Rifle squad composition

[Bill Moore]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Rifleman,
Actually I there is a point in a conflict where you shift from infantry formations to constabulary formations. I don't know if the Army can afford to stand up full time constabulary units, so more likely it will be the next unit in line designates so many Bns to train as constabularies during their pre-mission train up.

Are there any case studies of this type of dual formation unit?

Chris,

Please see responses to my RFI for PRC measures for links to this. Go to Small Wars Communities of Interests, then RFI's and Member's Projects, then see my RFI for Popualtion and Resource Control Measures. The Council provided numerous references. I tried to paste the link here, but couldn't get it to take. Bill

[jcustis]

And, while I am on my soapbox: All newly commissioned 2LTs should go through the following prior to attending OBC: CLS, Level 1 Combatives, a week to two week long hands-on course covering BFT, FBCB2, and current radio systems (SINCGARS, ANCDs, MBITRs, ICOMs, satellite phones, TACSAT...), a week to two weeks of weapons (Mk19 on down to include hand grenades and perhaps the bayonet assault course) PMI and standard qualification along with an introduction, with familiarzation fire, with optics and the various designators, and an introductory weeklong classroom symposium, with assigned reading, covering the history and basics of COIN and also "cultural awareness" courses on the current relevant culture(s) (New 2LTs will get firehose fed 3rd generation/"march-up" tactics at their OBC). Also, the new 2LTs should get option of attending airborne and/or air assault prior to OBC. However, they should wait until after their OBC to attend schools like Ranger or Sapper Leader.

Jonslack, the Marine Corps already gets that with its Basic School (6 months) period of instruction for all newly minted 2ndLts before they go to their MOS school. The thrust of it is to get them basically trained to operate at the level of a rifle platoon commander. I've always wondered why the Army didn't have a similar system.

SGTMILLS, pls define what BOG means. I think I know but want to make certain, because I want to delve deeper into this subject.

Aside from having been both a rifle platoon and weapons platoon commander, I was also a troop once, and had the opportunity to attend the Corps' squad leader course. I've also had some very interesting self-education in vintage distributed operations, from the Long Range Desert Group and the Rhodesian Light Infantry/Rhodesian African Rifles. To that end, I've done a lot of reading on how the Rhodesians organized for COIN ops, and the tactical scenarios they faced are very interesting. Much of it is anectdotal, but illuminating nonetheless.

I'm going to chew on this and try to push out a cogent reply over the weekend. The following are my notes to pull initial thoughts back together again:

-current communication capabilities PRR/MBITR
-SAW vs. GPMG
-Permanent structure and task designations vs. basic units that can perform all tasks
-How the mobility platform changes the dynamic
-Rhodesian distributed operations (time/space, communications, fire force ops, etc.)
-Support weapons (SMAW/AT-4/SMAW-D: whatever happened to that?)
do we need new ones to reflect the threat
-Common operational picture tools (e.g. urban warrior, the now-defunct Land Warrior)
-Calkie White input if applicable
-DMR vs. ACOG in application
-fighter leader concept
-being at the point of decision vs. point of friction

[SGTMILLS]

BOG = Boots On Ground. Sorry for the mix up.

[jonSlack]

Jonslack, the Marine Corps already gets that with its Basic School (6 months) period of instruction for all newly minted 2ndLts before they go to their MOS school. The thrust of it is to get them basically trained to operate at the level of a rifle platoon commander. I've always wondered why the Army didn't have a similar system.

Well, I figure for the CS and CSS 2LTs it is because the system needs to crank them out ASAP because they have got CPTs slots to fill. For the Combat Arms 2LTs, for those that don't get put on staff for the duration of their LT years, I think the assumption is they'll earn it through OJT. Or perhaps the reason is because there is some question of which part of the institutional army should be responsible for it, TRADOC or Accessions/Cadet Command.

Who knows, it is echleons above me.

[Wildcat]

Jonslack, the Marine Corps already gets that with its Basic School (6 months) period of instruction for all newly minted 2ndLts before they go to their MOS school. The thrust of it is to get them basically trained to operate at the level of a rifle platoon commander. I've always wondered why the Army didn't have a similar system.

I was under the impression that the purpose of the Army's new BOLC I and BOLC II for newly commissioned 2LTs was to provide them with the skills necessary to lead a provisional rifle platoon. Friends of mine who were funneled through the AROTC pipeline last year were among the first crop of 2LTs to go to BOLC.

[RTK]

I was under the impression that the purpose of the Army's new BOLC I and BOLC II for newly commissioned 2LTs was to provide them with the skills necessary to lead a provisional rifle platoon. Friends of mine who were funneled through the AROTC pipeline last year were among the first crop of 2LTs to go to BOLC.

As a primary BOLC III Recon Tactics SGI, I'll tell you this:

BOLC I is the precommissioning source,
BOLC II is the standard "common core" training subjects. Depending on where they go (Sill or Benning), to quote Animal Farm "All LTs are equal, some are more equal than others"

By the time they get to us they're about 5 months after commissioning. I get them in tactics for about 30 of the 86 days they're in BOLC III. The school is ever changing as we're constantly revising and improving the system. Total training days is a moving target but we're beginning to get a handle on it. LTs are getting to the point where they can intelligently talk and apply tactics, in some cases better than the career course students. At the final FTX, where CCC students play company commanders, this is sometiems strangely and sadly apparent. We've got a little way to go, but we're getting better every day.

[Rifleman]

I've seen elsewhere that the Marine Corps is looking to adopt a true automatic rifle; heavy barrel, magazine fed, firing from an open bolt. This is partly because the M249 SAWs are wearing out and partly because they've never truly been comfortable with a belt fed light machine gun in the AR role at fire team level.

However, it seems they want to keep a light machine gun at some level in addition to adopting an AR. They evaluated two alternate platoon and squad organizations for AR and SAW employment. The traditional 13 man squad was used in both test organizations.

The first test organization kept the SAW at squad level but moved them all to one fire team. The squad's two remaining fire teams each had an AR.

The second test organization consolidated all the platoon's SAWs into an LMG squad. The remaining two rifle squads had one AR in each fire team.

The Marine Corps felt the first organization evaluated better overall but the second organization proved better at MOUT. The AR equipped rifle squads were able to gain entry to a building easier under the massed suppressive fire put out by an LMG squad. Once inside, the squads with only ARs were more effective at room clearing.

Since a platoon might go from urban to rural - and back again - within a short period of time which would you prefer? A SAW heavy team in each squad or a SAW heavy squad in the platoon?

[Lastdingo]

I've seen elsewhere that the Marine Corps is looking to adopt a true automatic rifle; heavy barrel, magazine fed, firing from an open bolt. This is partly because the M249 SAWs are wearing out and partly because they've never truly been comfortable with a belt fed light machine gun in the AR role at fire team level.

However, it seems they want to keep a light machine gun at some level in addition to adopting an AR. They evaluated two alternate platoon and squad organizations for AR and SAW employment. The traditional 13 man squad was used in both test organizations.

The first test organization kept the SAW at squad level but moved them all to one fire team. The squad's two remaining fire teams each had an AR.

The second test organization consolidated all the platoon's SAWs into an LMG squad. The remaining two rifle squads had one AR in each fire team.

The Marine Corps felt the first organization evaluated better overall but the second organization proved better at MOUT. The AR equipped rifle squads were able to gain entry to a building easier under the massed suppressive fire put out by an LMG squad. Once inside, the squads with only ARs were more effective at room clearing.

Since a platoon might go from urban to rural - and back again - within a short period of time which would you prefer? A SAW heavy team in each squad or a SAW heavy squad in the platoon?

How did they test what's better at MOUT? Did they do some MILES-based simulations in those tiny one block-sized training sites? I remember only such training sites with quite large fields of fire and distances between buldings. Nothing like Arab or South American slum urban environments.

About your question; according to your description, the difference is primarily a question of what's the minimum size for independent missions.
Does the MC want to have squads to do missions independently using their better stealth by exploitin micro terrain than a platoon would have or do they want to have a force consisting of many platoons as smallest maneuver element?
As far as I know it's the trend since WW2 that squads should if possible (depends on training quality and length) be the smallest maneuver unit. Platoon sized units have more trouble with unetected flanking and so on.
The overall trend to dispersion adds to this.
So I'd say that a relatively large squad like a 13 man squad should be the smallest maneuver element and not the platoon. This requires (combined) arms integration at squad level. Version 1 would be preferrable.

If version 2 is superior in a specific environment, the PltLdr could still concentrate the LMG fireteams and let the squads maneuver without their organic SAWs.

[jcustis]

I just clipped back through an earlier post and MCWL document provided by Rifleman, and it made me sit back and ponder these "Specific (additive) capabilities of a DO Platoon":

-Conduct mounted and dismounted combat patrols at extended ranges

-Interdict and/or destroy enemy forces
•Direction of Fire Support Assets
•Direct assault (greater lethality -increased ranges and close assault)

-Secure and Hold Key Terrain (at extended ranges)
•LZ, Bridge, Road Junction, Hill top, etc.

-Conduct ITG and provide guides to the Main Force

--Conduct tactical preparations in support of the Main Force
•Provide a “skeleton”to fall in on (i.e. SBF position)
•Provide an in-position Fire Support Team to assault elements

-Conduct zone reconnaissance patrols in greater depth and breadth

-Control or Influence key avenues of approach (isolate target area)

Mixed with mobility upgrades, we would have a force that remarkably looks a lot like a Long Range Desert Group patrol (mixed with a small band of Stirling's merry men).

It makes me ask the question of how well a DO platoon would do in the littorals and inherently built-up areas, because if you read the LRDG/SAS history closely, they almost always got into trouble behind enemy lines when they came across locals who weren't necessarily on their side.

The same thing holds true for the SF team that had a running gunfight after becoming compromised during roadwatch duty during the Gulf War, as well as the SAS patrol of McNabb notoriety. Now it seems that the team led by Lt Murphy, USN (and Medal of Honor recepient come 22 Oct) in Afghanistan ran into the exact same problems.

I think we tend to forget that when dealing with an even remotely organized enemy, it's not necessarily that he will find you and kill you, but rather one of the locals will find you...and then the enemy will come and kill you.

There is a lot of fieldcraft to snooping and pooping around the battlefield, and as with other skills, we are losing this in our current endeavours.

Anyone know if the DO folks are reading about the LRDG? I've got a whole shelf of books they are welcome to browse. They may learn some minor tactics that have always been known.

[Norfolk]

Anyone know if the DO folks are reading about the LRDG? I've got a whole shelf of books they are welcome to browse. They may learn some minor tactics that have always been known.

Them thar' smart folk gots themselfs commmpuuuters to do that.

[ROKMAN]

with all this deliberation, what is the ideal rifle squad and platoon organization, in all of yall's opinion.

[Norfolk]

with all this deliberation, what is the ideal rifle squad and platoon organization, in all of yall's opinion.

ROKMAN, were you in the infantry, and if so, what rifle squad composition did you find yourself either favouring, or just simply having to make the best of while over in the Sandbox? Your platoon or company - mech, air asslt? Your command - Plt, Coy?

[ROKMAN]

ROKMAN, were you in the infantry, and if so, what rifle squad composition did you find yourself either favouring, or just simply having to make the best of while over in the Sandbox? Your platoon or company - mech, air asslt? Your command - Plt, Coy?

No, I spent all my time with tanks. I lack the experience of small unit tactics since the use of tanks is inherently for large scale battle and often employed as a battalion. I know that the future wars most of the conflict will involve small units. Which I don't really have experience but do read quite a lot of.

There are four general options that I am currently studying, which led me to this forum.

The Commando 21 organization used by the British Royal Marines. On a large unit viewpoint I like it. Basically it is a battalion sized unit, consisting of a logistics company, a C4ISR company, 2 firepower support companies that "shoots in" the 2 close combat companies. Each close combat company has a dedicated firepower support company. Hence this battalion generally has two field commands mimicking the "Combat Command A/B" system used by the US in WWII. However the close combat company is based on the 8-man squad. Is this squad too light or does it matter at all, since they have the support of a firepower support company. Should or shouldn't such firepower assets be allocated at lower echelons, like Tom Odom's idea.

The US Marines Distributed Ops is another candidate, based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan but are they too focused on COIN? What about the case for conventional wars where the enemy is not an insurgent?

Tom Odom's idea, tested in experiments but creates a rather large platoon of over 60 soldiers and a company of over 300 soldiers, do we have the manpower for this? Or is it the case where the brigade treats these units more like mini-battalions and thus will be employed as such? Also there seems to be a lot of specialization, wouldn't it be better to arrange for general purpose unit organization.

German Panzergrenadiers a squad of 10 soldiers, a Squad Leader and Assistant Squad Leader, 2 Machine Guns, 2 Assistant Machine Gunners, 4 Rifleman. The squad can be split into two just like how the British do with their 8 man squads. However this seems that the squad can only operate as part of a platoon. (They basically operate like typical platoon of 3 squads.)




Another question is which performs best in terms of Squad organization the ones in current usage that I have are these:

The old 11 man Army squad of 2 teams plus Squad Leader.

The Marine squad of 13 man of three teams plus Squad Leader.

The DO Marine squad of 12 man of three teams with the Squad Leader embedded in a team.

The Army mechanized infantry platoon of two 9 man squads plus a five man machine gun team of two machine guns (the 2 X 9 plus 5).

The German 10 man squad of two teams with a Squad Leader and Assistant Squad Leader.

The British 8 man squad operating (similarly to the German squad) within the British Commando 21 system in all its entirety.



Gotta ask.... and appreciate the responses.

[Norfolk]

Gotta ask.... and appreciate the responses.

ROKMAN - very good questions to ask, but I don't think you're as out of your league as you seem to think. General William E. DePuy, who gave the US Army much of its present tactical doctrine, obeserved that there was quite a striking correlation between infantry and armour small-unit tactics; the principles of movement, suppression, assault, and security were the same.

The RM Commando 21 organization is remininiscent of that of the Bundesheer's Mountain and Parachute Battalions (at least until recent years - they've reorganized, I'm not clear on their present composition): Two Rifle Companies and two Anti-Tank Companies, plus HQ and other CS and CSS elements. I'm not completely sold on it, but it offers intriguing possibilities.

The 8-man Rifle Section is a personal peeve of mine. That's what I had to use in the RCR (most Commonwealth Armies use an 8- or 9-man Rifle Section, the difference between 8 or 9 being dependent upon funds for troops slots, and when the 9th man is authorized, he's stuck carrying a Carl Gustav. The 8-man Rifle Section is easy to control, and responsive, but vulnerable. Having 8 men gives you almost no capacity to sustain battle losses, and as I was told in the RCR, such a Section would lose 60% of its strength in the first 24 hours of offensive operations (while attacking a dug-in Soviet Motorized Rifle unit, I presumed - and after attacking such a position on ex, I can see why). Clearly, there's a problem there.

The other problem with the 8-man Section is that the Section Commander and the Section 2i/c are not free to move about as necessary within the Section. The 8-man Section is divided into two 4-man Fire Teams (Australian, British, and New Zealand Armies) or Assault Groups (Canadian Army). The Section Commander personally leads one fire team/assault group, and the Section 2i/c the other. While discipline is certainly tight and control good (and the NCOs are practically indistinguishable from the other soldiers of the section - a good thing), the NCOs are necessarily divided in their attentions by fighting the section as a whole, fighting their own fire teams/assault groups, staying alive themselves, and handling commiunications and sitreps, etc., with platoon, company, etc. That's a lot of burden and a lot of potential distraction.

The final problem with the 8-man Section is its tactical use in offensive operations. It does not typically use the US technique of sending a fire team forward a safe distance with the other (or in USMC others) following, thus potentially avoiding the total destruction of a squad in the first bursts of enemy machine gun/mortar fire. The entire section, both fire teams/assault groups advance like an over-sized US fire team, while the rest of the platoon supports; the advantage of this is that, coming under fire, the entire section instantly responds, bringing its entire firepower to bear on the source of enemy fire; the disadvantage of this is as I described immediately above - the section might not survive the initial enemy fire to respond in kind.

Yeah, ROKMAN, I agree that the Marines' DO Squad is hardly ideal for non-COIN ops. This is a reconaissance/forward observer/raid element, not really a line squad.

I like Tom's ideas for a squad (except for the breech specialization by just one element). As for whether it and higher units are too large and too demanding upon manpower, I'll put it this way: using the present US Army organization and tactical concepts, you'll suffer up to twice the losses while having only 2/3rds of the manpower to begin with, compared to Tom's organization and the tactical concepts it uses. When the shooting starts in a high-intensity war, no one is going to like the fact that the infantry battalions are running out of rifleman at least a few times faster than the Army can train replacements for them - that's a real manpower problem. Tom's way goes a long way to avoiding that.

The German panzergrenadier sqaud was similar to British Commonwealth section with the following differences:

1. Used GPMGs/MMGs instead of LMGs - YEAH!
2. The Squad Leader had control over the Squads' machine guns, while ASL led assault; in Commonwealth Section, the Section commander "leads" the assault, while the Section 2i/c "controls" the cover fire.
3. The Germans did not use Battle Drill or Fire Teams; once the fire fight was won, the machine gun teams simply stayed with the SL, and the riflemen went with the ASL into the assault. But as the Squad reduced in size from an authorized 12 men and finally down to 8-9 men, it lost its offensive power. In the defence, the machine gun teams nominally remained under the control of the SL; in practice, the machine gun teams were the defensive line, as there were so few riflemen left by late in the war - so an NCO per machine gun team was not exactly unheard of.

The Germans, like the Commonwealth, held that the squad was not independent, but just a part of the platoon. But like the Commonwealth, the Germans found that independent squad/section operations were necessary.

As to your last question ROKMAN, the answer requires some explanation. The USMC Rifle Squad is best (but not quite ideal) in and of itself, provided that it has machine guns, rather than automatic rifles. But the RM Commando 21 organization follows the German Mountain/Parachute Battalion organization, which provides for the best minor-unit level suppression. In WWII, German infantry battalions either had a full machine-gun company, or each rifle company had a full machine-gun platoon (depending on circumstances), plus either a separate Heavy Company (mortar, pioneer, AT, AA platoons, etc) or elements of those attached from Regimental companies. With 4-6 MGs per platoon, and 2-3 platoons per machine gun company (plus mortar fire), German rifle companies were often able to more or less walk to their objectives (yes, I said walk, not pepper-pot/bound) with such fire support coordinated at either company- or even battalion-level.

The more recent German organizations are developments of this, and with the Royal Marines also adopting this organization, having 8-man Rifle Sections is only a problem when:

1. Either the terrain or cover masks the Fire Support Companies' fires.
2. Coordination with the Fire Support Companies breaks down or said companies come under serious attack.
3. When 8-man Rifle Sections are detached on independent missions by as a result of tactical circumstances.

In these circumstances, the 13-man USMC Rifle Squad is much better suited. It can provide its own heavy suppressive fires using two of its three fire teams while the other assaults; it can take heavy losses and still remain effective; the squad as a whole does not have to reorganize to accomodate unfamiliar and newly attached strangers who themselves are unfamiliar with this particular squad; and you don't have to take fire support (platoon weapons sqaud or heavy weapons attached from company) away from the parent platoon or company which is already having to deal with the loss of an entire squad while still facing the potential for contact with the enemy.

Finally, with the Squad Leader free to fight the squad and not have to fight a fire team as well, the USMC Rifle Squad's only major problem is that it does not have a dedicated ASL likewise free from fighting his own fire team in order to handle communications/sitreps/adminstration/logistics and the like in order to free the SL from having to deal with platoon/company when ever they get on the horn; and the ASL can deal with platoon/company over all the beans n' bullets matters while the SL deals with the enemy. I think Tom had that idea.

Sorry for the long response ROKMAN.