Blasphemy: Article advocates afternoon PT

[Ken White]

I know its hard to believe but there are individuals out there who would when individual PT was given would be off slacking somewhere.

Well of course there are -- the same guys will also sluff on keeping their uniform and equipment squared away and anything else their NCOs will let them get away with. So it all boils down to that first line leader.

Now when the leader, who is responsible for everything that unit does or fails to do, collides with the human instinct to take the course of least resistance, then I think the leader trumps all to insure mission success and a certain level of physical fitness among his men.

Yep. Question is what leader are you speaking of. Tm ldr? Sqd Ldr? Platoon Sgt / Pl or PC? Co 1SG or Cdr?

Now I am not saying that every PT session needs to be a platoon or company formation run, what I am saying is giving NCO's the responsibility to led their squads and fire teams on a daily basis builds leadership among those NCO's and insures a level of fitness among the troops.

Ah. Slight change. I can almost agree with that -- except the level of physical fitness HAS to be an individual responsibility. Even as long ago as I retired, smoking troopies for fun and profit was illegal...

I just retired from the Marine Corps.

I know, I read your Intro post -- but that was too good a target to pass up...

My experience tells me that its a combination of both. Field training no doubt builds unit cohesion, but the whole garrison experience builds it as well.

True but the Garrison cohesion is largely a different animal and not conducive to combat cohesion -- that's why I said watch who the Troops run around with in Garrison. In most units, only after extensive field work will they run around with sqd and platoon mates instead of others they have something else in common with.

Agreed, there should be no room for micromanagement in a combat unit, but supervision from a distance is another story. Mentor, teach, and instruct.

I agree with the theory; I suspect we'd disagree on the distance.

Hey I liked individual PT just like everybody else, but I do not think that letting individuals go out and do it themselves is the answer. Nor do I think it is the units respoinsibility to get you in shape. This is why you see the gyms on base flocked with individuals working out and such. But to just discard organized PT as some dinosaur because someone believes it micromananing, in my opinion is not the case.

We can disagree on that, specifically on whether PT as most in the Army and Marines conduct it today is a combat fitness builder or a cohesion builder of any real significance.

[wm]

I think good leaders recognize what talent they have assigned (and every member of every unit has some kind of talent), then they groom and use that talent to the unit's (and the soldier's) best advantage.

One other thing worth noting is that we're not talking just irresponsibility, but substandard leadership in general. I've known a lot of NCOs who were not good leaders. But, as my favorite BN Ops SGM explained to me, "some NCOs can't lead a fire team to latrine, but they can staff their asses off." None of the platoons wanted my Redneck driver or Pill-popping gunner so they joined the ranks of my HQ. They were not team leader material, but they were great crew members. Kind of like my Armorer. He was not a leader, but he could fix anything in about 15 seconds - often pointing out, "sir, this is (30/40 level), but I can fix it if you don't want to send it to Anaconda." Maybe we should bring back the SPC-5 pay grade?

Caution Hoary War Stories follow:
Long ago in the "dark days" of the late 70s, shortly after the implementation of VOLAR and in the post VN draw down when the Army was probably at its nadir in terms of the quality of serving soldiers.

When I was a Plt Ldr, we got rid of Spec 5, 6, and 7 ranks--I had a number of good troops, who were not leaders but had great technical skills (BIG DISCLAIMER: this was a unit with a very complex strategic intelligence collection mission), all of a sudden become buck and staff sergeants. Fortunately, my PSG and I got to choose which of my E-4s got to be 2-stripers and which stayed as Speedy 4s. My E-5s and -6s were not so lucky--they all converted to SGT/SSG. The bad news was that I had to give many of them leadership roles for which they were not currently qualified and, in many cases, would never be qualified to perform. The doubly bad news was that I could not in good conscience recommend many of them for promotion. A poor buck sergeant (who had a been a great Spec 5) would make an even poorer SSG (even though his technical skills were more than good enough to get E6 pay as a Spec 6) and similarly with many of my SSGs becoming SFCs.
Nonetheless my original cadre of SSG and SFCs made it work--we actually whipped some of those converts into NCOs and continued to get our mission done with an average assigned strength of about 45 (versus an authorized strength of over 80)--most I ever had assigned was 62 or 63.

As Ken would say, that conversion was dumb with 2 B's.

I also agree about the Company XO and his "staff" of NCOs doing the heavy lifting with problem children. I XO'd a service company for an MI Bde--my 106 folks did much of what a BSB does in a BCT (although we were a fixed site, non-tactical operation). The company had 3 officers authorized: CO, XO, MP Security Force platoon leader--the last vacant for about half my tenure as XO. My company was the dumping ground for poor performers and clowns who lost their security clearances. My nucleus of strong NCOs, who were strong leaders because I let/made them do what they were trained to do as small unit leaders, made things work. They OJT'd reassigned intel MOS slackers to become wrenches, spoons, and drivers (63B, 94B, 64H) as well as various admin MOSC like 71L. My cooks, with the help of some of those cast off "misfits" from other units, won the Connelly Award for best food service operation in the Army.

[Ken White]

good units -- and don't have bad NCOs or troops. Well, not unbearably bad, anyway...

[slapout9]

The greatest and most scientific study that was ever done was done at West Point in 1975 by Arthur Jones. Which completely disproved all known theories of physical conditioning. The whole thing was actually filmed and not just documented. Since then the Army has done about everything possible to disregard the facts of conditioning that it learned in the study. As Ken said the best way in a pinch is to run an obstacle/fitness course, otherwise lift weights in a circuit fashion with no rests between stations. Link to short paper on the study below.




http://baye.com/wp-content/uploads/2...nditioning.pdf

[Uboat509]

The first is that it's a dumping ground for NCOs and enlisted who can't cut it on the line. The second is that only the highest caliber NCOs and enlisted are selected for staff positions.

I have never understood the concept of putting the highest caliber NCOs in staff jobs. What NCO staff job is there that requires the "highest caliber"? I have done my Bteam time. It was long tedious hours and it was as thankless a job as I have ever had but it wasn't especially demanding, not when compared to my job on the team.

Without exception, the best battalions I have been in have worked on the latter rule. I say this as someone who was a company commander who sometimes lost his best soldiers to HHC. The reasons are several:

1) A screwed up HQs makes every subordinate unit miserable. From messed up support to messed up orders, it makes everyone work twice as hard.

That may be true but lower performers in staff jobs cause headaches, whereas lower performers in line jobs cause casualties.

2) If NCO/soldier snuffy isn't making grade, the answer isn't transferring him to someone else's problem. The answer is doing the right thing yourself - reduce him (I have reduced NCOs), counsel him, flag him, chapter him, etc. Not shift him to HQ.

In most of the units that I have been in, when we talked about sending problem children someplace else, ie staff it wasn't usually our lowest perfomers, DUIs, spouse abuse, drugs etc. It was usually one of three catagories, 1) long term injuries, 2) family problems like divorce, ill spouse, deployed spouse, etc and 3) guys who weren't cutting it in their jobs but weren't necessarily dirtbags. Some guys make terrible squad leaders but good staff guys.

3) What happens in HQ? There is less NCO and officer mentorship. Too busy. They neither have the time or ability to "reform" your problem child. So they get worse. And they make your life on the line miserable.


4) You solve the motivation problem by strictly time-limiting HQ time for NCOs and officers. No more than two years for NCOs, for enlisted, one year. This prevents the case (I received several) of a new PVT going to the S-3 shop and staying there an entire tour, making NCO grade. He then PCSs to his next unit, where he is your team or squad leader, and has no skills relevant to the job. I had an E-6 that spent his enlisted time in S3, went to recruiting, and came to me as a section leader who had never seen a tank. Smart guy set up to fail as a leader by us.

I have yet to see anyone do that much time in staff without making a concerted effort to do so.

5) Your HQ officers perform better if they aren't having to babysit unsat NCOs dumped to them by the line. They need good people to do officer business.

You can say the exact same thing on the line. A few problem children in a line unit can be like cancer. They eat up a diproportionate amount of leadership time, often for little return. They often drag morale down and they can be murder on cohesion.

6) Keeping a poor soldier in the line provides a lot more mentorship and supervision. An infantry platoon has how many NCOs? Compare that to the S4 shop, or S1. And again, if he can't be fixed, do the right thing and get rid of him.

You make it sound easy, sir. When I was in Hawaii we had one soldier that woudl go to check himself into mental health every time we went to the field but his platoon (not mine thank goodness) could not get rid of him. Even when he finally drove his car through the front doors of enlisted club on post it took weeks to get rid of him, during much of which time the NCOs in the company had to take shifts guarding him. Since about '98 or '99 the Army, or at least the units I was in, started a program "rehabilitative transfers" in lieu of chapters for all but the most serious problem children. The theory was it would give Joe a new start with a different chain of command to give him the chance to be a better performer. In practice, it turned into a game of musical problem children. If we thought somebody was not necessarily a dirt bag but just wasn't cut out for the line we tried to get them a staff job. Otherwise, we did out best to deal with the problems.


SFC W

[Stan]

Hey Wayne,

They OJT'd reassigned intel MOS slackers to become wrenches, spoons, and drivers (63B, 94B, 64H) as well as various admin MOSC like 71L.

Also from those dark 70s - but I was fortunate enough to have completed an education (affording me an apprenticeship and high tech MOS) - our 1SG and CO were constantly dumping the SP4s and E-5s into that pool of admin weenies, drivers and wrenches. Only much later would I realize what a mess that OJT system created for the remainder of the Army. I can't decades later emphasize how pissed off I was with those admin/finance clerks incorrectly filing my TDY vouchers and dorking up my pay , the CO's driver running into trees , and the HHQ company experts that couldn't change a spark plug without the dash 10 manual

I like the idea of bringing back SP4, 5 and 6; not everybody can lead and there's a genuine need for good technical personnel. Instead of wasting slots at NCO leadership courses, send those folks off to learn a trade.

[Ken White]

I like the idea of bringing back SP4, 5 and 6; not everybody can lead and there's a genuine need for good technical personnel. Instead of wasting slots at NCO leadership courses, send those folks off to learn a trade.

Great idea. Really need a way to pay and / or otherwise reward people without necessarily giving them more rank -- the Peter Principle is real. I've never seen a Motor Sergeant who wasn't a truly great mechanic; I've met very, very few who were good Platoon Sergeants or even wanted the job...

We should also consider a Specialist track system for Officers -- perhaps at least to the extent of a Command track and a Staff track above Captain.

I've met a lot of people who (shudder!!) enjoyed staff work and thought command was something to be endured for advancement. The Personnel system should consider this (LINK) variously attributed to Von Manstein and CvC among others. Congress will object, slightly, but that really should be manageable if it's handled correctly -- realizing there will be those in power who will not want it handled correctly...

[Schmedlap]

We should also consider a Specialist track system for Officers -- perhaps at least to the extent of a Command track and a Staff track above Captain.

I've met a lot of people who (shudder!!) enjoyed staff work and thought command was something to be endured for advancement.

That would not be a "Staff track." That would be a Masochism Track, with Sadist branch managers.

[Ken White]

...Sadist branch managers.

Seems like one...

[wm]

I've never seen a Motor Sergeant who wasn't a truly great mechanic; I've met very, very few who were good Platoon Sergeants or even wanted the job...

If you are lucky enough to find one who can do both (I was), it's probably worth making a pact with the devil to keep him or her (fortunately I didn't have too).

We should also consider a Specialist track system for Officers -- perhaps at least to the extent of a Command track and a Staff track above Captain.

Isn't the Navy's LDO (limited duty officer) program pretty much just that? I believe that is also largely the case wrt to each service's use of JAGs, sky pilots and medical officers.

Sadist branch managers

Oxymoron?

I think sadistic branch managers is a redundancy rather than an oxymoron. Once upon a time (about when my assignment was changed from Fort Carson to Fort Polk), I looked up "sadist" in the dictionary and found a picture of my Captains assignment officer.

[Uboat509]

Isn't the Navy's LDO (limited duty officer) program pretty much just that? I believe that is also largely the case wrt to each service's use of JAGs, sky pilots and medical officers.

I have met a number of SEAL LDOs. They can command platoons but are told that they will never command a vessal. Oddly, they never seem to feet cheated by that.

I think sadistic branch managers is a redundancy rather than an oxymoron. Once upon a time (about when my assignment was changed from Fort Carson to Fort Polk), I looked up "sadist" in the dictionary and found a picture of my Captains assignment officer.

That hurts my feelings just reading it. I have considerable experience stationed both places. I don't wish Polk on people that I don't even like, unless they really, really, really, really like bass fishing.

SFC W

[Uboat509]

I have also often wondered if it might not be a good idea to bring back the old specialist ranks. That system was already gone when I came on active duty in '91 but we did still refer to Specialists as Spec 4s and a lot of the NCOs still remembered the old system. The argument that I have always heard against bringing it back goes something like "Everybody needs to be a leader at that point in their careers." Apparently the idea is that we pretend that everybody who makes SGT and above is cut out to be a leader and everything will be OK.

SFC W

[Schmedlap]

If you are lucky enough to find one who can do both (I was), it's probably worth making a pact with the devil to keep him or her (fortunately I didn't have too).

My team chief was swapped out halfway through a deployment and his replacement was a guy who was a great mechanic and a great leader. It made my life so much easier.

PS - I can't read the tiny writing on the "Appearances" post so I looked for it online. In doing so, I stumbed upon this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wsq8ol9XJPY Those guys can have that job.

[Uboat509]

This reminds me of a quote by a German officer by the name of Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord.

I divide my officers into four classes; the clever, the lazy, the industrious, and the stupid. Most often two of these qualities come together. The officers who are clever and industrious are fitted for the highest staff appointments. Those who are stupid and lazy make up around 90% of every army in the world, and they can be used for routine work. The man who is clever and lazy however is for the very highest command; he has the temperament and nerves to deal with all situations. But whoever is stupid and industrious is a menace and must be removed immediately.

The last line in particular is as true now as it was when he said it.

SFC W

[82redleg]

I like the idea of specialist ranks, but I don't think we need ranks- just move the RCP for SPC (E4) to 20 years, increase E4 pay for longevity (to match E5 pay at 10-12 years, E6 pay at 14-16 years and E7 pay at 18-20 years), and make retention of E4s past a certain point contingent upon their PSG, 1SG and CO CDR's evaluation every 2 years. It eliminates the need for "promotions" that would cause contention between SP5/6/7 and SGT/SSG, but pays their abilities.

[Stan]

Don't the Canadians have something like a Corporal Sergeant Major ?

Same deal, pay increases, greater retention and skills without the hassles of leadership and promotion.

The only problem I experienced with the parallel Specialist and Hard Stripes ranks was the SP6 ended up being an SFC with no clue what was in store for him at the company level. That individual could have been a God sent at at the motor pool or depot.

The AF takes all their E9s and turns them into some wizbang staff NCO. Fact is, they had little business doing a job sans prior experience (leadership). Most of them I worked with in DIA were former aircraft mechanics who were probably very good at what they did. They certainly didn't belong in leadership !

[sandbag]

Maybe we should bring back the SPC-5 pay grade?

I thought this was virtually done already. I would welcome the return of the extended Specialist grades.

[slapout9]

Don't the Canadians have something like a Corporal Sergeant Major ?

Same deal, pay increases, greater retention and skills without the hassles of leadership and promotion.

The only problem I experienced with the parallel Specialist and Hard Stripes ranks was the SP6 ended up being an SFC with no clue what was in store for him at the company level. That individual could have been a God sent at at the motor pool or depot.

The AF takes all their E9s and turns them into some wizbang staff NCO. Fact is, they had little business doing a job sans prior experience (leadership). Most of them I worked with in DIA were former aircraft mechanics who were probably very good at what they did. They certainly didn't belong in leadership !

How about bringing back Tech Sergeants like in WW2, same idea as specialists but sounds more Army like.

[Schmedlap]

I thought this was virtually done already. I would welcome the return of the extended Specialist grades.

Really? You mean officially? I didn't realize that. Unofficially, I know it has been around, depending on the command climate. For example, one of my micromanaging CO's, when I was PL, seemed to think that he had direct control over every squad and fire team and that his LTs were SPC-5's who only existed to relay instructions or to just sit back and observe as he attended to every minor detail with whatever goat-screw he was determined to perpetrate. But, officially, I didn't realize it was re-instituted.

[82redleg]

Really? ... But, officially, I didn't realize it was re-instituted.

It hasn't been reinstituted officially. I think that Sandbag was referring to the speed with which we promote Soldiers to SGT these days. Because of the lock in for deployment, I returned from OEF with at least 3 SGTs in each howitzer section (authorization is 1 SSG, 2 x SGTs, 4 x EM)- one section had 1 SSG, 5 SGTs and a PFC.