Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
The article is fallacious from the beginning.
However, it is absolutely correct at the ending...
" Of course, all this is not to say that we should be oblivious to civilian deaths, or wage “total” war in Afghanistan. Clearly, however, the pendulum has swung too far in favor of avoiding the death of innocents at all cost. General McChrystal’s directive was well intentioned, but the lofty ideal at its heart is a lie, and an immoral one at that, because it pretends that war can be fair or humane.

Wars are always ugly, and always monstrous, and best avoided. Once begun, however, the goal of even a “long war” should be victory in as short a time as possible, using every advantage you have."
Truer words were never spake...
With regards to firepower; yes, risk aversion is an issue, but in COIN strategy, it is more important to avoid inflicted collateral damage (thereby creating more insurgents) than it is to merely kill insurgents. The author clearly fails to grasp the underlying nature of COIN and is trying to apply an attrition mindset to a problem where classic attrition is irrelevant. To compound this, she also fails to grasp the scope of what Airpower brings to the fight.
Perhaps true. Also perhaps like me she simply does not believe a COIN strategy is at all wise, effective or efficient (in my case, most anywhere at most anytime and particularly now and in Afghanistan). She may even share my belief and that of others that COIN theory is fallacious and was predicated on wars of choice most of which were in the end proven to be a huge waste and that it evolved as a practice mostly due to lack of perceived options. That COIN efforts are not wise and to be avoided if at all possible is true for any nation and it is particularly true for the US -- we have historical examples out the ying yang of not doing it at all well.

I repeated an earlier quote of hers but it occurs to me it bears yet another repetition -- this time emphasizing the key point:
"...Irrespective of how it is applied American air dominance will not decide the Afghan war. Success or failure in tackling the underlying problems which have made coalition forces so air-dependent will."
Emphasis added / KW. My point, perhaps hers also, is that we are excessively dependent on 'support' and are unwilling to trust most of our units to operate without massive backup -- which will almost certainly not be available at all times. Nor should it be. We are doing ourselves and many units a significant disservice and are using hardware to compensate for poor training and education.
And why the heck is an Army guy defending Airpower like this?
Well, somebody's gotta do it...

I'll defend it also and your comments on what it brings to the fight are of course quite accurate. The real question, to me, is should we be in such a fight? If so, why?

Time again for my Stonewall Jackson quote:

"War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end."

Thomas J. Jackson quoted by G. F. R. Henderson

Maybe the article authoress read that somewhere...