Motivation vs. causation

[Bob's World]

Jeeez. I post something, minding my own business, wake up in the morning and find I am now hosting a thread? As they say in the US Army, "Buddy is only half of the word...")

So, going back in time a bit, one of the things that got me thinking about this was what I saw as a powerful, yet misguided, obsession with Islamism and ideology. The US position was, (and probably remains), that Islamist ideology is the center of gravity for the entire damn GWOT/long war/global insurgency, etc, etc.

That just didn't square up with me. Sure, the ideology of a movement is what is in your face, as are the terrorist events; but does that mean one is dealing with an ideologically driven terrorist movement? I think not. I think CvC is correct that war is politics; and that insurgency is about internal politics and wars between states are more about external politics.

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.

I would describe those things I bundle under motivation (dynamic leadership; ideology; dramatic events, etc) as Critical Requirements (CRs) to a COG of "Support of the Populace"; but not as standalone COGs. You must have them, but these are the things that ignite and sustain an insurgency; but why is it you can have them in one society and have an insurgency, and in another a 200 word story on page 5 of the local paper?

Why is one man a "crackpot" spewing "crazy talk"; while another is a dynamic leader with a profound message??? It’s a fine line, and that line moves as conditions among the target populace change. But change in what way? What changes are critical and must be addressed, and what changes are immaterial? One could argue that over his reign of activity in post WWI Germany that Hitler morphed from Crackpot, to dynamic leader and back to Crackpot again. What changed? I argue that what changed were the perceptions of the German populace.

As I like to say, "The Pied Piper is a fairy tale." What I find though, is that there are many smart people who are willing to believe in fairy tales. I, however, am a skeptic. I do not believe that some dynamic leader can come along, and play his magic flute of ideology, and lead a satisfied populace (experiencing "good governance") to its insurgent doom. I just don't buy it.

I also found Maslow's work instructive. Most were focusing on "effectiveness of governance" and were pounding away at the importance of the bottom of his pyramid. And that may well be true for the average fighter who comes to Helmand in Poppy season as a migrant worker to make some money working the poppy harvest; and then stays to make some money through the summer planting IEDs or fighting with the Taliban. For a Pashtun, getting paid to fight is like paying a teenage American boy to date Megan Fox.

But what is it that creates the conditions that would cause men like our US founding fathers to risk their fortunes, families, reputations and very lives to form the sustaining nucleus of an ultimately successful insurgency? As mentioned above, the FACTs in the Southern colonies were very different than in the middle colonies, and then in the New England colonies. So get past the facts. How did those men FEEL about the facts that they were experiencing?

This takes us to the top of Maslow's pyramid. Respect, Justice, etc. Much higher order aspects of human fulfillment than chasing one's next meal. If I am hungry I will poach a deer in the King's forest. If I am disrespected and live in a world with no justice I will go after the King himself.

Those who think that millions of Muslims living in the Middle East are supporting efforts against the West either directly or indirectly because of the leadership of Bin Laden or the skewed perspective on Islam that he employs as ideology do these people a tremendous disservice. It also very conveniently takes a position that allows the West to ignore its own transgressions against these very people.

Ok, so that's a start at what I am getting at, look forward to hearing what others think. And to all of you "lurkers" out there, please to weigh in, even if it is just with a sentence or two. At the end of the day, I don't want to prove that I am right, I want to figure out what is right. And one of you may well hold the key that will unlock that door.

Regards,

Bob

[Bob's World]

Just by coincidence I ran by this quote today. I like it.

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex... It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction."
Albert Einstein

[slapout9]

Slap says that Motivation is most important. I could argue that either way; but I would stand firm on the point that motivation alone will not ignite a successful insurgency unless you have conditions of causation in place first.



Bob

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

[davidbfpo]

Bob's use of causation and motivation is far easier for the non-academic and non-specialists to follow IMHO. Other papers I have read are far more complex, partly as they try to cover all civil conflicts / terrorism / political violence. Maybe it is a marketing device, I think not. Nor does the failure of good governance and related points diminish looking at conflicts through causation and motivation.

[jmm99]

This comment from Slap:

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

got me thinking. What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

-------------------------------
This continuation is somewhat thinking out loud; although the thoughts have occured to me before.

In Southeast Asia, we can look at four countries: Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. As to them, we can accept some common factors:

1. All were feudal (as the Marxists used that term) and colonial, pre-WWII.

2. All were occupied by the Japanese during WWII (showing the people that an Asian military could defeat Western militaries).

3. During WWII, nationalist movements were strengthened.

4. At the end of WWII, the colonial powers returned (length of stay varied).

5. After WWII, insurgencies developed in all (in Indochina and Indonesia, we have I and II cases).

We could (simplistically, IMO) look at WWII as the "cause" of those insurgencies and that the "Causes" were "anti-feudalism" and "anti-colonialism". There is some truth in that, but the realities were more complex.

In considering those six insurgencies (Indochina I & II, Malaya, Indonesia I & II, the Philippines), Bill Pomeroy (CPUSA author and special operator) left us with some good advice in his Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism (1968, International Publishers, the CPUSA bookstore - book no longer in catalog), p.200:

The theory that there is an "Asian model" of contemporary guerrilla liberation struggles (it is assumed to be patterned on the Chinese experience) breaks down with a close examination of each struggle. This has been pointed out in the Introduction, but it needs to be stressed further that liberation movements in the region have been variegated, each with its own historical roots, deriving from the peculiar nature of the colonial system in each colony, and each pursuing its own course of development.

With that caveat in mind, considering the "Causes" expressed in the "Narratives" (both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) in each of these six instances gains some understanding as to one factor (among many) that made each of them different from the others, in both development and outcomes. That is an exercise that I've not yet completed.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, to me all problems start at the level of either nature made or man made. Nature..... Tornado's,Hurricanes,etc. vs. Man made.... Crimes and Wars. Man made requires Active Agency......I think that is the legal term,i.e. guns do not kill people until a human (Active Agent) picks it up and shoots somebody.

So for an insurgency to happen requires a motivated person (Active Agent) to motivate other humans to join with him/her to fight for the common motive which becomes a United Common Cause.

[jmm99]

agree with this:''

from Slap
So for an insurgency to happen requires a motivated person (Active Agent) to motivate other humans to join with him/her to fight for the common motive which becomes a United Common Cause.

So, then the questions are: whether we look for the factors that motivated the Active Actor (and those who join); how far back we should go in looking for them; and whether we should then try to fix them ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

So, then the questions are: whether we look for the factors that motivated the Active Actor (and those who join); how far back we should go in looking for them; and whether we should then try to fix them ?

Regards

Mike

I would go back as far as practical until you come to the factor and it will be a person or persons ,that started it. I don't know if you should fix them or just shoot them

PS a good principle for Law to. Don't ask what you were fighting about.....ask WHO started it. My 2 cents.

[marct]

What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:

1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.

2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".

You know, Mike, I really like this. Personally, I would go one step further and point out that, barring "natural" events (tornados, hurricanes, etc.), we as a species don't "know" about the first category in any really objective sense, only inter-subjectively. This gets us to the point that we cannot ascribe cause and effect relationships or factors unless we have a knowledge system, a "narrative" if you will, of how reality is constructed.

"Cause and effect" is, really, just another term for a specific type of relationship (an "if-then" one). But if we say that X causes Y (or a percentage of it), then we have to have at least a rough, inter-subjective agreement on what constitute X and Y. The process of getting that agreement, which we could call "indoctrination", "enculturation", "radicalization" or any other similar concept pertaining to the adoption of one symbol system by a person, carries with it its own "causal" logic (i.e. implied relationships). Even the case of "natural events" is not privileged as a natural/universal category with absolute membership, since many systems ascribe them to the operation of supernatural entities (Katrina as the curse of God, Haiti as punishment for signing a pact with the Devil, etc.).

When you say

The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".

I think you are spot on. In fact, I don't think you go far enough with its implications. Narratives structure lived, day-to-day experiences by providing both expressive and explanatory means for people to comprehend these experiences; they are the "interpretive schemas" I keep talking about. Where we get a really interesting "convergence" is between ideological and religious narratives which, basically, cover the same ground area by offering sometimes complementary, sometimes antithetical schemas.

Cheers,

Marc

[Bob's World]

I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

[Bob's World]

Mike,

Thanks for the legal assist. That is exactly what I was trying to get at in clarifying the difference between cause and causation. Its unfortunate the words are so similar inconstruction, becuase the meanings in application are very different indeed.

Bob

[jmm99]

as to this:

from BW; [ ]s by JMM
I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation [small "c" "cause"], motivation, and cause [cap "C" "Cause"] when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or in support of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

but I really am cut to the quick by your criticism of my favored approach to washing clothes:

from BW
Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

Who cares if the underwear turns pink & the red sweatshirt is now a darker shade of pink - some people like that.

Cheers

Mike

PS: Always happy to assist a fellow legal beagle, who is now doing more important work.

[slapout9]

But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.

For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:

Independence


I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.

Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.

I would say it is Independence from Person(s) Acting as Tyrant(s).

[William F. Owen]

So let me get this right...

a.) War = the setting forth of Policy/politics via violent means, and the interactions that are inherent to that?

b.) Strategy = the use of force to get things done - in terms of the military contribution to strategy - and the adaptations that flow from the passion, reason and chance that are inherent to the use of force?

....thinking I read this somewhere else before......

I think in the case of Hitler, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon, the Tsarist White Russians and Julius Caesar, folks fought very hard and in great numbers to ensure they had a tyrant in control of their lives - because they liked the idea of the stability that a single leader brought and did not like the idea of a ultimately "corrupt" democratic process. Funny that.

[slapout9]

So let me get this right...

a.) War = the setting forth of Policy/politics via violent means, and the interactions that are inherent to that?

b.) Strategy = the use of force to get things done - in terms of the military contribution to strategy - and the adaptations that flow from the passion, reason and chance that are inherent to the use of force?

....thinking I read this somewhere else before......

I think in the case of Hitler, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon, the Tsarist White Russians and Julius Caesar, folks fought very hard and in great numbers to ensure they had a tyrant in control of their lives - because they liked the idea of the stability that a single leader brought and did not like the idea of a ultimately "corrupt" democratic process. Funny that.

Sorta, except we (US) wanted the right to choose our own Tyrant not use somebody elses.

[jmm99]

I'm happy to see that the Local Governance-Local Populace Section of the Ad Hoc SWC Civil Affairs Team (created by Steve the Surfer - ) is on the same page.

Admittedly, I could have gone further with Causation (both with multiplicity of causes and their proximity to the material situation - and which ultimate causes are "Acts of God" and which are "Acts of Man"). Been there and done that to some extent with civil litigation (where we look more to multiple causes and attribution of comparative fault than in criminal litigation, where its nature requires simpler solutions).

As you say:

....we as a species don't "know" about the first category in any really objective sense, only inter-subjectively.

and we get into a process similar to a Thomist proof of God taught to me by my mother (she taught RC religion). Fine for a matter of belief (after all, Credo means "I believe"), but not really a matter of objective knowledge (Scio = "I know").

-----------------------
So, as a practitioner, I'd rather focus on the "Causes" in the respective "Narratives" - and how those Narratives meet the realities of the situational environment. The best theoretical Narrative in the world will fall on its tail if it is not implemented on the ground at the local level (whether urban or rural).

Yes, I could have gone into "Causes" and the "Narratives" further - and suggested a study program (see last half of post, Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" - that discussion would be a bookshelf added to what already exists). I'm not sure how much Mao-Giap and other Marxist-Leninist theory SWC wants to hear - not all here are red diaper or pink diaper babies (). The Marxists wrote the original books, except for the Indonesian Gen who wrote his original book from a center-right viewpoint.

In fact, if the Narrative is really "from the People, back to the People" in a positive feedback loop, where theses and anti-theses are worked into syntheses, and the syntheses are implemented at a local level so that the People can see that the Narrative works, then we have in your wonderful academic language:

Narratives structure lived, day-to-day experiences by providing both expressive and explanatory means for people to comprehend these experiences; they are the "interpretive schemas" I keep talking about. Where we get a really interesting "convergence" is between ideological and religious narratives which, basically, cover the same ground area by offering sometimes complementary, sometimes antithetical schemas.

Was your mother a Librarian ?

Best as always, Canuck

Mike