
From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army ReserveThe U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population.There are more than enough analysts in Afghanistan. Too many are simply in the wrong places and assigned to the wrong jobs. It is time to prioritize U.S. intelligence efforts and bring them in line with the war’s objectives.
Google Earth KML programming linkThis section presents the primary research question of this monograph as determining the potential value of using Geospatial Information Systems to assist the Government of Colombia’s counterinsurgency efforts and thus provide a framework for determining the value of using GIS as a tool in other counterinsurgency settings. After a discussion of the doctrinal and conceptual background that informs the project, it discusses the methodology, limits, and delimitations of the project. The following chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding counterinsurgency and the critical role terrain plays in it.
KML is a file format used to display geographic data in an Earth browser such as Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Maps for mobile.
Last edited by Surferbeetle; 01-05-2010 at 09:29 PM. Reason: Added SAMS paper and Google Earth KML links...
Sapere Aude
Its usually a pretty good practice to think through and understand what you expect to do and how you expect to do it before actually doing it.
Situation dependent of course.
Also helps to remember that to assume it's implied in clear holds the very high likelihood that the particular operation is approached more in a what do I want to make happen as opposed to what needs to happen to facilitate"X" and what might help to influence it that direction.
Last edited by Ron Humphrey; 01-06-2010 at 09:34 PM. Reason: Added information
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
First, JCustis- good luck downrange brother. As time allows from the day-to-day business of doing the good work, let us know what your thinking in terms of theory and practice.
Second, I meant to address this question a while ago. If I'm successfull, hopefully, I'll encompass it in my next series of essays, but for now, here's an attempt in this thread.
No. Shape is a separate phase. In reality, the collective "we" does a poor job of shaping. Remember, in a denied area of sanctuary, we do not know what is going on. Doctrinally, we have many terms to describe this process- IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield), Reconnaissance, and Survellaince.
Ultimately, we're just trying to figure out what we know and what we don't know. Throughout this phase, which remains simultaneous in later efforts, we seek to answer:
What do we think we know? What is actually going on? Who is fighting whom? Who is the enemy? What does the enemy think they know? What does the enemy want? What do the people need? What is the enemy's weakness? What are we missing here?
One way of approaching these answers to define facts and assumptions for MDMP is the following:
SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.
v/r
Mike
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