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  1. #11
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    Default Hi John - part 2

    I'd say that extensive knowledge of the "causes" of the insugency, the "ideology" of the insurgent leadership, and the "ultimate political causes" deciding on the armed conflict, are generally not important to the local level practioner. The "Causes" stated in the competing revolutionary and counter-revolutionary "Narratives" are important - and, fortunately, can be determined much more easily than questions of "Causation" - see Marct, (untitled). How important depends on what the local practioner is doing.

    Let's leave aside the practioner in the GPF, and such things as SFA; and instead focus on the areas of Special Operations Warfare, which AQ also employs as a flip side of the coin (not a pun cuz we are dealing more with a generalized concept of unconventional warfare and counter-unconventional warfare, not necessarily counter-insurgency).

    Here are the areas, from Robert Martinage, Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities (CSBA 17 Nov 2008), Chapter 1. A Primer on Special Operations Forces, pp.28-30 (pdf) (simply cuz he sums each area with doctrinal refs, so JMM doesn't have to re-invent the wheel). Brief comments re: AQ after the quotes.

    The Department of Defense defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”[13] They differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”[14]

    13. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 516. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 1-02.

    14. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 517.
    Since AQ is a near-global pariah, its operations must of necessity occur in "hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments".

    More specifically, SOF are currently organized, trained, and equipped to conduct nine core tasks.

    > Civil Affairs (CA): CA missions create a link between the commander and the local population or government by providing key social and governmental services when the local government cannot; by keeping civilians safely away from combat operations; by establishing programs to build trust between the US military forces and the local population; and by supporting information operations.[15]

    15. Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, p. II-2. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 3-57.1
    It is well to remember that UBL was primarily a civil affairs officer (engineer) vs the SovComs in Astan.

    > Counterproliferation (CP): CP missions are offensive actions to“locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”[16] Counterproliferation includes actions taken to prevent the development or proliferation of WMD.

    16. Joint Pub 3-57.1., p. II-10.
    AQ, so far mostly unsuccessfully, has a tasked mission to obtain WMD.

    > Counterterrorism (CT): CT missions are offensive actions to “prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism.”[17] They include intelligence operations; attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures; hostage rescue; recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations; and non-kinetic activities such as information and psychological operations designed to decrease the influence of terrorist groups and their ideologies.

    17. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 131.
    Terrorism is a state of mind, in which I don't indulge. But my term, Transnational Violent Non-State Actors (TVNSA), simply does not have the ring of "(expletive) terrorist ba$tards" (my friend Todd) or "criminal scum" (my friend Ted). So, counter-AQ and AQ are the two sides of this coin currently - with room for more pond scum to be added.

    > Direct Action (DA ): DA missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets of strategic or operational significance, employing specialized military capabilities. Direct action differs from conventional raids by the value of the target, the politically sensitive or hostile nature of the environment, and the need for highly discriminatory applications of force.[18]

    18. Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-4. See also Joint Pub 1-02, p. 161.
    AQ's direct actions include 9/11.

    > Foreign Internal Defense (FID ): FID missions build the capacity of partner nations to provide for their own internal security. SOF’s primary contribution to FID is to organize, train, advise and assist host-nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. It includes SOF support to any programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.[19]

    19. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 214 .
    AQ does it (not for nations, but for groups) - see UW.

    > Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting the joint force’s information capabilities.[20]

    20. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 261.

    > Psychological Operations (PSYO PS): Planned operations to convey selected information to foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to US interests. Typically, this is achieved through the dissemination of information by dedicated PSYOP units.[21]

    21. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 44 ; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-11.
    AQ does this well.

    > Special Reconnaissance (SR): Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures not normally found in conventional forces.[22]

    22. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 512; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-6.
    AQ also does this.

    > Unconventional Warfare (UW): UW operations are conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, including: guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. While unconventional warfare is traditionally considered to be aimed at the destabilization or overthrow of a state, it can also be conducted against non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups. In that application, irregular forces can be controlled by US forces directly in permissive or semi-permissive environments, and indirectly in hostile or politically sensitive areas.[23]

    23. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare; and Joint Pub 1-02, p. 572.
    Since most everything that AQ does takes place in denied areas, AQ can be said to be waging unconventional warfare covering a larger scope in activities than our UW definition. More to our stricter definition, AQ supports larger groups (insurgencies), smaller groups (e.g., Madrid and London train bombings), and even individuals where the support is indirect and moral only (MAJ Hasan), located in what to AQ is "enemy territory".

    Following this old advice:

    Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.
    —Sun Tzu
    I'd like to know as much about my enemy as possible; but for a tactical level practitioner, far more important things (than his politics and ideology) probably take precedence - depending on what he is doing.

    As Wilf just said:

    Context, context and context.
    All incoming is welcome

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 01-17-2010 at 10:26 PM.

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