Motivation vs. causation

[Entropy]

Bob's World,

I have some questions and criticism of your theory I've been meaning to put to you, so thanks for starting this thread and providing the opportunity:

To begin, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" may not be possible in some cases? IOW, is it not possibile that a state's internal tensions may ultimately be irreconcilable? That gaining the legitimacy and respect of one constituency will cause illegitimacy and disrespect from another group? This possibility seems particularly relevant to places like the Balkans, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia where the tribal and ethnic rivalries are fierce and violent. Your theory seems to assume that there is always some kind of "governance" that will be viewed as legitimate enough by everyone to prevent or end insurgency. That's seems quite doubtful - otherwise fantastical scenarios enter the realm of possibility - think world government or a united India and Pakistan (Indiastan?).

Secondly, if my contention is true and there exist situations where governance within a state is not possible, then that would seem to indicate that state borders matter greatly in the application of your theory. And if so, then I would think that border demarcation becomes at least as important, if not more important, than governance since redrawing a border could bring good governance where it could not exist previously. Consider the case of East Pakistan, for example.

The point being, have you considered the possibility that "good governance" is not practically achievable (or achievable only through violent means) in several "nations" (quoted intentionally), particularly those I previously mentioned?

[jmm99]

Since Entropy has added "good governance", which is central to COL Jones' populace-centric construct, I'm going to add one more term, "legitimacy", as viewed by Timothy J. Lomperis, Vietnam's Offspring:The Lesson of Legitimacy (Winter 1986, Conflict Quarterly).

From that, we have this chart:

Domestic Legitimacy.jpg

In this chart (more fully discussed in the article), Lomperis is not considering "legitimacy" from the viewpoint of a nation-state; but from the different viewpoints of persons (three levels) in each of two incumbant models and the revolutionary insurgency model.

The individual "legitimacy issues" (which Lomperis considers fluid and variable) look much to me like "causation" or "motivation" issues - whichever box you put them in.

I understand that the 1986 article was expanded and became a chapter in Lomperis' 1996 book, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam. Only two reviews, but the second (from 2005) is interesting:

This is a book about the non-lesson "lessons" of the Vietnam War. Published in 1996, it could be considered the most horribly confusing book about political-military strategy ever conceived. Based tightly on articulating research bounded inside a "paradigmatic presupposition," many early readers would venture to believe Lomperis wasted a decade of research to make sense of a society "in the throes of a revolutionary insurgency struggling to form and consolidate an independent and modernizing state." But reading this book in 2005 makes it all relevant. It actually makes perfect sense, so much so that when read and digested properly, it can be used to predict not only how the newly formed Iraqi government will stabilize and prevail, but will also predict when it will happen by month and year, and that will determine the US exit strategy.
....
To bring about the change of government from turmoil due to insurgency and into a sphere of stability, Chapter 11 is the most interesting and useful because it demonstrates how to create a timeline for an exit strategy. Using lessons from six case studies ranging from Mao's long march in China from 1920-1949, Greece 1941-1949, Philippines 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambodia-Laos 1949-1975, to Sendero Luminoso's Peru 1970-1992, Lomperis benchmarked insurgent successes and defeats in a smartly laid out timeline that identifies factors important to legitimate governments. He then plots categories and possible futures which are laid out for policy analyst to mull over. Lomperis' work shows that from legitimate national elections to victory will take approximately five years to achieve, if, all involved will stay the course.

I guess I will get sucked in to see what he actually says.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Jeeez. I post something, minding my own business, wake up in the morning and find I am now hosting a thread? As they say in the US Army, "Buddy is only half of the word...")

So, going back in time a bit, one of the things that got me thinking about this was what I saw as a powerful, yet misguided, obsession with Islamism and ideology. The US position was, (and probably remains), that Islamist ideology is the center of gravity for the entire damn GWOT/long war/global insurgency, etc, etc.

That just didn't square up with me. Sure, the ideology of a movement is what is in your face, as are the terrorist events; but does that mean one is dealing with an ideologically driven terrorist movement? I think not. I think CvC is correct that war is politics; and that insurgency is about internal politics and wars between states are more about external politics.

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.

I would describe those things I bundle under motivation (dynamic leadership; ideology; dramatic events, etc) as Critical Requirements (CRs) to a COG of "Support of the Populace"; but not as standalone COGs. You must have them, but these are the things that ignite and sustain an insurgency; but why is it you can have them in one society and have an insurgency, and in another a 200 word story on page 5 of the local paper?

Why is one man a "crackpot" spewing "crazy talk"; while another is a dynamic leader with a profound message??? It’s a fine line, and that line moves as conditions among the target populace change. But change in what way? What changes are critical and must be addressed, and what changes are immaterial? One could argue that over his reign of activity in post WWI Germany that Hitler morphed from Crackpot, to dynamic leader and back to Crackpot again. What changed? I argue that what changed were the perceptions of the German populace.

As I like to say, "The Pied Piper is a fairy tale." What I find though, is that there are many smart people who are willing to believe in fairy tales. I, however, am a skeptic. I do not believe that some dynamic leader can come along, and play his magic flute of ideology, and lead a satisfied populace (experiencing "good governance") to its insurgent doom. I just don't buy it.

I also found Maslow's work instructive. Most were focusing on "effectiveness of governance" and were pounding away at the importance of the bottom of his pyramid. And that may well be true for the average fighter who comes to Helmand in Poppy season as a migrant worker to make some money working the poppy harvest; and then stays to make some money through the summer planting IEDs or fighting with the Taliban. For a Pashtun, getting paid to fight is like paying a teenage American boy to date Megan Fox.

But what is it that creates the conditions that would cause men like our US founding fathers to risk their fortunes, families, reputations and very lives to form the sustaining nucleus of an ultimately successful insurgency? As mentioned above, the FACTs in the Southern colonies were very different than in the middle colonies, and then in the New England colonies. So get past the facts. How did those men FEEL about the facts that they were experiencing?

This takes us to the top of Maslow's pyramid. Respect, Justice, etc. Much higher order aspects of human fulfillment than chasing one's next meal. If I am hungry I will poach a deer in the King's forest. If I am disrespected and live in a world with no justice I will go after the King himself.

Those who think that millions of Muslims living in the Middle East are supporting efforts against the West either directly or indirectly because of the leadership of Bin Laden or the skewed perspective on Islam that he employs as ideology do these people a tremendous disservice. It also very conveniently takes a position that allows the West to ignore its own transgressions against these very people.

Ok, so that's a start at what I am getting at, look forward to hearing what others think. And to all of you "lurkers" out there, please to weigh in, even if it is just with a sentence or two. At the end of the day, I don't want to prove that I am right, I want to figure out what is right. And one of you may well hold the key that will unlock that door.

Regards,

Bob

[Bob's World]

Just by coincidence I ran by this quote today. I like it.

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction."
Albert Einstein

[slapout9]

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.



Bob

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

[davidbfpo]

Bob's use of causation and motivation is far easier for the non-academic and non-specialists to follow IMHO. Other papers I have read are far more complex, partly as they try to cover all civil conflicts / terrorism / political violence. Maybe it is a marketing device, I think not. Nor does the failure of good governance and related points diminish looking at conflicts through causation and motivation.

[jmm99]

This comment from Slap:

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

got me thinking. What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

-------------------------------
This continuation is somewhat thinking out loud; although the thoughts have occured to me before.

In Southeast Asia, we can look at four countries: Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. As to them, we can accept some common factors:

1. All were feudal (as the Marxists used that term) and colonial, pre-WWII.

2. All were occupied by the Japanese during WWII (showing the people that an Asian military could defeat Western militaries).

3. During WWII, nationalist movements were strengthened.

4. At the end of WWII, the colonial powers returned (length of stay varied).

5. After WWII, insurgencies developed in all (in Indochina and Indonesia, we have I and II cases).

We could (simplistically, IMO) look at WWII as the "cause" of those insurgencies and that the "Causes" were "anti-feudalism" and "anti-colonialism". There is some truth in that, but the realities were more complex.

In considering those six insurgencies (Indochina I & II, Malaya, Indonesia I & II, the Philippines), Bill Pomeroy (CPUSA author and special operator) left us with some good advice in his Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism (1968, International Publishers, the CPUSA bookstore - book no longer in catalog), p.200:

The theory that there is an "Asian model" of contemporary guerrilla liberation struggles (it is assumed to be patterned on the Chinese experience) breaks down with a close examination of each struggle. This has been pointed out in the Introduction, but it needs to be stressed further that liberation movements in the region have been variegated, each with its own historical roots, deriving from the peculiar nature of the colonial system in each colony, and each pursuing its own course of development.

With that caveat in mind, considering the "Causes" expressed in the "Narratives" (both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) in each of these six instances gains some understanding as to one factor (among many) that made each of them different from the others, in both development and outcomes. That is an exercise that I've not yet completed.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, to me all problems start at the level of either nature made or man made. Nature..... Tornado's,Hurricanes,etc. vs. Man made.... Crimes and Wars. Man made requires Active Agency......I think that is the legal term,i.e. guns do not kill people until a human (Active Agent) picks it up and shoots somebody.

So for an insurgency to happen requires a motivated person (Active Agent) to motivate other humans to join with him/her to fight for the common motive which becomes a United Common Cause.

[marct]

What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

You know, Mike, I really like this. Personally, I would go one step further and point out that, barring "natural" events (tornados, hurricanes, etc.), we as a species don't "know" about the first category in any really objective sense, only inter-subjectively. This gets us to the point that we cannot ascribe cause and effect relationships or factors unless we have a knowledge system, a "narrative" if you will, of how reality is constructed.

"Cause and effect" is, really, just another term for a specific type of relationship (an "if-then" one). But if we say that X causes Y (or a percentage of it), then we have to have at least a rough, inter-subjective agreement on what constitute X and Y. The process of getting that agreement, which we could call "indoctrination", "enculturation", "radicalization" or any other similar concept pertaining to the adoption of one symbol system by a person, carries with it its own "causal" logic (i.e. implied relationships). Even the case of "natural events" is not privileged as a natural/universal category with absolute membership, since many systems ascribe them to the operation of supernatural entities (Katrina as the curse of God, Haiti as punishment for signing a pact with the Devil, etc.).

When you say

The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

I think you are spot on. In fact, I don't think you go far enough with its implications. Narratives structure lived, day-to-day experiences by providing both expressive and explanatory means for people to comprehend these experiences; they are the "interpretive schemas" I keep talking about. Where we get a really interesting "convergence" is between ideological and religious narratives which, basically, cover the same ground area by offering sometimes complementary, sometimes antithetical schemas.

Cheers,

Marc

[Bob's World]

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

[Bob's World]

Mike,

Thanks for the legal assist. That is exactly what I was trying to get at in clarifying the difference between cause and causation. Its unfortunate the words are so similar inconstruction, becuase the meanings in application are very different indeed.

Bob

[jmm99]

as to this:

from BW; [ ]s by JMM
I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation [small "c" "cause"], motivation, and cause [cap "C" "Cause"] when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or in support of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

but I really am cut to the quick by your criticism of my favored approach to washing clothes:

from BW
Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

Who cares if the underwear turns pink & the red sweatshirt is now a darker shade of pink - some people like that.

Cheers

Mike

PS: Always happy to assist a fellow legal beagle, who is now doing more important work.

[slapout9]

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

I would say it is Independence from Person(s) Acting as Tyrant(s).

[William F. Owen]

So let me get this right...

a.) War = the setting forth of Policy/politics via violent means, and the interactions that are inherent to that?

b.) Strategy = the use of force to get things done - in terms of the military contribution to strategy - and the adaptations that flow from the passion, reason and chance that are inherent to the use of force?

....thinking I read this somewhere else before......

I think in the case of Hitler, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon, the Tsarist White Russians and Julius Caesar, folks fought very hard and in great numbers to ensure they had a tyrant in control of their lives - because they liked the idea of the stability that a single leader brought and did not like the idea of a ultimately "corrupt" democratic process. Funny that.