SWJ has published an article containing the detailed outline of the new Host Nation Information program.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9504

Setting aside the jargon, acronyms and flow charts, the issues, now are:

First, does the system create new and actionable insights into the situation?

Second, how do those insights find their way into application, staffing, activity organization, and, in the end, actions?

In Iraq, our purpose in structuring and assembling this type of information was in order to find a framework for synchronized and properly targeted actions in the post-conflict reconstruction environment.

What resulted was were several key understandings. First, that there had not been an effective plan and course of action. Second, that there needed to be one, and that it must be heavily driven by Iraqis, and based on sound hierarchical actions, and sustainable strategies.

The results were a simplification of focus on clearly identified first-things-first: security, water, energy and power (the preconditions for any future successful efforts). From there, US DoD resources to see, assess, travel, and plan/engineer were used to systematically assess and prioritize project needs (roads, bridges, fuel movement, water & wells, etc...); CERP and other resources were targeted consistent with the priorities (and Iraqi sourced projects were not CERPed in order to focus US funding away from duplication of Iraqi activities. Then, after identifying the Iraqi implementing agencies (mostly national ministries), the MND-N CG implemented a process of "helicopter diplomacy" to substantially reconnect the ministries to the provinces, and link the ministries with the problems.

One critical factor behind the Iraqi strategy was the recognition that relevant Iraqi agencies and leaders had twice rebuilt their country from two devastating wars, and one of which was done under hugely restrictive sanctions. This may not be the case in Afghanistan.

In my view, the effort in Northern Iraq in 08 was to identify the way through to improved post-reconstruction, which, in that circumstance, identified Iraqi-focused solutions to connect Iraqi provinces and ministries, and deliver to them (not us) the knowledge, responsibility and power to move forward on their own. This may not be practical in Afghanistan.

The questions in Iraq were answered there, and thpose answers dictated specific solutions and actions.

If the new information systems answers the same basic questions, what will the answers be, and how we they drive solutions in Afghanistan?

Clearly, it is unlikely that the answers should be the same. Let's see what they learn...