From my current perch in the middle of things here in Southern Afghanistan, I get a chance weigh these theories against the facts I deal with daily, and the various programs that higher develops.
One area drawing a lot of focus is that of Reconciliation and Reintegration (or "forgive and forget" as I think of it.) Personally, I think we are worrying too much about this, and that to over formalize or overly shape this from our outsider perspective would be as likely to be harmful as helpful, but that is not what I wanted to address.
In reviewing some R & R documents, it struck me that we are really dealing with two distinct types of insurgency with the Taliban, and it divides on hierarchical lines.
For the Taliban senior leadership, I believe it is primarily a "Revolutionary Insurgency” (In BW, there are three broad categories of Insurgency: Revolutionary, Separatist, and Resistance). For revolutionary insurgency Causation and Motivation are more distinct than for a resistance insurgency. I believe that the key to R & R with the Taliban leadership must address the Causal factor of the illegitimacy of the Karzai government; that there must be some place for their ideological concerns in the new government; and that lastly, the presence of the foreigners must be reduced.
For the rank and file, I believe it is primarily a resistance insurgency. 50-80% fight simply because we are here, or because we are here and they can draw an honest wage as well to attack that foreign presence. I think they don't spend much time thinking about the government in Kabul, or its legitimacy. I think they don't much think about the TB ideology. For them the key factors that must be addressed are virtually the inverse of those for the senior leadership. BL, is that I don't believe we need to really worry about the majority of the populace to address the causal factors for the insurgency writ large, and that the COIN / R & R effort must focus on addressing the issues of the leadership.
This throws a wrench in the POP COIN machine to a degree. Yes, we must treat the populace with respect, no, we can't kill our way out of this (merely killing senior leaders drives the Pez effect. New ones keep popping up). We must enable a legitimate process that includes the leadership of this large, disenfranchised segment of the populace. In so doing, we will be able to bring them into the system and bring legitimacy to the system at the same time. This stands leadership down. Then we can reduce our presence. This stands the rank and file down.
But you must address the leadership first.
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