Her previous work was published in SWJ.

Despite the acknowledged shortcomings of air attacks within the current framework of U.S. counterinsurgency, for the time being air power in general and close air support operations in particular will continue to be indispensable components of the Afghan war. Constrained by a shortage of troops, vast and dispersed areas of operations, limited human intelligence, and proximate insurgent sanctuaries, CAS is a lifeline for coalition troops. Yet with the exception of nuclear weapons, arguably no military has used a weapon of war more judiciously than the American military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, even remarkable restraint has proven insufficient. While the physical and psychological toll of air strikes on the civilian population is undisputable, the American military’s hesitating use of CAS not only runs the risk of putting the lives of its troops in danger and affecting their willingness to patrol larger AO, but of encouraging insurgents to fight under the literal aegis civilian human shields. Frank acknowledgement of civilian deaths and timely distribution of reparations might marginally mitigate public outrage, but neither are not long-term solutions. Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will.
Lara M. Dadkhah is a graduate student in Security Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She has worked as an open source analyst covering biodefense issues in Iran and Afghanistan, and as a data analyst for current coalition information operations in Afghanistan