MG Flynn (on intell mainly)

[Steve the Planner]

Eloquent answer beyond: It's complicated.

Effects on the land and people---I think that starts with the ways to define and differentiate the land and people---then to start thinking about how to model effects on them.

I think one of the gaps, which the military only has to do as the force of last result, is to now look at what is beyond the conflict issues.

We saw today in the kids killed and injured what many people have talked about as a challenge to typical COIN practices. Troops bring conflict. How does that get factored into obvious effects?

Also, sometimes troops bring population displacement.

Talk on another thread about safe zones and refugee areas. Do those get factored in before conflict? Are they a critical component of winning hearts and minds while not losing population? Is there a process? (Warn. Resettle. Clear. Rebuild. Repopulate. Hold.)

I keep watching the metric of 6.5 million in schools and growing. What are they going to do when they graduate? Better educated opponents, or a central part of the solution? (Tick. Tick. Tick.)

There was a poultry processing plant in Tikrit, and every new deployment would bring folks who spent US dollars trying to restart it (for the supposed thousands of jobs), but it wasn't going to work until you restarted agriculture. I sure as hell hope that these kids can be uptrained to be the Johnny Appleseeds instead of, every year, another deployment of US ag teams.

Be nice to understand the framework and processes of sequenced job evolution before what the UN calls the Ticking Time Bomb (one million per year graduating form school).

Those big factors are, I believe, the more critical gap that is separating us from a clear picture. Lots of bits around to assemble, but bits don't make strategy.

Etc...

[Steve the Planner]

Cross-posted from the Sanctuary Thread:

Beetle:

Major Madera does a great job in providing an overview of CIMS -Civilian Information Managament Systems as:

demographics, economics, social constructs, political processes, political leaders, civil-military relationships, infrastructure notes, non-state actors in the area of operations, civil defense, public safety and public health capabilities, the environment.31 In short, CIMS capture the sort of information that paints a clear picture of the ecology of insurgency.

If he were updating this 2006 paper, I would suggest that he add: cadestral/property ownership (What MG Flynn calls out), and the basic topo, soil type and hydro data sets for cursory reconstruction/manuever stuff.

In Iraq, we used roads and bridges (with identification of the agency responsible for the component-state, provincial, local), ag components (the whole value chain for each applicable sector), reconstruction assets (asphalt & cement plants), major industrial/economic components, and important government activities (schools, clinics)/repair facilities.

Other special purpose maps "might" have included appointed/elected official's homes (for a variety of reasons).

Key thing in Iraq and Afghanistan, where UN demographics were used, was to set up shape files for each census boundary, even if political boundaries may have changed since. Important to, is to integrate real time, refugee, and pop displacements best estimates whenever you can suck them in.

As much as you can get whenever you can get it.

I'll cross post this on the Fixin's thread.

Steve

Citation from SurferBeetle:

"From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve"

[Pete]

Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

[Entropy]

Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

I don't have a problem with publishing an article, but this wasn't just an article - it was also an order which, to me, is extraordinary.

[Steve the Planner]

In a strange quirk of fate, somebody on Tom Ricks blog pointed out that MG Flynn's positions on intel were directly parallel to those made by the White House re: CIA.

So, in September Gen. McCrystal is criticized in the press for appearing to oppose the White House (although that is no longer obvious).

Now, perhaps by accident/incident, the two elements are in lock-step, and at the same time.

Isn't that news?

No chance that it is anything other than compatible, and for all we know, synchronized. If modern war, and especially this one, is a public policy matter, the two are earnestly chasing the same rabbit down the same hole.

Wired made the interesting comment that laid off journalists ought to be applying for the Stability Ops positions, since: (1.) they are trained as journalists to scurry around and get intel from many obstinant sources; and (2.) most everybody is relying on journalism, vs. intel sources, anyway.

Toynbee's big point. If a political structure fails to adapt to challenges, it will be bypassed. Darwinian....

Oh, Brave New World!

Steve

[Pete]

One of the people leaving a comment to Tom Ricks' blog said CNAS is a centrist-Democratic think tank and that putting the article there was like a DoD information operation aimed at gaining support from the Democrats. When I first heard the "Hearts and Minds" expression during the Vietnam War around 1965 it seemed like the addition of an LBJ Great Society program to warmaking.

[Steve the Planner]

Inteltrooper:

The risk is that a spook, or quasi-spook, becomes to vaporous.

Just can't seem to touch the ground.

Steve

[IntelTrooper]

Does anyone have an opinion about the appropriateness of CNAS/Foreign Policy magazine as a place for an active duty two-star to publish his article?

I think it has the effect of making pseudo-spooks realize that their little world isn't above scrutiny.