WAPO Op-ed on airpower

[William F. Owen]

I do suggest the more restrictive ROE probably poorly interpreted encourage even more ill informed further over zealous and totally extreme risk aversion (and add that today's technology allows even more second guessing from further in the rear -- not a good thing).

All excellent points Ken, and yes, the old "stupid things done badly" seems to be a constant challenge!

My point is that the article concerned does not merit being published as an OP-ED in the NY Times, purely because it lacks credible evidence and data. I want informed opinion, not mere opinion.

There is almost certainly a debate to be had about the effective implementation of ROE concerning CAS and Stand-off fires, but the article concerned does not form part of that argument, other than to show the current debate is being particularly intelligently conducted.

I just do not see any problem with using Air Power, IF it can be intelligently applied. If the evidence is that it cannot be intelligently applied, then stop using it - AND - point out the reason there is no CAS is because of the poor standards of training and leadership (risk averse?) does not makes its use supportable as a policy.

[Van]

The article is fallacious from the beginning.

Firepower is least among the things Airpower brings to COIN.
What Airpower does bring to the fight;

• Logistic support - specifically transportation both of people and supplies

• Intelligence collection - both air and space collection assets across the spectrum of intelligence discipline; an incredible suppliment to scouts

• Fire support - doesn't replace ground based fires, but does reduce the need for ground based artillery when the minimum 'in country' footprint is needed

With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.

And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this?

[William F. Owen]

Firepower is least among the things Airpower brings to COIN.
What Airpower does bring to the fight;

• Logistic support - specifically transportation both of people and supplies

• Intelligence collection - both air and space collection assets across the spectrum of intelligence discipline; an incredible suppliment to scouts

• Fire support - doesn't replace ground based fires, but does reduce the need for ground based artillery when the minimum 'in country' footprint is needed

Good point and well made... and I have no excuse. I'm saying exactly that at a conference some time soon!!

[Bill Moore]

Van, I second WILF's comments, a very concise and accurate summary.

Posted by Ken,

My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.

We discussed this previously and are in agreement that using infantry maneuver to close with and kill the enemy is rarely practiced due to risk adversion. As we know, we're now fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan instead of conducting strictly offensive operations against Al Qaeda, and we know that insurgents conduct acts to prompt the counterinsurgent to over react, thus isolating the counterinsurgent from the populace. We all know this, but we disregard this knowledge in practice! GEN McCrystal has it right, kill the enemy, not the Afghan people.

The other issue you addressed is tying the hands of junior leaders at the tactical level. These leaders should be given a piece of turf (AO), a mission and commander's intent (with ROE, etc.), and anything that falls under this mandate they should be allowed to execute without sending a request for permission to a higher hqs that doesn't know ground truth. At no time shold staff officers be allowed to say to no to a subordinate commander (they can share their opinion and advice). That is a commander's call period, and to the extent possible it should be delegated to the lowest level. Simply need to get back to the basics, a lot of the so called complexity is a stew of our own making.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, here's no-one from the "peace!" faction, so let me fill this role.

Civilians should be treated as humans, not different from your own fellow citizens.

There's no need for dedicated COIN doctrine or strategic insights to find the right path in this case. Simply don't treat foreign civilians as sub-humans and you'll avoid stupid mistakes.

- - - - -

About the high level of carefulness in infantry actions:
Infantry is not meant to fight in open terrain. It's not the infantry's element. I think that should have been understood by the late 19th century.

ISAF/OEF-A are using infantry in open terrain because of logistical restrictions. I'm sure everyone there would be happy to use IFVs for almost everything.
The infantry may be more risk-averse than appropriate for the mission, but that's in my opinion just an emulation of the degree of necessary carefulness in conflicts against enemies with proper firing range training.

We better don't expect the infantry to show more aggressiveness and daring in future conflicts - it would in my opinion be inappropriate.
Support has taken over most personnel slots in modern armies - for a reason. It's there and it will stay. Such a force structure would be insane if support wasn't important.*

I remember the discussions of 2002. It wasn't air power or nothing. The discussion was about the neglect of artillery and mortars. This aspect has strangely lost attention. Sure, there are mortars and there is artillery, but it seems as if the log problems still keep these assets from becoming the primary source for FS.
Or maybe the infantry doesn't place much emphasis on mortars because higher HQs want to have control over support fires and thus keep mortars relatively unimportant?




*: I'm in favour of a greater infantry share, but not so much that it would alter the argument.

[Ken White]

Check the LINK. Note IFV friendly terrain.

Those mountains are why there's infantry, walking infantry, there. IFVs are useful but they also impose limitations...

As for Infantry in future wars -- METT-TC. Depends on where and who among other things. Always use the right tool for the job.

[Fuchs]

The people mostly live in valleys and flat ground, not on mountains. The mountains make good photos, but the maps and satellite imagery is quite devoid of houses or even settlements on mountains.

Besides; I know people who would prefer IFVs even in such terrains (not my opinion).

[Fuchs]

Hmm, here's no-one from the "peace!" faction, so let me fill this role.

Civilians should be treated as humans, not different from your own fellow citizens.

There's no need for dedicated COIN doctrine or strategic insights to find the right path in this case. Simply don't treat foreign civilians as sub-humans and you'll avoid stupid mistakes.

I guess I will never learn to predict the extent of reactions that my writings provoke.
Sometimes I get fierce reactions to secondary remarks and at times I get none about stuff like this quote.
There's always a reaction to no reaction; I begin to think about whether I merely wrote something that was a hidden consensus or maybe nobody wanted to touch that topic or maybe...?

[Ken White]

agree with what you wrote. Ignoring the unnecessary "peace" faction bit, of course...

[Ken White]

The article is fallacious from the beginning.

However, it is absolutely correct at the ending...

" Of course, all this is not to say that we should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage “total” war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.

Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a “long war” should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have."

Truer words were never spake...

With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.

Perhaps true. Also perhaps like me she simply does not believe a COIN strategy is at all wise, effective or efficient (in my case, most anywhere at most anytime and particularly now and in Afghanistan). She may even share my belief and that of others that COIN theory is fallacious and was predicated on wars of choice most of which were in the end proven to be a huge waste and that it evolved as a practice mostly due to lack of perceived options. That COIN efforts are not wise and to be avoided if at all possible is true for any nation and it is particularly true for the US -- we have historical examples out the ying yang of not doing it at all well.

I repeated an earlier quote of hers but it occurs to me it bears yet another repetition -- this time emphasizing the key point:

"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."

Emphasis added / KW. My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.

And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this?

Well, somebody's gotta do it...

I'll defend it also and your comments on what it brings to the fight are of course quite accurate. The real question, to me, is should we be in such a fight? If so, why?

Time again for my Stonewall Jackson quote:

"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."

Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson

Maybe the article authoress read that somewhere...

[qp4]

I'll grab this same quote to illustrate the view from the ground.

My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.

Throughout this and a few other threads I've been reading about the risk aversion in operations, particularly in OEF and OIF, but having developed over the last several decades (there was at least one reference to Desert Storm).

I pose these questions as response. Why not back off and call for "support"? If "support" is available, be it ISR, CAS, AA, or IDFs, why not use it? Isn't the guy on the ground using his best judgement and determination on whether he is losing the initiative by waiting up to "90 minutes" for some AH-1s (or whatever)? In "COIN" or even HIC in 2010 isn't using aviation nearly the same as calling immediate suppression in wars past?

[Ken White]

Throughout this and a few other threads I've been reading about the risk aversion in operations, particularly in OEF and OIF, but having developed over the last several decades (there was at least one reference to Desert Storm).

The bad thing is the excessive. That excessive dependence is mostly due to the risk aversion factor, a little less to a lack of trust. A lot of that risk aversion is due to the mistaken idea that the American public will not accept casualties in combat. I have not seen that; they aren't stupid and they know that combat means casualties. I believe they will accept casualties as long as some progress is being made. Little progress will get them upset but the Army has --and far more importantly the Politicians have -- this idea that the people do not want any casualties. So they pin units to support to minimize casualties.That stupidity started in Viet Nam when an edict that no US unit could operate outside the supporting fan of US artillery was promulgated.

I pose these questions as response. Why not back off and call for "support"? If "support" is available, be it ISR, CAS, AA, or IDFs, why not use it? Isn't the guy on the ground using his best judgement and determination on whether he is losing the initiative by waiting up to "90 minutes" for some AH-1s (or whatever)? In "COIN" or even HIC in 2010 isn't using aviation nearly the same as calling immediate suppression in wars past?

The answers IMO are:

(1) Agreed, why not -- provided that support is needed and not an excuse to do nothing (that happens...) or because the guy on the ground doesn't know what else to do next and wants the time to think and plan (that also happens).

(2) No reason not to use it provided METT-TC, the infamous 'situation,' calls for it. OTOH, it is not wise to use it as a crutch or due to inability to decide on another course of action, due to fear (risk avoidance...) or because it is directed from above (risk avoidance) or expected at ANY contact (risk avoidance) or if as happens all too often that guy on the ground is not trusted by his Boss or that Bosses staff (risk avoidance) or where it is just inappropriate.

(3) Generally yes and the system should defer to that guy on the ground; not to some Staff type who's concerned with 'protecting' his boss (who may not need or want that kind of protection...).

(4) If it is, it should not be. That due to the fact that it's a bad habit to get into and air can be weathered out, diverted to a higher priority mission or out of weapons or fuel; IOW it is not reliable enough to use in lieu of immediate suppression (which rarely works well against good opponents anyway...).

Bold aggressive action should be the norm; waiting for fires should be avoided. Yet, it is not avoided, it is encouraged. That's excessive dependence. That's also the result of poor training.

[Schmedlap]

The bad thing is the excessive. That excessive dependence is mostly due to the risk aversion factor, a little less to a lack of trust.

I think that is only half the explanation (and no more than half). The other half is the availability of assets that can be called in for support. If there were a shortage, then we would just make do and get along without it. But if the assets can be launched and made available, and if the guy on the ground doesn't use them, and then something bad happens, then you can expect people to be outraged that the "necessary" asset or equipment was not made available. That's why we can't let troops patrol without body armor. If they get shot without wearing it, few people will be saying "sh*t happens." Instead, many will be screaming bloody murder and railing against our attempts to fight "too humanely" or some other nonsense. The American public may not be stupid, but the people with the loudest voices and most influence sure seem to be.

[Ken White]

...but the people with the loudest voices and most influence sure seem to be.

Many of those are politicians who listen to those other loudmouths who are not politicians...

[qp4]

The other half is the availability of assets that can be called in for support. If there were a shortage, then we would just make do and get along without it. But if the assets can be launched and made available, and if the guy on the ground doesn't use them, and then something bad happens, then you can expect people to be outraged that the "necessary" asset or equipment was not made available.

That's another part that I just left out. It seems ridiculous to push through without utilising those assets just to be "hooah" or "because that's how infantry/armor/branch rolls." I don't think it's because any commander (at the PLT or CO level at least) is thinking that someone will be outraged that we didn't use asset for role, rather, I contend it's about self preservation. If I think that freshly turned pile of earth over there is holding some HME, I'd much rather EOD come take a look at it instead of myself or PFC Snuffy.

That said, I personally witnessed units from three different manuever brigades shooting p-IEDs in 2005. The assets simply weren't available in a timely manner, and so those units were taking the necessary steps to accomplish their mission.

That's why we can't let troops patrol without body armor. If they get shot without wearing it, few people will be saying "sh*t happens." Instead, many will be screaming bloody murder and railing against our attempts to fight "too humanely" or some other nonsense. The American public may not be stupid, but the people with the loudest voices and most influence sure seem to be.

Actually I think this is a completely different topic. Or several of them, because there is a case for not having armor in some situations (all abiding METT-TC dependent of coruse). But I'd also say that by and large the American public long ago quit caring about casaulties beyond a bit of lip service and flag waving patriotism. Don't mistake the really loud voices as being the majority.