Enhanced MAGTF Operations- USMC's Small Unit Future
A little over 6yrs ago the USMC announced a new Operating Concept titled Distributed Operations.
D.O. was taking USMC infantry Plts & Squads and enhancing them w/ Advanced Patrolling, Zone & Area Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Observation, Man Tracking, Communications, & CAS Packages; operating them 10s-100s of miles & fr/a BN HQ w/10s of miles of dispersion btwn them.
Although heavily embraced fr/Lance Corporal to Commandant it was heavily criticized outside the Corps. 2yrs later the Concept was proven an overwhelming success in Combat in the Mountains of Afghanistan Jan-Jun '06.
In '07 just when the AA reports and articles on the successful deployment began to heavily circulate HQMC announced the program was dead.
But later that year very quietly the next logical step in the DO for was taken and Enhanced Company Operations. Whether DO was dead in name or not was irrelevant, its Operating Concept, training, and TTPs, were already validated & set in stone.
The Marine Rifle Co is seen as Optimum Construct to support Tactical DO. ECO set out to develop Marine Inf Co's that can do 2 things:
1) Support DO Plts
2) Conduct Operations over vast distances Independent of Higher HQ
The Corps has been developing the ECO Concept over the last 2yrs & has put much of the results into practice in its Operating Forces.
This summer the USMC will conduct its Culminating Exercise in ECO dubbed LOE 4. This LOE will be the proving ground for some potentially revolutionary Tactics & Technologies. Including:
1) Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS): A PDA-based Netted Iridium push-to-talk system that allows Squads to communicate out to 100 miles presently & w/a software upgrade coming that will push that out to 250mi.
The PDA also fulfills its traditional role of Personal Data Assistant for the Squad leader giving him a direct data link to Higher HQ. Also each squad member will have a Trellisware radio directly connected to the SqdLdr's PDA giving the SqLdr & HHQ exact locations for every Marine.
2) Reorganizing the Marine Rifle Co: Doubling the size of HQ, removing the Plt Guides, & adding a Scout & Reconnaissance Section made up of two 5-man S&R teams specially trained in controlling CAS & providing Close-In Reconnaissance.
3) Squad-Level Unmanned Ground Vehicles: The LOE will include early models of emerging UGV. 1) A wheeled variant of a Polaris 2+2 ATV that can be armed. 2) The early-stage gas powered Big Dog.
4) 155mm Howitzer Plt attached to the Inf. Company: In the future this could, & probably would, change to a 120mm EFSS Plt. But for now they want to test to the extreme of whats possible & available to support a Company Operating on its own w/Plts spread over great distances.
The Marine Corps always does things in relation to the Corps as a whole. W/the announcement of the Culminating EX last yr HQMC began referring to the ECO Company as the Company Landing Team or CoLT.
When the Marine Corps uses the suffixes 'Landing Team' or 'Combat Team' that means its the base Ground Combat Element of a larger MAGTF construct.
W/the validation of Distributed Ops Plts & Squads, the Company-level HQs to both Coordinate & Support DO Units independent of HHQ wrapping up. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab announced it will move on to the Logical Conclusion of DO, Enhanced MAGTF Operations.
EMO Concept will develop:
1) How to properly incorporate Aviation & Logistics Units into Independently Operating Company-Sized MAGTFs.
2) Whether or not a separate Command & Control Element would need to be developed like that of the other MAGTFs w/an O-4 Major as over all MAGTF Commander.
Thanks for that update.
Though this item caused me to have all kinda psychopathic conflicts.Being a Platoon Guide (briefly) was the most august rank I managed in the Corps....removing the Plt Guides, & adding a Scout & Reconnaissance Section...
Howsomeever, the Sct Section in the Co is great!!!
Hopefully conceptual development does not end there.Originally Posted by COMMAR
How do the Marines take enhanced companies to sea, and operate from the sea? We have gone from 5 ship ARG to 4 ship ARG to now 3 ship ARG, and over the same period we have gone from Regiment level to battalion level and are now looking at company level.
Consolidation at sea and distribution on land - two trend lines going different directions. What is unspoken here is how moving to a company level operational construct forces a change to the ARG - which I do think is a good thing, but not easy to do when the Navy is already throwing the Marines the minimum level of ships.
This should not be seen as questioning the MEU, rather how to size and shape the MEU when companies need more specific support, like fire support.
You might be terribly grieved by reason they said they removed it then. They said that... It appeared useless & seemed to serve no purpose.Though this item caused me to have all kinda psychopathic conflicts.Being a Platoon Guide (briefly) was the most august rank I managed in the Corps.
Howsomeever, the Sct Section in the Co is great!!!
Fr/whats being discussed the MEU construct will remain unchanged by EMO.
The place where the EMO will most likely be the Preferred Construct will be in the SC MAGTF Concept which will deploy in conjunction w/the Navy's Global Fleet Stations, & be complementary to the MEU.
The SC MAGTF will deploy Comp-sized Dets aboard Naval GFS widely dispersed thru-out a Theater Command.
These Dets would further deploy Platoons & even Squads to conduct Bi-lateral training mission in neighboring countries coordinated by the MCTAG (small tms of Sr Marines that stay constantly engaged w/Partner Nations, providing a bridge btwn PNs & TComms).
That became true after about the US Mexican War in one sense.
Once going on line to fight became not in fashion he really had no job as a 'guide.' Plus that's been said before -- there were none before Korea, they got quickly added back in during that fracas, so no grieving from me (other than a head shake at business as usual).
However, they missed the fact that most everyone knew that and kept the space around for most of another 160 plus years as an Assistant Platoon Sergeant for four reasons:
- Marine aggressiveness meant high casualty ratios and the rapid availability of an experienced NCO as a replacement in the heavy combat of WW II, Korea and even Viet Nam was important. (Today, right now anyway, with far fewer casualties, that seems less important to the folks who have not experienced 50% or more casualties in one operation and have been told to find spaces...).
- He could do the beans and bullets while the Platoon Sergeant did the more important tactical stuff and sheparded his LT. Or, if the Platoon Sergeant wasn't that competent tactically (it happens), the Guide hopefully would be...
- He was an immediate replacement (due to the above mentioned combat job and thus location) for a knocked out Platoon Sergeant -- or even a Squad Leader if that seemed worthwhile. Or for a Platoon Sergeant position in another Platoon that had taken even higher casualties. He had disappeared before in various reorganizations but just wouldn't stay dead...
- He was a counterpoint to the Platoon Sergeant and was being very effectively trained for that job while offering a different approach to the constant training of the Squad and FT Leaders.
Other than that, 'they' were right, It appeared useless...
Then I see three issues.
1) A major problem I have with the SC MAGTF planning is the same issue I have with Global Fleet Stations - the dwell time. I am not sure we are going to be able to develop the regional knowledge that makes these missions so valuable if the Marines can't get longer dwell times than the usual 6 month deployments. I have seen some serious discussion on this issue, but it comes and goes.
The Navy has the same problem with Global Fleet Stations.
2) The EMO was developed under conditions of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is being applied to organizational developments intended for assured access in peacetime. The EMO is a really good idea IMO, I'd hate to see it not get serious consideration as part of a MEU - construct including ARG elements. COCOMs are requesting solo LPD/LSD assets for GFS. OK, I get it, but the requests started coming because the ships were available while Marines were in Iraq. I've seen this play before, the Navy is expanding the number of JHSVs to meet this COCOM demand for GFS, so Marines should count on EMO ultimately being a JHSV deployed capability.
This will lead to problems down the road. The JHSV doesn't give the Marines their aviation or amphibious capabilities. The Marines need to get in front of this issue. It serves no ones interest (except the Navy) to make SC MAGTF a capability deployed by pier alone - aviation must be a major consideration and sea based capabilities give SC MAGTF increased options as a MEU reinforcement.
I'd prefer to see some serious intellectual energy put into the EMO as a joint Navy/Marine Corps DO concept from the sea beyond the assured access SC MAGTF construct, in particular as part of the analysis of alternatives for forcible entry that are going to be forced upon the Marines over the coming weeks as the Ray Mabus tries to kill the EFV.
3) The Navy has agreed to 33 amphibious ships out of the 38 the Marines wanted. Instead of 11-11-11, the Navy is saying 10 LHA/Ds -11 LPDs -12 LSDs. All kinds of games being played here by the Navy, and the ultimate result is not even 2 MEB assault. I think this represents how the 3 ship ARG no longer works as an effective organizational model from the sea, but there are other observations that can be made.
The Marines are putting a lot of work into new expeditionary organizational elements, but the absence of dedicated sea based capability as part of the discussion is allowing the Navy to control options for the Marines at sea - and the Marines have not made a compelling argument under this pressure.
General Conway telling Congress the Navy needs to buy more DDG-1000s to provide naval fire support as part of the EFV purchase isn't a compelling argument winning the Marines any credibility. EMO on the other hand represents a very attractive concept that resonates with a national strategy focus and as such, represents a much more compelling reason to listen to Marines regarding their sea based requirements.
I am very much interested in all information regarding further development of EMO. All I have really seen is what is in MC Gazette, here and private conversations - very few discussions or opinions online. If there are well known articles otherwise, links appreciated.
Maybe I'm getting a little off subject here, but can someone in the current USN/USMC community tell me why the USMC has shown no interest in modern seaplanes?
It seems like they would have a lot of application for dispersed USMC units in littoral and riverine areas in small wars.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Most likely because we haven't been working in the littorals the past six years.It seems like they would have a lot of application for dispersed USMC units in littoral and riverine areas in small wars.
Heck, we can't even get the EFV done right.
Galrahn: I hear what your getting @ but your kind of putting the cart before the horse.
DO/ECO/EMO are not locked into any construct whether MEU or SC MAGTF or for that matter MEF or MEB. Like most all formations the USMC designs, it's fluid. Every Battalion's Companies will be capable of detaching or not.
Its the Marine Corps version of asking, "Do we have an app for that?"
In other words, if we need to Dis-aggregate have we done all we can to train our Marines for that...? What we need is a rubric to allow us to Dis-Aggregate all the way down to the Squad, if need be, then hit every unit on the way back up.
Constructs like the MEU, the SC & everything else doesnt matter, what matters is say we're in a MEB or whatever & we need a BN to break off can we do it? Of course we do it all the time, BNs are trained for that.. But what about a Co.? ANS is they can, but they have 'not' been trained or structured for that.
OK, how can we both train for that & maximize their utility?? Regardless of if they started the deployment as the 24th MEU, MEB-Afghanistan, or SC MAGTF-Africa... If its to our advantage to Dis-aggregate @ anytime can we do it?
There are a few reasons why I have to disagree w/that.
In the SC MAGTF Construct its not the Marines of SC MAGTF that are intended to develop the relationships & maintain the constant engagement w/the Partner Nations, that role's intended for the MCTAG.
The SC Dets role is to be a conduit & do what Marines have always done; provide Small Unit Training, build roads/schools/canals, provide Hum-Aid, etc. Difference is fr/now on it'll be according to a coordinated development plan designed by the MCTAG.
It won't sending a whole Comp in per country either. One Comp might have 2, 3, or more Dets in as many countries simultaneously. They'd complete their task & move to the next.. task or country.
The MCTAG maintains the engagement, assesses the progress, & develops the next step.
MCTAG-"How was the marksmanship training?"
PN-----"It was great but our boys are a bit unruly"
MCTAG-"As we plan our next Bi-Lat we can plan-in an NCO Leadership Course"
PN-----"Sounds Great"
MCTAG-"I noticed that the road to the training site isnt that good... I'll attach a team of Engineers & maybe they can also do some repairs to that old hospital"
The MCTAG stays constantly engaged, schmooosing w/the Brass, rubbing elbows w/the diplomats, constantly making the plans & refining the relationships.
As far as everything else again I think your putting the cart before the horse. The Corps has to move ahead w/its development regardless if all the rest of the DOD grasps its point.
The Corps has always proven far ahead of the rest of the Defense Establishment in defining threats, pointing out weakness, & taking actions that appear to make no sense but always prove ahead of their time.
My sense is the lack of DOD foresight in the Amphib matter will prove the same, but the CMC's gonna do what Marines do; Improvise, Adapt, & Overcome.
Last edited by COMMAR; 02-11-2010 at 07:04 AM.
Wingate's "Disributed Operations" and Burma
I find it interesting that a lot of the conceptual thinking behind concepts like DO was tried in one form or another by Orde Wingate and his operations in Burma especially with regards to semi-independant operations behind enemy lines relying on air-dropped supllies while briage sized sub-units (deploying as "columns" with strong scout groups) relied on mules (AFIAK an option being reconsidered in some cirlces) and locally made/acquired bamboo boats for riverine operations. Fire support was also mortar and pack howitzer based. Of course, the air component, supplied graciously by the USAF under the innovative thinking of the its commanders (whose names escape me currently) by No.1 Air Commando, also offers interesting lessons learnt if only from an USAF perspective.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA397999
http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bits...imonThesis.pdf
Pls read completely thru
There are many examples of various units using similar tactics in relatively modern warfare. The HQMC/MCWL often sites the Norwegians use of distributed Line Units against the Soviets & Nazis as the most comparable example.
But as similar as these examples appear on the surface none are near as comprehensive or developed as DO.
It would be like comparing the landing of Gallipoli or any other previous landing to what the Marines spent 10yrs in the 1930s developing.
Something which at the time Military "Experts" of the day said was impossible to conduct in modern warfare. They not only proved them wrong, but also proved that when performed as they designed its nearly impossible to defend against.
Its the level of refinement & attention to detail paid to insisting that DO remain both Comprehensive & Fluid, shifting fr/Aggregated to Dis-Aggregated or vice/versa & back according to: the enemy, the terrain, the flow of battle, etc. that makes DO Light Years beyond any previous example.
One of the Major differences that made the USMC's Amph-Asslt Doctrine more advanced & successful than any before was the recognition/development of mastering of the fluid flow of "controlled chaos" in the shift from 'Landing' to 'Build Up' to 'Breakout'.
Today its still the most complex of Military Maneuvers for that reason.
Its the same w/DO & any of the other examples, the designed recognition of the fluid flow fr/ one form to another, its Comprehensive nature by design & a few other subtle differences in DO... is like comparing Algebra to Advanced Calculus.
Last edited by COMMAR; 02-12-2010 at 01:25 AM.
It is an interesting discussion, but I think you lost me there. What do you mean by the use of the distributed Line Units by the Nowegians against the "Soviet & Nazis"?
Certainly not the "mobilize and harass a bit as you flee" forced on the Norwegians (and the British) in increasingly large parts of Norway during the Operation Weserübung, in which the German army completely outfought their opponents on each level?
Perhaps you mean the Finns?
Firn
Thanks for the clarification
Being a civvie I get the impression, for the above post and a number of Marine Corps Gazette articles I have read on DO, that it is essntially an evolutionary approach to fielding task/mission based units according to METT-T(C) through the exploitation of advanced C4I without which "controlled chaos" would result is just plain, vanilla chaos? To use the example of Wingate, poor and largely irrelevant that it may be, Operation Longcloth suffered from severe C3I problems which resulted in a number of "columns" becoming "unco-ordinated" which led to mission paralysis form the strategic and operational PoV even though, tactically, they performed well (in most instances). How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?
On a different note, I do get that historically the force to space ratio gap has been widening since antiquity with smaller and smaller units (thanks to advances in technology (ISTAR/C3I) and weaponry) being able to hold larger and larger frontages/AOs but it seems to me that this is very much an Weberian "ideal type" refering to ann almost pure expression of Eucledian space. IN WWII Sixth Army prior to Operation Blau held a horizontal front of a few hundred kilometers yet upon entering Stalingrad the entire Army group was swallowed up in the vertical morass comprising a dozen or so square klicks. Excuse my ignorance but as you are more knowledgable than I I am taking this opportunity ask questions that I ordinarily wouldn't be able to (at least not in my local Pub!).
I think the confusion is caused by the Marine Corps overcomplicating the whole issue. All DO is is independent fire team ops. All ECO is beefing up the Company HQ to better support those teams. USMC infantry (and I'm sure US Army infantry) has always had the capability to punch out a fire team if need be. Hell, in the early days of OIF, Marine units would punch out buddy teams or buddy teams (+) to catch bad guys emplacing IEDs. Companies/platoons/squads aren't going to lose their ability to operate as such, we're just going to specifically train the fire teams to act as fire teams and enable them with specific training/wonderful toys. I don't see anything really new or revolutionary in ECO, it's basic just a nice package to get Congress to buy us all those wonderful toys. However, I'm saying this as a Marine, but an outsider to the program. I could be way off. For some reason, they didn't consult me before coming up with this program.How would these "Enhanced Companies" operate in an environment in which C4I would be severely degraded/disrupted say by an EMP? or, in systems terms what if sub-systems were severed from their parent organisation and deprived of battlespace awareness from Bn, Bde and national intel sources....surely then the guides/scouts and their traditional role of "finding" in order to Fix and Kill would become paramount again?
As for what will happen if individual teams get cut off, they'll probably do the same thing a Marine division/battalion/company would do in that situation: collect all the serialized gear that retreating Army units leave behind and blast their way to the sea.
Last edited by Xenophon; 02-12-2010 at 01:39 PM. Reason: tags
Thanks for the information. I'm a little curious about the permanent/ templated addition of Howitzer's to a Coy.
While 155s would provide a very welcome addition to one's indirect arsenal at hand, I'm imagining that the 155s would require security (a platoon?), plus the logistics support to sustain fire missions. Mobility wise, in a littoral/ maritime projected mission, would they be motorised or helo'd in?
I'd have thought that the Marine ECO-capable Coy (sorry, 'Co' in US abbreviations) would be a rifle unit and any fspt assets would be attached as a mission-specific requirement with their own security elm to free up the rifle platoons.
I'm not doubting any wisdom here - I think the concept is great, but am curious as to the reasoning behind assigning a 155mm grouping to the Coy.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
I'm scratching my head a bit here. Attaching arty tubes to a company tells me that someone s thinking that company is going to clear those fires as well. Given the degree of accuracy required for mensurated target grids, in spacial relation to potential collateral damage concerns (for current operating environments), I am having a hard time seeing how a company is going to do that, with a distributed arrangement.
I'm curious and want to know more, but geesh, I remain flabbergasted some times at the realization that the Marine Corps still tends to focus on the equipment at the detriment of sharpening the skill first.
From what I understand, the 155 plt is being used for the experiment but in eventual execution the EFSS can be used as well. It won't be attached, it will be in direct support. As it is now, a battery is assigned as direct support to a battalion. During ECO, two guns (or tubes) will be DS'd out to each company. An 0802 will be in charge of each platoon as a platoon commander/FDO/XO all in one and will clear fires (allegedly anyway, grunts have this ridiculous idea in their head that they're better qualified to clear fires than an artilleryman). Depending on the environment, each platoon will require security if not co-located on a FOB. The logistics and security issues are being tossed around by MCCDC as we speak.
I trust that you intended to put an emoticon behind the clearance of fires comment. Or if deliberate, why would come to that conclusion?
COMMAR - Thank you for the heads up. The overall concept makes my heat sing. In the wide land wooly boondocks of Afgahanistan, Small infantry outposts, linked to modern support assets seems to fit.
I, like the cannon cocker in Quantico's take on the placement of a battery of a platoon of 155's with a Company base camp. I am a little concerned with the application of a artillery platoon attached to a company who's squads and even fireteams as dispursed over a large area. Is the Artillery for HQ protection or for support of the disbursed units?
Back in the day - Quemoy and Matsu! My platoon provided battery security for a Marine 8" Howitzer unit that was on loan to the Nationalist Chinese.
I'm in full accord with the training and assisting friendly nations, in odd places. Marines have done it forever. Lt. Presley O'Bannion probably started that whole trend.
I discovered recently that Marine Helo. Squardrons were in Vietnam two years before the first Marine BLT waded ashore in 1965. They were training South. Vietnam Forces in the vertical enveloment concept.
I know that there are some rocket assisted tube support that may range out to 40 miles, but I doubt a 155 unit could reach half that far. The 100 mile to 250 mile concept of DO needs a fair amount of air support for supply and protection. What are the downsides of putting eyes and ears that far out into indian country?
I like the fact the Corps is still pushing the envelope and with the new giszmoos and communications that allow a small unit set up in a high place could control a lot of land. I suspect Afgahanistan is a place where the terrain dictates movement through valleys and over passes. A little like Korea, but a lot broader in land mass. It is a very large nation, but a lot of it is vertical.
I can sense compression in the mountains will work for the folks who have the high ground looking down on the travel routes. Hardened OP can exist in the middle of the enemy, but they need extrodinary support 24/7 and a realistic rotation schedule.
I see the Right Guide is history. Ken hit the nail on the head. Replacement Platoon Sgt. was always the idea in the 50's thru the 70's for that position. gathering beans and bullets was always a tough job. Right Guides also operated as arbiter of personnel problems and father confessor for the troops.
Is the Marine Squad still 13 men? Squad Leader 3 fireteam leaders and and AR per fireteam?
A fireteam is too small a unit to handle OP and patrol work if detatched from the Squad. Hanging a 4 man team out on the end of the supply line, deep in enemy controlled country seems a reduction in force too far. Small special Operations units, fine. But a fireteam that is part of a multiple disbursement of Fireteams might be too complicated to support. A fireteam as a base for that 5 man Recon unit might work, but 4 guys and a radio a 100 miles of more in the Hindu Kush. I'm not comfortable with that picture.
Just an old platoon Sgt.s 2 cents.
Last edited by RJ; 02-13-2010 at 07:15 AM. Reason: spelling
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