I agree that the Taliban won’t fight a “war of COPs”, but to a degree, that’s the physical reality of the ISAF/GoA fight. To get to the population, we need to be among them. Since the idea of patrols from large remote bases has been discredited as ineffective (commuting to war), what we see (I imagine if I looked at a detailed map of our forces) is a host of smaller COPs spread out across the country. From there we conduct patrols (hopefully that’s the main function/reason).

I was somewhat troubled when this story first hit the news a few months ago because some of the reasoning being used on why these outposts were where they were sounded right out of the Khe Sanh playbook—by providing attractive targets, these outposts drew insurgents away from more critical populated areas and provided an opportunity to employ our advantages in firepower. I don’t know if this was actual planning, or after-the fact rationalizing. If it was the part of a deliberate plan, it doesn’t appear that we thought it through to ensure we could actually effectively employ that firepower and ability to maneuver/mass quickly (time/space calculations).

If the COPs are a reality, I agree with Ken that we need to be prepared to lose one every now and then—not based on gross incompetence, but by the nature of risk and the fact that the goddess of war does not always smile on us. However, understanding that kind of risk and likely bad occurrence from time to time, we ought to have our PA/Information plan set, as well as expectation management. Unfortunately, we are in a situation of expectation management, especially at home, that any action of more than a few dead or wounded is seen as a gross tactical mistake worthy of investigation and fault-finding.

I’m not stating that there is or isn’t fault in this case. I think it is worthy of study and reflection for how the larger campaign design either supports these outposts having a positive function, or how it can place them in untenable positions regardless of how well or poorly the perimeter is constructed. In the end, I’d state that the lack of popular support meant the lack of meaningful intel. The question is how to garner any popular support, even if minimal, without first establishing yourself in strength?

As an addendum, on the subject ofour COIN approach, I’m guessing that there is the additional option of small teams embedded in tribes or other governing structures. That could work. I’d say that if the political/social structure of governing supports a less static and visible place of governance, then this will work. However, at some point, the GoA must establish governing facilities that both symbolize and exercise their governing power. For example, the vaunted Combined Action Platoons(CAPs) in Vietnam took two main forms. The first was the compound CAP, where the CAP located itself, with its PF platoon and usually local government officials in a compound. This was usually coordinated in with the local battlespace owner for fire support and reinforcements (QRF), when/if there was a major attack. The other type of CAP was the mobile CAP which basically was on patrol 24/7 in its area of operations. It moved around constantly, depending upon its survival through the inability of VC to accurately predict where it would be, or even find it (at night). The mobile CAP was very effective in many instances in throwing the insurgents off and taking the initiative. However useful it was from a military sense, however, it was seen a sign of weakness in the political sense. Without an identifiable place to govern from, the local GVN looked like they lived in fear of the VC (which they did). At some point, the government had to establish a visible place to govern from in order to be legitimate.

Phil Ridderhof USMC