The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[William F. Owen]

I hope that we are in agreement that TTP are types of warfare and infinitely variable, i.e. Conventional, COIN, Financial, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, etc.

Abso-F**king-lutely! What might work in irregular warfare might fail in regular and vice versa. Context, context and context.

However when solving a multivariate equation such as war = politics + economics + security = 1 + 1 + 1 we can not assume that war = politics.

Agreed, but I would merely submit that ALL WARs are the result of political policies, be they being promoted, contested or failing. "I want your land/food/water/women/hamster grazing rights, for my me and my people" or "I want you to worship my G*d," is a statement of policy.

[jmm99]

and your answer to my "recon probe". Taking its two parts separately:

from John
Up front...I continue to wrestle with the distinction. Here are a couple of ideological based insurgent group ideas.... arguably religion could enter the discussion. I say the Ku Klux Klan, under the auspices of racism perhaps, but also ideological. Additionally, al Qaeda, depending on distinction, is ideological. Honestly, I believe the distinction, in the context of al Qaeda, is subtle if we agree that their strategic endstate is restoration of the Caliphate. Here is my thought, if one labels AQ, in a broader context as terrorists, than one could argue they are waging a war against governments to expand their ideology. Yet, that ideology is established to restore a political model.

The 20th Century Klan was very political - e.g., in the 1920s, it heavily influenced a few state goverments and many local governments; in the 50-60s, some local governments; and we have David Duke, the new face of the Klan.

As to AQ, it is very much political cuz, in its Salafist ideology, religion and politics are intertwined, and AQ is very religious (to the extreme of dogmatic rigidity). The political struggle and the military struggle are all part of its campaigns based on a "common Jihad" (defensive jihad and offensive jihad - the "Lesser Jihad"), and the more personalized struggle (the non-violent "Greater Jihad"). This follows (but more violently) the 1939 construct of Maududi - presented by JMM in simplistic form, You're moving in the right direction, and agreed as to their substance by COL Jones, To me these points are important and true. Without getting into it, Bob and I also agree about the problems caused by over-obsession and over-reaction to AQ.

In general, I see problems in trying to separate insurgencies into political and ideological. A primary reason is that the ideology of the leadership may not be reflected in the "Cause" which is the subject matter of the insugency's "Narrative", as explained here, Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes"; and also COL Jones, Agreed as to what a cause is, and Marct, (untitled).

-----------------------------
You have briefly met Wilf and Surferbeetle (aka Commandant Steve of the ad hoc SWC Civil Affairs Team, an engineer who dabbled in biochem; I, a biochem who dabbled in engineering, and later a lawyer - a label shared with COL Jones who went on to better things).

Having gone back and forth with both of them, publically and privately, I'd say there is much truth in Wif's comment:

I think we may be in agreement.

and we certainly are in the same boat. The differences come from who should be pulling the oars, starboard and port - and how to describe the oars.

As to all of our "oar descriptions", we sometimes "lack rigour" (a Wilfimism) in our terminology and so we have to work toward at least "working definitions" (fully explained by Marct, IIRC, somewhere at SWC).

As to the starboard and port issues, most all recognize that wars involve a political struggle and military struggle (political effort and military effort in less Maoist terms), in greater or lesser degrees depending on the armed conflict.

From Wilf's standpoint, the military effort and the political effort should be very separate (in who), but co-ordinated (in how and what) - e.g., the British experience, Malaya, etc., following Callwell and Kitson naming just two.

Because of US doctrine and (frankly) capabilities, Steve the Surfer and JMM see both the political and military efforts as involving the military (following a modified Mao-Giap approach - see John McCuen's, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, reprint available from Hailer Publishing).

Which brings us to the practitioner at the tactical level.

----------------------------
I'm going to split this into parts

end part 1

[jmm99]

I'd say that extensive knowledge of the "causes" of the insugency, the "ideology" of the insurgent leadership, and the "ultimate political causes" deciding on the armed conflict, are generally not important to the local level practioner. The "Causes" stated in the competing revolutionary and counter-revolutionary "Narratives" are important - and, fortunately, can be determined much more easily than questions of "Causation" - see Marct, (untitled). How important depends on what the local practioner is doing.

Let's leave aside the practioner in the GPF, and such things as SFA; and instead focus on the areas of Special Operations Warfare, which AQ also employs as a flip side of the coin (not a pun cuz we are dealing more with a generalized concept of unconventional warfare and counter-unconventional warfare, not necessarily counter-insurgency).

Here are the areas, from Robert Martinage, Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities (CSBA 17 Nov 2008), Chapter 1. A Primer on Special Operations Forces, pp.28-30 (pdf) (simply cuz he sums each area with doctrinal refs, so JMM doesn't have to re-invent the wheel). Brief comments re: AQ after the quotes.

The Department of Defense defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”[13] They differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”[14]

13. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 516. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 1-02.

14. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 517.

Since AQ is a near-global pariah, its operations must of necessity occur in "hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments".

More specifically, SOF are currently organized, trained, and equipped to conduct nine core tasks.

> Civil Affairs (CA): CA missions create a link between the commander and the local population or government by providing key social and governmental services when the local government cannot; by keeping civilians safely away from combat operations; by establishing programs to build trust between the US military forces and the local population; and by supporting information operations.[15]

15. Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, p. II-2. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 3-57.1

It is well to remember that UBL was primarily a civil affairs officer (engineer) vs the SovComs in Astan.

> Counterproliferation (CP): CP missions are offensive actions to“locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”[16] Counterproliferation includes actions taken to prevent the development or proliferation of WMD.

16. Joint Pub 3-57.1., p. II-10.

AQ, so far mostly unsuccessfully, has a tasked mission to obtain WMD.

> Counterterrorism (CT): CT missions are offensive actions to “prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism.”[17] They include intelligence operations; attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures; hostage rescue; recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations; and non-kinetic activities such as information and psychological operations designed to decrease the influence of terrorist groups and their ideologies.

17. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 131.

Terrorism is a state of mind, in which I don't indulge. But my term, Transnational Violent Non-State Actors (TVNSA), simply does not have the ring of "(expletive) terrorist ba$tards" (my friend Todd) or "criminal scum" (my friend Ted). So, counter-AQ and AQ are the two sides of this coin currently - with room for more pond scum to be added.

> Direct Action (DA ): DA missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets of strategic or operational significance, employing specialized military capabilities. Direct action differs from conventional raids by the value of the target, the politically sensitive or hostile nature of the environment, and the need for highly discriminatory applications of force.[18]

18. Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-4. See also Joint Pub 1-02, p. 161.

AQ's direct actions include 9/11.

> Foreign Internal Defense (FID ): FID missions build the capacity of partner nations to provide for their own internal security. SOF’s primary contribution to FID is to organize, train, advise and assist host-nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. It includes SOF support to any programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.[19]

19. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 214 .

AQ does it (not for nations, but for groups) - see UW.

> Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting the joint force’s information capabilities.[20]

20. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 261.

> Psychological Operations (PSYO PS): Planned operations to convey selected information to foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to US interests. Typically, this is achieved through the dissemination of information by dedicated PSYOP units.[21]

21. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 44 ; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-11.

AQ does this well.

> Special Reconnaissance (SR): Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures not normally found in conventional forces.[22]

22. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 512; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-6.

AQ also does this.

> Unconventional Warfare (UW): UW operations are conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, including: guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. While unconventional warfare is traditionally considered to be aimed at the destabilization or overthrow of a state, it can also be conducted against non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups. In that application, irregular forces can be controlled by US forces directly in permissive or semi-permissive environments, and indirectly in hostile or politically sensitive areas.[23]

23. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare; and Joint Pub 1-02, p. 572.

Since most everything that AQ does takes place in denied areas, AQ can be said to be waging unconventional warfare covering a larger scope in activities than our UW definition. More to our stricter definition, AQ supports larger groups (insurgencies), smaller groups (e.g., Madrid and London train bombings), and even individuals where the support is indirect and moral only (MAJ Hasan), located in what to AQ is "enemy territory".

Following this old advice:

Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.
—Sun Tzu

I'd like to know as much about my enemy as possible; but for a tactical level practitioner, far more important things (than his politics and ideology) probably take precedence - depending on what he is doing.

As Wilf just said:

Context, context and context.

All incoming is welcome

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

Here are the areas, from Robert Martinage, Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities (CSBA 17 Nov 2008), Chapter 1. A Primer on Special Operations Forces, pp.28-30 (pdf) (simply cuz he sums each area with doctrinal refs, so JMM doesn't have to re-invent the wheel). Brief comments re: AQ after the quotes.

Mike,

Very nice, the Sun Tzu/Judo approach to your analysis is appreciated and worth reflecting upon.

I have been following your analysis across politics/religion (very difficult if not impossible to separate in some parts of the ME, and the US for that matter), causation and motivation over the last few days/months and it has sparked some thoughts on demographics, coherence of a group (both senses of the word), and capabilities. How does understanding the concept of value chain analysis apply to analyzing political/religious groups? Here are three links that might add to the discussion.

Microtargeting by Wikipedia

Microtargeting is the use by political parties and election campaigns of direct marketing datamining techniques that involve predictive market segmentation (aka cluster analysis). It is used by United States Republican and Democratic political parties and candidates to track individual voters and identify potential supporters.

Microtargeting's tactics rely on transmitting a tailored message to a subgroup of the electorate on the basis of unique information about that subgroup.

From FP Limbo World: Dispatches from countries which do not exist by GRAEME WOOD

This trend is a mess waiting to happen. The first worry is that these quasi-states' continued existence, and occasional luck, emboldens other secessionists. Imagine a world where every independence movement with a crate of Kalashnikovs thinks it can become the new Kurdistan, if only it hires the right lobbyists in Washington and opens a realistic-looking Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its makeshift capital. The second concern is that these aspirant nations have none of the rights and obligations of full countries, just ambiguous status and guns without laws. The United Nations is, in the end, binary: You are in or you are out, and if you are out, your mass-produced miniature desk flag has no place in Turtle Bay.

Encouraging states like Abkhazia to flourish and proliferate has created precisely the kind of second-class statehood, with uncertain rights and responsibilities in the international system, that diplomacy was designed over the last several centuries to avoid. The Peace of Westphalia established an international order of fixed boundaries in 1648 and made no provisions for the existence of functionally independent enclaves in Brandenburg-Prussia, say, that France could use for leverage. The whole point was to come to conclusions about what was sovereign territory and agree to knock off the warfare and ambiguity. That was in part for the welfare of those enclaves, so they were not trapped in uncertainty and used as proxies -- or worse, neocolonies -- by first-class states. But Limbo World suffers that exact fate today.

Throughout my travels in Limbo World, the conversation would often swing back to Uruguay, where a 1933 agreement was sealed that is today an article of faith to Limbo Worlders. The Montevideo Convention established a theory of statehood that treated countries like starfish, capable of surviving after having their limbs hacked off and able to sprout new and independent states from those hacked-off limbs.

It has come to be known as the declarative theory of statehood: the idea that a state is any entity with a fixed territory and population, and a government that can enter into relations with other states. Needless to say, if the letter of this convention, to which the United States is a signatory, were followed, nearly every country in Limbo World would immediately convert into full nationhood and every rebel group on the planet would be scrambling to print business cards for its hastily convened diplomatic corps. Like many sweeping declarations of foreign policy, the Montevideo Convention has been the victim of wise neglect nearly ever since its signing. Still, the opposite extreme in international relations -- giving existing countries a veto over every self-determination movement -- hardly recommends itself, and whatever happy medium exists between the two has not yet been reached.

Relevant to the topic?

From the 16 Jan 2010 BBC, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt elects new leader

The Brotherhood has influenced Islamist movements around the world with its model of political activism combined with charity work.

[jmm99]

I'm a little written out, but thanks for the kind words.

As to this:

from SB
How does understanding the concept of value chain analysis apply to analyzing political/religious groups?

you might apply it to the unit described in the first paragraph of this post, Eh, Marc ...:

I'm happy to see that the Local Governance-Local Populace Section of the Ad Hoc SWC Civil Affairs Team (created by Steve the Surfer - ) is on the same page.

cuz, "Sir", I'ze just about thought out as to civil affairs.

But not quite. The value added chain seems a logical extension of profit centers and good cost accounting by adding to the equation (in what only could be a "fuzzy pattern"): the surplus value of labor; the surplus value of capital investment; and the surplus value of a functional multi-link chain. Marx is now rolling in his grave.

I liked the diamond cutter example from the Wiki on Value Chain:

The chain of activities gives the products more added value than the sum of added values of all activities. It is important not to mix the concept of the value chain with the costs occurring throughout the activities. A diamond cutter can be used as an example of the difference. The cutting activity may have a low cost, but the activity adds much of the value to the end product, since a rough diamond is significantly less valuable than a cut diamond.

Now, my local brewery union president daddy would say (if still alive): "If management sees the value of the diamond cutter, pretty soon the diamond cutter will see it too. So, unless diamond cutters can be picked up for a dollar, the diamond cutter should ask for a fiver; but the diamond cutter can't be a pig cuz otherwise the company will shut down and the diamond cutter will be out cutting sheep balls, which don't pay even a dollar."

So, "Sir", what terms of endearment are you offering your team - so I won't have to cut sheep equipment with my teeth as Errol Flynn claimed in his autobio.

------------------------
More seriously, the Value Chain concept probably has added value, but I'll leave it to bright management types to explain in rational detail how it could be applied to Special Operations Warfare and Counter-Special Operations Warfare.

Next item is Microtargeting. In a post a few months ago, I suggested keeping Karl Rove and David Axelrod in solitary confinement until they came up with a plan to solve the local governance issues in Astan - or admit in a bi-partisan spirit that we lack the capabilities to do so and then should get out of Dodge. What I implied is their knowledge of political microtargeting.

So, yes, microtargeting at the local level is what the "Narrative" and its "Causes" are all about - Mao's "from the people, to the people" (see John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, pp.54-64 "Mobilizing the Masses"). That Narrative has to flow up and down (villages, district, provinces, nation); and it has to be implemented. Otherwise, you are left only with military force - that might win (as Wilf has often proved); but it is not a complete solution.

As to Limbo World, I'm not big on spilling my own blood and guts, or those belonging to someone else, solely for preservation of a Westphalian state, or worse yet to build one - one exception, the US, cuz It is mine and I am its. If the US fell apart, I guess I'd become a Yooper and work from there.

More directly, I believe we should learn the Management of Chaos (yes, I ripped off Naji's Management of Savagery). Let them take their own paths and see where it leads. If they become actual threats to the US then more corrective measures might be necessary. Perhaps, in these failed, failing and quasi states, we should be looking for alliances with NGOs (as to which, Legrange has his theories), as opposed to overt intervention and attempted nation building.

As to the last item, the brethren in Egypt split with AQ on the issue of addressing the near enemy (the Egyptian government) vs the far enemy (the US government); and also turned to the political struggle as their primary effort. That is one page out of the Maududi playbook. Whether the other pages will be left on the shelf - the future shall tell. As to this:

After the announcement of his election by the group's Shura Council on Saturday, Mr Badi told members: "Show the world the true Islam, the Islam of moderation and forgiveness that respects pluralism in the whole world."

Trust, but verify thrice (credits: an anonymous Finlander ).

Regards, "Commandant"

Mike

[John]

I'm a little written out, but thanks for the kind words.






Mike

jmm (et al)

I appreciate the "recon probe" and the follow up. In actuality, my initial comments, were to develop my own understanding, and a "recon probe" of my own. (See RFI Thread, wargaming). I am interested in researching tactical level wargaming (not simulation or gaming), but the application of "thoughtware".

I have seen the practical uses of Value Chain Analysis; SWOT; Delphi Forecasting and several other commercial business models. My initial question is the applicability of such a model in our current threat environments. The Sun Tzu quote is spot on. However, given the number of players knowing your enemy is potentially quite a headache.

Certainly appreciate the comments from all. Alas back to the study grindstone.

Regards
John

[slapout9]

Wasn't sure where to put this, but, it is one definition of good government. Bill Still's report on Good Government and how their greatest power is to create money.

http://www.youtube.com/user/bstill3

[sullygoarmy]

From the NY Times picking on poor Uncle Carl:

http://ideas.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/...man-fetish/?hp

[William F. Owen]

Actually I don't see this as picking on CvC. I see it as someone pointing out that most US military thought is very poor and bumper sticker forcing mechanisms do not work.

I could quibble with detail, like using the word "Blitzkrieg," but just because stupid people mis-quote Clausewitz and do not understand him, does not make CvC not incredibly useful - and no one has ever done better!

CvC is only the best because he is the only comprehensive theorist on war that withstands rigour. If someone wants to argue that, I'm very "up for it!"

[J Wolfsberger]

Wilf, Sully,

If you have time to waste, the NYT article leads here: http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175208/

The reason it will be a waste of time is that it is the most thoroughly muddled "thinking" on the subject of war I've ever read. I agree, he can't possibly be picking on CvC, since he either never read him, or didn't comprehend what he read.

[William F. Owen]

The reason it will be a waste of time is that it is the most thoroughly muddled "thinking" on the subject of war I've ever read.

....and as if for confirmation...

For many of us, these are the key pieces of analysis that made sense of our post-9/11 world.
- Naomi Klein

Why? What didn't make sense in the world before and what is you do not get now??

[MikeF]

What translation of Clausewitz would y'all recommend?

I'm putting some of my beer money away towards buying more books.

v/r

Mike

[kotkinjs1]

The Howard/Paret translation (1976/1984), hands down.

[MikeF]

The Howard/Paret translation (1976/1984), hands down.

Thanks Jeremy. BTW, my brain is churned to by your last essay. Keep on keeping on.

[William F. Owen]

What translation of Clausewitz would y'all recommend?

I wouldn't go and buy Clausewitz. Go and buy either the books I listed here.

They are commentaries on Clausewitz and you'll get far more out of them - Especially Smith, than wading through it yourself. - then go and buy the Howard and Paret edition of CvC!

[Tukhachevskii]

What translation of Clausewitz would y'all recommend?

I'm putting some of my beer money away towards buying more books.

v/r

Mike

You could also try the following website for an English/German side by side comparision of Vom Krieg run by Clausewitz scholar Christopher Bassford which uses the J. J. Graham version (which my old Professors claimed was stylistically closer to Clausewitz). Nonetheless, you could use it as a rossetta stone against which to judge the Paret/Howard Version which has its own problems.

http://clausewitz.com/CompareFrameSource1.htm

[kotkinjs1]

I'd also piggyback w/ Mr Owen; Colin Gray is one of the best interpretations of CvC for modern usage.

[Firn]

I do no think one should waste too many bits to comment this "notional construct". Reading things before constructing some sort of premeditated rambling usually helps. We have already insightful discussions about CvC on this board.


Firn

[William F. Owen]

I'd also piggyback w/ Mr Owen; Colin Gray is one of the best interpretations of CvC for modern usage.

Concur. Colin Gray is the about the best there is for applying Clausewitz in the real world and he also has excellent insights into the limits of Clausewitz and how and why some of the perceived limits are relevant and why some are not.

See here. for the "simple" version.

[sullygoarmy]

Gents,
Glad we have so many CvC fans out there...I have the same impression that the author has never read CvC save a few bumper sticker phrases which misses the point entirely of delving into his work.