.....speaking of that it is almost time for "Breaker Morant".
This raises issues that need to be explored. Are we really using the force of arms to maintain the status quo? Where? Do we really have the capacity to exert influence in any given case? Are we resisting change, failing to enable change, or are we simply unable to exert meaningful influence? I suspect that we often overestimate our capacity to influence, and that in many cases our "soft power" is every bit as constrained as our "hard power".Originally Posted by Bob's World
We need to consider what might be called "domestic dispute syndrome". This is something Law Enforcement is very much familiar with: an intervening party in a domestic dispute, no matter how good their intentions, is likely to attract violent resistance from both parties. This is especially true if the intervening party is suspected of being out to advance their own interests. Thinking twice isn't good enough, we need to think a dozen times or more before messing in anyone's domestic affairs, no matter what we think of the way they manage them.
This discussion often comes back to Saudi Arabia, and it makes a good case study. We often assume that the Saudi regime depends on us for their survival, and that we can use a combination of carrots and sticks to influence their behaviour. This assumption was once true, but it is no longer. In today's world the Saudi regime does not need us, at all. We have no carrots or sticks to apply, and we have little or no capacity to exert influence. They have more carrots and sticks than we do. They have oil, which we need. They are heavily invested in US equity, debt, and real estate markets. Those investments can be increased, maintained... or withdrawn, which would have a devastating impact on an already fragile economy. We have no way to prevent or deter this: if they choose to sell our bonds and stocks, what can we do? If they decide to take payment for their oil in Euros instead of dollars, what can we do? Think about what that would do to the value of the dollar and the effective price of oil and gas... now that's a stick.
What carrots or sticks do we have to influence them? They sell us oil, but if we stop buying it (and we won't) there's no shortage of other buyers. We sell them lots of stuff, but if we stop there will be no shortage of other suppliers. In terms of economic clout the balance of power is overwhelmingly with the Saudis, not with us.
We have military force, but it's already overextended and its use is subject to popular will, making it irrelevant to our relationship with the Saudis. We can withdraw our promise of support against foreign aggression, but with Saddam out of the picture there is no truly credible threat. If the Saudis and Gulf States were threatened by Iran we would come to their aid anyway, and they know it - our national interest would demand it.
Similar situations apply in other countries. Once upon a time we could exert influence by tying financial and development aid to reforms. This was never terribly effective, and today it is less effective than ever. There are other sources of aid, and regimes that we cut off can easily turn to China or the Gulf states, who have more money to spare than we do and are generally more interested in promoting their own influence than in promoting reform.
I'm not saying "soft power" is not useful, but as with "hard power", a realistic assessment of our capacity to influence is an essential first step in using it.
I don't think they're scared either, most of them at any rate.
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