Entropy:

Right. It is the system, and it is tactically driven.

The gap really underscores my on-going criticism of the Humint effort, too heavy on anthropology, and devoid of the basic background studies needed to understand the problems and solutions.

Myself and a group of NGA staff in Baghdad last summer could have written the same report, about a critical background problem that has been in our faces for at least a few years now.

Social sciences include basic geography, geology, economic, market and infrastructure information, demography and demographics (actually two materially different specialties), history, ... and anthropology.

We do not have the basic suite of tools for Afghanistan that would be a bedrock for any routine public administration functions---including analysis and planning. Why? Who is responsible?

Well, we can point to the stripping bare of US State and USAID in the 1960s-2000s as one answer, and to the fact that CIA, too, seems to be tactical, and not strategic. That defines the problem, but not the solution.

The bottom line of Humint was, as I understood it, supposed to be that we understood that the US no longer that strategic, background framework which the DoD knew it would need in these new missions. So, where is the product? When is it going to be created? Can't Humint or NSC jump on this immediately? Can't ISAF staff, and or direct an immediate solution (as you have described)?

In the field, and here, I find so many people reluctant to use US background data, and I agree. The stuff they get from the present system isn't worth the paper its printed on, let alone the millions spent for it.

But, as this report notes, the problem is not fixed.

I believe the recommendations are a good first step, but wisdom cannot be gained by scurrying from one place to another. Somebody has to take charge of and focus on establishing a background framework of what is needed, assign people with the appropriate training and wisdom to pursue and collect it, then compile it, and use it for immediate actionable results. The RC levels are the right place, linked both higher and lower.

But a lot of this work, from experience, could be better done stateside as long as it is directed and closely linked to the field.

If, like the DoS Civilian Reconstruction Corps, it becomes a bureaucracy in evolution that, at best, creates demonstration projects, the effort will be wasted. MG Flynn needs to target, resource, and direct it---now---or it will not happen.

Steve