Agree with this:

from STP
Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.
re: local governance (which covers a lot of bases) in villages and districts and their interface with provinces.

But, more so than the primer (which could be compiled from numerous "lessons learned"), is developing the basic capabilities (organized people, whether military, civilian or mixed) who will use the primer.

For example, looking at MG Flynn "guidance" on intelligence, I saw many items that would be useful to me if I were advising on a local (village or district) level re: local governance, civil and criminal justice systems, etc. E.g. (p.7):

... census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Even Legrange could get into the act.

I suppose many of the same items would be useful to a combat commander in the same environment. Our military effort (in some places) reaches down to the district and village levels, in sufficient force projection to make a difference. E.g. (p.13, 14):

The tide began to turn in Nawa on July 2, when 800 Marines descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Five months later and with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation, the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers; government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, removing this powerful instrument of local control from the Taliban’s arsenal; the district center has transformed from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar; and IED incidents are down 90 percent.
....
To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. Nawa was lucky to have a charismatic governor and a modern battalion commander who, together, ran their joint effort like a political campaign as much as a military operation. The robust presence of security personnel (there was one Marine or Afghan soldier or policeman for every 50 citizens) was also vital. [6]

[6] 6 following report: Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).
Note also the force ratio 1:50. The 2005 Rand monograph is interesting (Astan is one of the countries considered); but have we gotten any better than we were then with respect to the political effort being made at the local (district and village level). At that level, the military (as part of the military effort) is an intelligence consumer. Where is the equivalent consumer organization, at that level, to implement the political effort ?

The political effort would include religious considerations where they are material; but also goes beyond that into my "law" areas, STP's mapping and records area, and "Commandant" () Surferbeetle's development area. I see a "whole of government" approach at national and provincial levels (less so there); but don't see it at the lower levels.

Regards

Mike