Unconventional War- 10th Group and the Kurds
In 2005, I was assigned to CJSOTF-AP. The staff guys (Majors and CSMs) went into Northern Iraq during OIF One while I was with the Rock of the Marne bringing shock and awe from Kuwait to Baghdad. I'd tell the stories of the Thunder Runs, and they memorized me with tales of 10-man SF teams teaming up with a Kurdish Brigade of 5000 men and taking on the Hammarabi Division. While a shaping effort, they managed to cause enough harrassment to confuse Saddam into believing 4th ID was coming in from the North. Their maneuvers made my job easier.
Next, they started giving me the SF manuals to read and schooling me on something called Foreign Internal Defense. "Mike, dude, we don't do anything ourselves. We teach others how to do it." Or, as I joke with my SEAL friends, "we just sleep, eat, and lift." Traditionally indoctrinated as a tanker, that mindset sounded good to me .
Foreign Internal Defense- Phillipines, Colombia, and El Salvador
In Monterey, I started meeting some new friends and instructors. Many of these men do not have combat patches or CIBs. In Class A's, they have no medals of valor. It's a strange sight because they still have many skill identifying badges, numerous scrolls on their sleeves, and wear a Green Beret. They walk into a room with a quiet, humbled self-confidence. When they choose to speak, even though it may be soft-spoken, you listen. I come from a world of cavalry officers and the Airborne Mafia. We lead large groups of young men. We are supposed to be loud, bold, and out-spoken if not overwhelming and overbearing at times. Quite a culture shock.
Anyways, they started showing me another way- the way of the quiet professional that mentors, advises, and assists. Because of the political sensitivity in the areas that they operate, most of what they do is done out of the limelight with little to no visibility. In systems terms, they attempt to have the least amount of physical presence and shock and the highest output of return on effort. Oftentimes, they are constrained on what they are allowed to do.
We shared long discussions on how to intervene in small wars outside of the US. We debated over what works and what doesn't, timing of intervention, and the escalation of violence.
Salinas- Narco-Terrorism, Gangs, and Effective Law Enforcement
There's a long thread on this in SWC and a corresponding article in the WaPo. I learned that gangs and insurgencies have similar characteristics albeit different goals. I also had to adjust my thought process on how to "fix" the problem. If I applied my Iraq solution to Salinas, we would wall off the neighborhoods, enforce curfews, and ration food controls to force population-control, drop JDAMs on the gangs safe-havens, and send the drug lords back to Mexico.
Some might consider that too harsh. So, we had to relook the problem, and we were striving for innovative, holistic solutions.
1. This is not a police problem, but you need to fix your police. Live with the people, gain the trusts, and stop shooting innocent people.
2. This is a community problem. The people of Monterey County refused to increase sales tax by one cent to pay for more police so until they determine the problem is severe, nothing will change.
3. How is the village working the issue? Are the schools adequate, is their after-school activities, are the churches involved?
Lots of learning points...More to Follow....
Bookmarks