Paper: Rethinking Role of Religious Conflict in Doctrine

[milnews.ca]

Copy of "Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare" by Matthew A. Lauder, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto available for download here (26 page .pdf).

Abstract

The US counter-insurgency manual (FM 3-24) has been criticised by several theorists for a lack of attention paid to the issue of religion. For example, critics of the manual indicate that religion is mentioned only a handful of times, and merely in-passing or as a secondary factor within a broader appreciation of the cultural context of the operating environment. The superficial treatment of religion in counter-insurgency doctrine, and a trend of dismissing the grievances of religiously-inspired antagonists as illegitimate, serves to illustrate a general lack of appreciation for the mingling of the religious and the political that exists outside of Western society. In other words, there is an overall lack of recognition of, and appreciation for, the ways in which religion underlies social, cultural, political, and economic discourse and action, and, more specifically, the role of religion in conflict. The aim of this paper is two-fold: (1) it will critically examine the treatment of religion and religious concepts in US and Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine; and (2) by drawing upon Religious Studies scholars, and by comparing historical and contemporary examples of religious conflict between states and non-state actors, it will argue that spiritual insurgencies are forms of violent new religious movements. The objective of this paper is to encourage the re-thinking of the problem-space and a reassessment of how we classify and treat religious conflict in doctrine and engage religious antagonists in the contemporary operating environment.

[graphei]

Copy of "Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare" by Matthew A. Lauder, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto available for download here (26 page .pdf).

Abstract

That link for the download isn't working for me. Is it available for download anywhere else?

[M-A Lagrange]

I personnaly think that focussing on labelling war as religious or ethnical or what ever else than political is just missing the target.
It's basically a way to simplify the problematic by putting it in a box. There are two kind of problematic in war: politic and legallity of the action...
Religion is too often used to undermine the legal aspect of it. Especially when it comes to war in Muslim countries.
Recently, most of the Darfur politic analist I have been meeting just conceded that probably Bashir did not have much choices with what was going on. Based on the fact that he wanted to stay in power and we did not want to have the Muslim Brotherhood or worst to come back in power.
Somehow, the bad muslim and the nice african animists tend to disapear...

But I have to read the paper once I found it as the link you gave did not work either for me.

M-A

[Stan]

Found Milnews.ca's link here.

(101.99 kB - downloaded 10 times.)

[graphei]

A very wise mentor once told me "Islam is politics", and I would argue it applies to religion as a whole. Any religious leader worth their salt can whip their followers into a murderous frenzy over the most miniscule issue. Why? You start pulling the threads that are attached to someone's beliefs in how the Universe functions and you can watch them start frothing at the mouth. Same thing goes for ethnic/cultural aspects. However, I would hesitate labeling conflicts as purely 'religious', or 'ethnic', or 'political' because they all come to bear and all are a part of human culture (I'm having flashback's of Gadamer's Truth & Method now).

Religion, culture, and ethnicity are used as political currency every day- even in America and Europe. And the arguments I saw on the other forum of 'It's not rational- only emotional' 'It's a crutch' are weak. Marx is dead. The Enlightenment is over. Let the Post-Modern java flow

MA- I'm not really sure what you mean by legalities. Can you explain a bit more for me please?

[Steve the Planner]

I remain in awe of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's moral conviction not to engage in politics if at all possible. Must be the hardest thing when battle rages, or threatens to rage all around.

Same with those in Iran. Sometimes you wish they would jump in, but it must be a very high and hard road.

But the same COIN criticism could be raised about politics.

Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

But how much can you pack into a Field Manual?

Steve

[M-A Lagrange]

Well, I will just go for the Jus in Bello and Jus at bellum stuff (as usual).
The legacy (judicial and/or moral) of going at war and the legality in conducting war.

Would be interresting to see the difference between Shia and Sunny and how this could affect COIN operations. I'm not convinced a classical COIN operation as the Surge would work in Iran or with Hezbollah.
Hezbollah was one of the first to do the shift in Lebanon to gain people support by providing social services. They do actually still challenge Lebanese state on that issue.

Shia seems to be more organised to take care of their people. Also, their tradition of dissimulation would make them in apparence more easy but in fact much hardcore and difficult to rally. But I might be wrong.

I finally managed to download it.

[Tukhachevskii]

I remain in awe of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's moral conviction not to engage in politics if at all possible.
Steve

This reminded me of something Carl Schmitt said in The Concept of the Political..."To define something as non-political is itself a political act"

Sistani's decision to not engage in or lend his support to the Iraqi Shia insurgency, the Mahdi army and parliament was a political decision. Let's not forget that the overt political participation in political affairs was almost purely due to the innovating ideological acrobatics of Ayatollah Khomeini. When he wrote Kashf Al-Asrar (The Revealling of Secrets) in 47(?) he was still adhering to the traditional Shia' position (for mujtahids that is) of quietism wherein the Ulema did not overtly participate in the political process instead prefering to remain aloof and influence events through the processes of "emulation" and their monopoly on Shaira' law (and the fact the Shah didn't want a head on confrontation). Those Shia that did participate in politics did so by supporting authority to preserve Shi'ism and even, on the rare occassion, threatened revolution (1906 and the Tobbacco Revolution/Constituional Revolution) but always only to protect the status of the cerlicical establishment and the role of Shi'ism and never to further a political/transformational (modernist) project (that right properly belonged only to the Hidden Imam/Imam Mahdi). It was only in the sixties with the rise of the likes of Ali Shariati (especially his Red Shism wherein he castigated collaborationist clerics as traitors to the revolutionary spirit of Ali) that Khomeini's views began to change. By Wilayat-e-Faqih (the rule of the Faqih) he abandoned the traditionalist position (of quietism) in favour of "red shi'ism" (though he himself would have deinied that given Shariati's socialism/marxism). It was Khomeini who broke with tradition and stated that the Shia' had no need to wait for the retrun of Imam Mahdi. Our view of the role claerics have in politics is coloured by the Iranian/Islamic revolution. Nonethless, for a weltanshauung/lebenswelt that defines itself as din-wa-daula (loosely translated as religion and "state"/ or more properly the spiritual and secular authority) the commentators here are correct in that segregating lived experience into phenomenoligically discreet entities is unhelpful at best (although some academics, who make their living by dividing up the world into intellectual categories would disagree).

Have to rush, need to pick up best friend's daughter from nursery...
(apologies for the grammar, slepping, syntax and)

[Tukhachevskii]

Having now caught my breath allowme to finish off my thoughts above with a caveat. As I was saying our view of clerical action in the political sphere is coloured by ther Iranian revolution. Interestingly the Khomeinite position (wilayaet-e-faqih) was rejected overwhelmingly in the important shrine cities/theologicalseminaries in Iraq. To this day Ayatollah As-Sistani is viewed with suspicion by his cousins across the border especially Ayatollah Ali Khameinei whose attempts to influence events in Iraq to Iran's favour were fillibustered by As-Sistani, especially with As-Sistani's intervention against Muqtada As-Sadr. As-Sistani is a "charismatic" threat to the Iranian "revolutionary" clerics but is adored by those who still adhere to the old queitist modus operandi (of which there are many). As-Sistani is a "charismatic" (i.e., Weber) rather than "ideological" alternative because using words like "ideology","religion",etc. separates the unity of the field of action within which the shia' and other Muslims act. As-Sistani is thus an alternative pole of authority in the widest sense rather than just in termsof narrow theology/jurisprudence (as conceieved by us Western types).

Wait, does that even make sense...?

Must go, best friends daughter has now said that she is hungry over 50 times without taking abreath...

[tequila]

Sistani's decision to not engage in or lend his support to the Iraqi Shia insurgency, the Mahdi army and parliament was a political decision.

I'll just add in that I don't think this is really accurate. Sistani was instrumental in forming the UIA in 2005 and they used his face on their posters. He not only vetoed the CPA's original plans for Iraqi elections in 2004-2005 (intended as a sort of caucus process), but outlined exactly what form legitimate elections and constitution-writing should take. He specifically did not lend any legitimating authority to the CPA in this process, instead selecting the UN as the proper overseeing authority.

Sistani has repeatedly indicated that the clerisy should take an overseeing role with regards to state affairs, and indeed this is the role he has arrogated for himself in Iraq. But he does not endorse Iranian style institutionalization of this i.e. with the office of Supreme Leader, Guardian Council, etc. But he certainly not a pure apolitical "quietist", a title that better fits the al-Khoei family. Reider Visser has this excellent paper about Sistani's views on politics.

[Steve the Planner]

I'm not sure that even a well-written 2006 paper fully encompasses the Grand Ayatollah's position, role or intent.

Defining his role in the body politic is perhaps more complex and nuanced than evaluating his role as a politician or in politics.

I don't have those answers, but, to date, as a man, an Iraqi, and a civic leader (and possibly as a religious community leader), he has stepped in where he believed necessary, but, it seems, in general, prefers not to engage directky in influencing the outcome of "Ceasar's due."

During the run-up to the 2009 Provincial elections, folks were jumping up and down to get him to break all the ties in the competing election rules. Finally, and only finally, he indirectly gave a small nod which, while others bit their nails as to the outcome, did, in fact, generally follow the direction of his reluctant nod.

That, to me, but not necessarily to his many followers, suggests a man and religious leader that did not, and still does not, wish to see Iraq's government follow an Iranian path, and with appropriate deference to the "quietist" tradition.

Without dispute, his nods have more effect than any US President has over a circumstance. But, unlike most folks who, if they have power, use it. He is fully invested in the religious and spiritual implications of his followers, not the political ones (within a reasonable range), but will, under extreme circumstances, use the temporal power scarcely.

That might not fit our objectives, but I have tremendous personal respect for the restraint he shows.

Steve

[jmm99]

I've found the following simple diagram (credit: Geoff Corn) useful:

Corn ROEs.jpg

In the Islamic take, the Dip/Pol Ring and the Law Ring will be influenced by the Koran, etc., to a greater or lesser extent.

In this particular diagram, the intersection of the three rings defines the acceptable ROEs (what is done in war). The same rings also come into play in defining the bounds of going to war in the first place.

One recognizes a bit of CvC's Triangle (Government, Military, People).

Regards

Mike

[Schmedlap]

I personnaly think that focussing on labelling war as religious or ethnical or what ever else than political is just missing the target.

Agree with that. Stepping way outside of my tactical-level approach to things...

There are no "religious wars" or "information wars" or "wars of attrition" or "proxy wars." Replace the word "war" in each one with "campaign." The campaigns are not waged to assert a religion, obtain information dominance, eliminate the other military, or defeat a friend's enemy as ends in themselves. They are supporting efforts in a larger war and that larger war is fought for a political end.

[M-A Lagrange]

Schmedlap,

There are no "religious wars" or "information wars" or "wars of attrition" or "proxy wars." Replace the word "war" in each one with "campaign."

you took my academic words to turn them in technical/practical words. If I can say so.
For me, religion will influence the context in term of how far and how easily you will penetrate in the opponant society/structure/network...

It will also give you a global idea of the direction to take for your cimic/psyop operations. But not much more.
The tribes I am dealing with are catholic but their culture is as far from mine than those of the afghan or somali could be. It's even amazing to see how close in fact some catholic/animist tribes are "culturaly" close to Muslim tribes in East Africa. All pastoralist have the same approach: my cows, my grazzing land and my water. My clan against the world.
After it's just a complexe political game on the one who will get the biggest part of the cake.

Mike,

I'll go with your diagram but I wonder how far it applies. With Shia, no doubt, the separation between administration and religion is there. With extremist... I somethimes really wonder. What would be the demarcation line between politic and law if it's the same religious leader who defines both?

Anyways, in operational terms, it always comes back to the fact that we need to find something that applies to it to re-establish dialog links with something that looks like us. It seems easier.

PS: yes I came back from my excursion in the bush. Was good by the way.

Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

Steve,

I agree just with you. I think that Kilcullen pointed it in a past article in SWJ: we always try to find a "new elite" to replace the one we want to go. In nation building, it's too often not functioning as we place guys who basically do not have the same understanding than us of what "being in power means". But this is rarely due to religious believes and even less to religious cultural background. My experience tells me it is rather pretty much closer to economical greed.

[Steve the Planner]

MA:

"All pastoralist have the same approach: my cows, my grazzing land and my water. My clan against the world.
After it's just a complexe political game on the one who will get the biggest part of the cake. "

I keep trying to avoid falling down the economic/geographic determinism well, but, sometimes, a lot of this can be made too complex. I have mouths to feed is a pretty standard human motivator even if some of the nuances change.

My Paris socialite friend always says it is about money or SEX, and even that gets overlooked sometimes.

Steve

[jmm99]

the Dip/Pol Ring and the Law Ring could become one in the extremist case:

from MA
I'll go with your diagram but I wonder how far it applies. With Shia, no doubt, the separation between administration and religion is there. With extremist... I somethimes really wonder. What would be the demarcation line between politic and law if it's the same religious leader who defines both?

But, some measure of secular input will enter the picture because of the external constraints - e.g., relations with the rest of the World.

An extreme example would be an all-encompassing dictatorship which ignores all external constraints - a North Korea on steroids - where one man calls all of the shots in all three rings >>> a single ring. Again, that construct would be theoretical, not real.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Agree with this:

from STP
Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.

re: local governance (which covers a lot of bases) in villages and districts and their interface with provinces.

But, more so than the primer (which could be compiled from numerous "lessons learned"), is developing the basic capabilities (organized people, whether military, civilian or mixed) who will use the primer.

For example, looking at MG Flynn "guidance" on intelligence, I saw many items that would be useful to me if I were advising on a local (village or district) level re: local governance, civil and criminal justice systems, etc. E.g. (p.7):

... census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Even Legrange could get into the act.

I suppose many of the same items would be useful to a combat commander in the same environment. Our military effort (in some places) reaches down to the district and village levels, in sufficient force projection to make a difference. E.g. (p.13, 14):

The tide began to turn in Nawa on July 2, when 800 Marines descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Five months later and with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation, the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers; government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, removing this powerful instrument of local control from the Taliban’s arsenal; the district center has transformed from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar; and IED incidents are down 90 percent.
....
To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. Nawa was lucky to have a charismatic governor and a modern battalion commander who, together, ran their joint effort like a political campaign as much as a military operation. The robust presence of security personnel (there was one Marine or Afghan soldier or policeman for every 50 citizens) was also vital. [6]

[6] 6 following report: Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).

Note also the force ratio 1:50. The 2005 Rand monograph is interesting (Astan is one of the countries considered); but have we gotten any better than we were then with respect to the political effort being made at the local (district and village level). At that level, the military (as part of the military effort) is an intelligence consumer. Where is the equivalent consumer organization, at that level, to implement the political effort ?

The political effort would include religious considerations where they are material; but also goes beyond that into my "law" areas, STP's mapping and records area, and "Commandant" () Surferbeetle's development area. I see a "whole of government" approach at national and provincial levels (less so there); but don't see it at the lower levels.

Regards

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

An interesting note from McCreary's Nightwatch (01/11/2010):

Iraq-Saudi Arabia: For the record. Iraqi President Talabani has asked Saudi King Abdullah to intervene in stopping Saudi criticisms of Iraq's Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Mehr News Agency reported 11 January. In a letter to King Abdullah, Taliban(i) wrote that insults to al-Sistani cause "division and quarrels that spark the flames in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

To recap the action, a Kurd – Talabani – made an argument to a Sunni Arab King to protect Arab Shiites. That’ll work, right."

Politics, religion? Go figure.

[Bob's World]

I recently was engaged by man who "has several Ph.D.s" in Theology" who was intrigued by a paper of mine (Published here on SWJ) on the role of ideology in insurgency. He was fascinated by the paper but was adament that I had made the issue far too secular due to my background and approach to the problem.

"Are you sure that it is not you making the issue far too religious based on your background and experience" I countered?

At this point he called, and apparently it was table stakes and I didn't have adequate sheepskin to cover the bet so he felt he won that hand...

It was a good coversation though. What I told him in essence is that religion and culture are absolutely critical to ones understanding of the environment in which insurgency occurs, and it is these environmental factors that make every insurgency unique. That the goal of my work was to delve past these environmentals and attempt to get to the pure essence of insurgency at a fundamental level; and that to my thinking at that level ideology is simply a tool requried of every insurgency, and selected for its utility in rallying the populace to the cause, while at the same time taking positions that the sitting government was either unable or unwilling to adopt. But that a wise insurgent would discard any ideology that either failed to rally the populace or that was compormised by the counterinsurgent; and pick a new one to continue on to his political ends. That religion was used so often simply because it works.

It also works for expanding colonialism around the globe (be it christian or Muslim, or whatever); and for conventional warfare as well. The ultimate multi-tool.

[slapout9]

Bob's World, Marx kinda thought the same way as you. Find a contradiction between the classes and exploit it (propaganda) until you create an armed conflict.