Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Doofous]

Air Assault (or Airborne or Airmobile) isn't the solution to Iraq or Afghanistan. Vertical envelopment has its place, of course. But for all the tradeoffs of vulnerability, the decision isn't just about RPGs vs. IED. It has to come down to the purpose of the mission. To connect with IPs and win some old-fashioned hearts and minds, you need to really see people and come into contact with them, not just drop in and lift out of the neighborhood. Aircraft can't linger to form alliances...grunts have historically been the most successful at that, and IMHO, that is what we need to do to begin working with locals and gain their respect.

Close combat with clearly defined enemy forces demands and rewards speed, power and audacity. Unfortunately, our enemy today is like the VC two generations ago...extremely difficult to distinguish from the IPs.

[jcustis]

I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.

Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.

This was precisely what we did during Operation KHANJAR in July of last year. So to answer your question, when you look at that operation, along with other ops like ANACONDA, we have the ability to project combat power through vertical envelopment, but the question comes up concerning why we would want to do so. The reasons are often very specific and attuned to the situation at hand.

This earlier thread highlights some details: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=strike+sword

Heliborne operations are difficult to sustain for a long duration, for a number of reasons. I wish I could post the photo of that mortarman carrying the baseplate and a load of other gear he shouldn't have. That highlights what happens when we try vertical envelopment but fail to fight light enough.

ETA: Just found it!

[tankersteve]

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

[Firn]

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

Very much so. And the heat. And the sweat. Light infantry indeed.

Most of the points have been already adressed. A well armored vehicle is a (very) important element but only the last line of defense against IEDs. The COIN operations in Rhodesia and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that well designed armored vehicles play a very important part in troop survivability, but have also important drawbacks (greatly increased fuel consumption, reduced mobility, lesser situational awareness). Finding the right mix and balance as well as adjusting it in time and space is the great difficulty, as war is no science but art.


Firn

[Eden]

Other reasons why we travel on the ground:

We are, in fact, short of helicopters in Afghanistan. More are being sent, or so I glean from open sources, but we lack the resources to move many troops around by air. Moreover, any heliborne insertion results in a continuing committment of aircraft to logistically support the inserted force. Our allies are especially short of helicopters - I know it is something of a national scandal in the UK.

Also, the environment in Afghanistan makes employment of helicopters problematical in many areas due to climate and elevation.

[zealot66]

Thanks for the input. I know that COIN requires sustained presence on the battlefield. I was really curious on the supply of helo's in the area. Its just so frustrating to see a good many men die without confronting the enemy and just get whacked by a roadside bomb.

It does make sense that in being on the ground and clearing, holding and building will yield intelligence on who and where the ambushes take place. Gary Schroen in his book, first in in 2005 decried our resource allocation to Iraq and pretty much predicted what would happen in afghanistan. Little resources people and machines and believing the terrs have departed the region only to come back in droves. Again, thanks for clarifying some issues. I aint been there so its hard to understand some methods and why.

[Steve Blair]

If you review some possible lessons from Vietnam, you find that potential LZs are also quite susceptible to IED-type activities (the NV/NVA used to booby-trap LZs with unexploded bombs or shells, Chinese claymore copies in trees, and so on). So it doesn't necessarily get you around the issue, and in fact it can make it more complicated (downed birds and all that).