The Zero Casualty Priority in Coalition Strategy

[Eden]

What I don't know is how much of a burden such 'soft' contributors are to those that foot the bill (US, Britain, Canada off the top of my head) in terms of tangible sacrifice. Is it acceptable to accept the small, politically-limited contributing states will always go into the rear echelon areas and accept the safe course?

I left Afghanistan in 2007, so my experience is somewhat dated. This was the period in which ISAF was expanding to control all of the country, including considerable American forces that had, up to that time, been operating outside of NATO.

There were many senior American officers who expressed disdain and contempt for armies that appeared to be exceptionally casualty averse. Many honestly believed that national caveats or differing approaches to counterinsurgency reflected timidity (to use a polite term) or a fundamental unseriousness on the part of various nationalities. In many cases this was unfair; in a few it was not. It was dysfunctional, in that it interfered with the smooth operation of a multi-national force. Commanders bristled, staffs bickered, and planning took longer than necessary because of a lack of mutual respect among partners.

This attitude was not generated because of any perceived lack of training or the shortages in equipment and capacity that afflicts most small armies. The Danes, for instance, were respected for their aggressiveness and can-do attitude; the Portugese for their reputation as team-players; the Estonians for their ability to accomplish a lot with a little. While the Dutch regulars were criticized for hiding behind the wire, the Dutch special forces had a reputation as tough sonsabitches.

Let me repeat that this was unfair in many cases, the military equivalent of urban legends. I can think of at least two firmly held beliefs among US officers that were wrong but had to be dispelled through education:

1. The Canadian leave policy was ironclad and would be allowed to interfere with operations.
2. The Germans were not allowed to feed troops MRE-equivalent for more than three days in a row; they would have to be brought back to the base to eat in a dining facility.

More professionally, there was real concern that timidity gets you killed and makes the entire mission much harder. For instance, the Belgians guarding KIA were not allowed to go outside the wire - not a good way to actually secure an airfield when the wire is only about 100 meters from the tarmac.

Is this important? Yes. In my opinion, a generation of leaders in the American Army will come away from Afghanistan with hardened opinions on the utility of certain national military forces. They will believe that certain nations are not worth the logistical effort to sustain them in the field. Others they will actively seek as partners the next time we fight a war.