Bob:

Military perspective aside, when I first saw that ppt, I was looking at the civilian dimensions.

International economic development had not matched local expectations. What does that mean? How do you "Cure" that with quick hits and low-hanging fruit?

Maybe wrong, but I read the "Shadows" as an inevitable result of the above, plus failure to extend the basic writ and services of local government (basic civil/criminal justice, humanitarian services, and, above all, security). People find a way to representation, and, for better or worse, the troublesome election, the continued lack of government effectiveness, and the lack of focus on basic constitutional reforms (a Loya Jirga to move to locally elected governors, for example)plus the fact that international forces are being portrayed as the cause or attractor of population insecurity. While it is easy for us to dodge these fundamental issues, it is inevitable that the dodge has consequences.

Is COIN so all encompassing as to address issues raised elsewhere in SW: What if we are representing a bad government? What if opposition is fairly grounded? What if the opposition, despite our views, is perceived as "better than ours?

Tony Cordesman's report about winning the battles and losing the wars is, in my opinion, not really a military critique, but a "whole-of-government" critique.

He punches hard on the lack of metrics, lack of focus, lack of results on the civilian side. Great, we built a new road somewhere: How did that project related to the short, medium, long range issues at the core of instability in this town or district?

What are the causes of instability in this town, district, province? Are there credible and effective projects highly-targeted at those, or are we just building a road because we can, and doing nothing significant to address the high-priority causes for instability?

Great. 1,000 civilians descended on Afghanistan. How did that help? What are they doing? What were the problems of importance? What are they doing about those?

No offense, but I hear a lot of crap about this human terrain analysis stuff, and the reconstruction stuff, but I don't see the results. We don't do this well, and aren't going to change absent a well-placed boot (or a shocking failure).

I get it that Afghanistan is more complicated than Iraq, but our civilian/ht, reconstruction in Iraq was abysmal. If we just do that quality and caliber of work in Afghanistan, it is no wonder the "yellow" is bleeding across the map.

Behind it all, I remain deeply concerned that the US is not following the consequences of urbanization (by UN definition), including the growing urban refugee pops in "informal settlements."

Kabul alone has exploded to 4.5 million people, and we are busy chasing bad guys on the frontier, while token protests are beginning to emerge in the cities. What are we credibly doing to assure that those token protests, and the causes of their protests (which go beyond the surface complaint) are being addressed/controlled/minimized/resolved/eliminated?

These refugee "cities", throughout history, are the place where there truly "Be Dragons," and provide an abundant opportunity for the next regional Sadrs to emerge, safe operational havens for current opponents, and the breeding ground (as we see in Pakistan) for Madrahsas.

If anything, I believe the Flynn report goes far beyond the military. I assume, in part, that is why it is public.

Just my ten cents.

Steve