Kandahar Province: catch all thread

[Icepack6]

Recieved the following through forwarded email; cannot attest to its veracity:

If the generals training the Afghan Army and Police can train them well enough to occupy these villages cleared by our warriors things will improve in Afghanistan. We all need a police force of some size whether it be in Afghanistan or in our own home town. When our warriors depart to clean up another village or area, the one just left must be occupied by friendlies with guns; otherwise the Talaban will be back. Training the Afghan Army and Police will take a lot longer than one might surmise. Patience is needed. That does not seem to abound in this society.

From an in-country Company Commander of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines.

I finally have a minute to sit down and write a letter concerning the past few weeks here in Now Zad. I wanted to make sure that I got the word out to everyone, so please send this out to friends and family that I may have missed on the distro list. I first want to say how incredibly proud of my boys I am. These Marines have been amazing and continue to be amazing. Between them and the amazing support staff that we have in 3/4 that allows us to do quite literally whatever we want to the Taliban, this has almost been an easy operation.

Here are the up sides:
1) Not a single Marine was killed or seriously wounded during this operation.
2) We have taken more ground, run off more Taliban, liberated more villages, and seized more weapons and Home Made Explosives than has ever happened in Now Zad. One of the caches of HME that we blew up was over 1100 lbs of HME (for a reference, that's over 16 "Mine-Proof" vehicles completely destroyed) and it was the largest find in Helmand Province. Ever.
3) We air inserted two companies, behind enemy lines, while my company went straight up the gut of the enemy's defense on the ground. The enemy was so terrified that he abandoned his stockpiles and ran away to where he thought he was safe. Some of them ran right into the arms of the British Battalion to our East, some of them we have hunted down since they ran. More importantly, we have begun to HOLD the ground by immediately building coalition positions in strategic locations all over the valley and partnering with the local Police and Army units. Let's not forget, the infantry is a TERRAIN based organization. We don't have to kill people in order to do our job, only if those people don't want us on that specific piece of dirt and wants to come get a taste.
4) We aggressively sought out and crushed a Murder and Intimidation racket that was going on in our AO. (M&I campaigns are used when the enemy has no other tactic but overwhelming fear to instill on the local population. The 'night letters' that were being delivered said things like:
"If you accept help from Coalition Forces we will kill your children one by one..." Except that Marines got to the letter writers first. Whammy.
5) We have re-opened a once deserted town to the people and have begun to pay them to clean it up. Quick cash infusion + Heavy labor for young men + promise of more work = no young guys re-enlisting in the Taliban. One of the key components of this plan was to instantly follow up with a Civil Affairs Group that would handle local national problems that weren't related
to the Taliban (food, shelter, work, etc...)
6) We have begun Medical Programs for the locals with what supplies we have. Those supplies are limited, but they are able to cover things like burns, and kids stepping on mines (yes, we MedEvac them just like we would a Marine), and skin rashes, and even an infant with pneumonia who is just fine, now.
7) Our engineers breached a mine-field that had completely frozen other forces. Our Danish friends brought some tanks to help us out and they were able to break up one or two ambushes for us. Nothing is cooler than getting ambushed and having tanks with you to respond. Nothing
8) Your Marines stayed on point, in the freezing cold weather, with the rain soaking them to the bone, to hunt down the Taliban who had been abusing, killing, and stealing from the people of the Now Zad Valley.
9) We are bringing back government into Now Zad, so people have an alternative than the Taliban to settle their legal disputes, and have someone to hold accountable for a lack of medical coverage, and to go to with their grievances about farming and commerce and security. They won't NEED us to hold them up any longer.

If all of this sounds like hubris, maybe it is. But I'm so proud of my Company and my Battalion for the planning and the execution and the follow through that they have done. Be proud of your Marines, they did good work in December. Merry Christmas to everyone. Much Love to all, let your friends know, we're winning and it feels good.

[slapout9]

Icepak 6 you need to find more emails like that one

[Rex Brynen]

UN pulls some foreign staff from Kandahar

United Nations withdraws half of its twenty foreign staff, orders local workers to stay home in wake of blasts

Sonia Verma
Kandahar — Globe and Mail Update
Published on Monday, Apr. 26, 2010 10:38AM EDT

The United Nations has withdrawn roughly half of its twenty foreign staff from Kandahar City and ordered its local Afghan workers to stay home, underscoring a growing sense of insecurity in this southern city.

The move came just a few hours after militants detonated three bombs in downtown Kandahar City Monday morning, killing two civilians and wounding two others.

“We’re re-evaluating the security situation and have pulled some of our staff to Kabul,” confirmed Susan Manuel, director of communications for the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

The decision was made based on a “combination of information and action,” she said. Ms. Manuel described the new measures as temporary but would not specify when staff would resume their postings.

Monday’s attacks signified the Taliban’s latest effort to show their strength in the city that is both their spiritual birthplace and the staging ground for a major NATO military offensive this summer.

As coalition troops ramp up operations ahead of a broad military surge meant to take decisive control of the area, Taliban insurgents have also stepped up attacks with a series of brazen assassinations and bombings.

Since April 12, at least 20 civilians have been killed in Kandahar City, including prominent Afghan politicians and civilians including children.

The attacks have become almost daily occurrences, rattling residents already deeply wary of the coming NATO operation, billed as the make-or-break battle of the war....

[Sylvan]

Replace AWK with Sherzai.

Success and failure in Kanadahar rests with the Afghans themselves.
The ANSF is strong enough to do whatever is needed. What is lacking is a legitimate representative of both the Kabul govnermnent and the people of Kandahar.

[jcustis]

More at the Army Times link:

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/1...ander-112711w/

A snippet:

Report blames lapses on Stryker commander
532-page report finds colonel ignored doctrine, proper procedure in leading undisciplined BCT
By Michelle Tan - Staff writer
Posted : Sunday Nov 27, 2011 9:06:28 EST

The frustration and confusion that permeated the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, was so pervasive that the brigade almost wasn’t certified to deploy, and senior commanders in Afghanistan lost confidence in the brigade commander’s ability to lead, according to an Army investigation.

The 4,000-member brigade, commanded by Col. Harry Tunnell, was rife with lapses of discipline, misdirection and mixed signals about its mission in one of the most important regions of Afghanistan.

Much of the blame is put on Tunnell, whose lack of emphasis on administrative matters such as command inspections and urinalysis “may have helped create an environment in which misconduct could occur,” the investigation found.

The environment created the setting for a series of deadly events:

• Five soldiers from one platoon in 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, were accused of killing innocent Afghan civilians “for sport.” Four of the soldiers have been convicted for their involvement in the deaths.

Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs, the accused ringleader, was convicted Nov. 10 of 15 counts, including three counts of premeditated murder, and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The court-martial of the fifth soldier is scheduled for January.

• One soldier died from a vehicle rollover in part because he was not following regulations requiring seatbelt use.

• Seven soldiers and an interpreter were killed when a platoon ignored procedure and failed to dismount from their Stryker before driving over a “suspicious chokepoint” — when the platoon directly in front of them did so to minimize the risk of being hit by a roadside bomb. A massive bomb hidden in that chokepoint was “detonated by a patient triggerman,” an officer from the unit told investigators.

• About 15 soldiers from the same platoon are accused of regularly smoking hashish in their housing units and even in one of the unit’s Strykers.

As a result, at least eight soldiers — five officers and three senior noncommissioned officers — have been recommended for letters of admonition, memoranda of reprimand or letters of concern.

The inside story of the brigade came in a scathing 532-page report obtained by Army Times. Brig. Gen. Stephen Twitty, the investigating officer appointed to determine the command climate within the brigade and whether it had any causal relation to the alleged criminal activity, describes a brigade that was rife with turmoil from the start.

[Bob's World]

I served in RC South under general Carter and worked with him and BG Hodges on a daily basis. I also worked closely with Harry Tunnell and his staff. I'll just offer this: I have not read this lengthy report, but from the highlighted quotes I have seen there is a middle perspective that is not addressed very well.

Harry and his Brigade did indeed "clear" the Arghandab valley; though when he would tell me that he "defeated the Taliban in the Arghandab" I would tell him that I believed he overstated the effects of their actions. (But this is no less true of the Clear-Hold-Build operations later pursued under the team led by Carter and Hodges). As to the follow-on mission Harry was given to keep the highways open from East to West across Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul; and North to South from upper Kandahar down to the border crossing at Spin Boldak, there is a "Feasibility" assessment that needs to be applied to bridge the gap between BG Hodges and COL Tunnell. There is probably 50% of the populace of that region that lives with in a few miles (walk over and plant an IED at night range) of that route. Strykers are well suited to running up and down roads and engaging threats; such units are not well suited, nor nearly large enough to engage the vast, diverse populaces along that route in "pop-centric COIN" and convince them that they have no need to attack the ISAF forces that were bringing Northern Alliance forces and governmental officals down to rule over them.

I don't think Harry was right in his perspective, and he was a powerful, dynamic, outspoken advocate for what he felt was the most effective employment of his command. I never heard or saw him disrespect his seniors; only disagree professionally as was his duty. I never saw or heard of him disobeying any orders; only fail to meet expectations that were arguably not feasible to begin with.

Not taking sides, but as I said, there is a middle ground that is not well addressed in what I have seen on this so far.

[davidbfpo]

Oddly considering the key role of Kandahar Province and city this thread has not been updated for a long time. So it was refreshing to see this update, which contains an optimistic assessment, notably on the ANSF. It ends with:

But make no mistake about it, Kandahar right now is much improved, and continuing to head in the right direction. And so are the Afghan national security forces.

Link:http://www.brookings.edu/research/op...em_alert032513