New Rules of War

[Firn]

I'm going to stick with my initial interpretation of his economic argument as a red herring. He has included it only in a "rhetoric of rectitude" and excluded the broader systems in which it is embedded. as a piece of rhetoric, it's a moderately telling point, but as a piece of rational analysis it is trivial.

I share this point of view just as the accusation of cherry picking. The author commits one of the biggest sin in science, trying to build a case fitting his premediated option by a very biased (and even erroneous) selection of interpretations. I also miss context, context and context.

About the bits about training, initiative and more liberty of movement for the lower levels. This reminds me a bit of a trend in the Germany army doctrine before WWII or I'm wrong Fuchs?

Firn

[Fuchs]

About the bits about training, initiative and more liberty of movement for the lower levels. This reminds me a bit of a trend in the Germany army doctrine before WWII or I'm wrong Fuchs?

I observed how clubs, amateur sports teams and the like organize. Natural leaders who want to lead and have enough respect to do so (without being able to send someone to jail for disobedience) can easily be identified in these environments.
It seems that this 'natural' method of identifying or choosing leaders may be superior to some extent and in some cases to the "this is Lt XY, salute your new platoon leader!" approach.

I did also observe how almost no-one is a natural born leader. Most people have a high tolerance for crap and don't intervene to fix problems*. Almost no-one is interested in training others to enable the team to perform better as a whole. Few dare to push forward and raise the mood when things go wrong.

On several occasions I grew tired of some chaos I spotted and organized teams. The reactions were about 10% overtly positive, 85% followed and 5% disagreed. Many noted that they were relieved that finally someone brought some plan and organization into the affair. I didn't organize because someone authorized or even commanded me to do so - it simply worked because someone in the crow suddenly was accepted as leader & coordinator.


Having observed many inexplicable cases of idiots in NCO or officer rank, I grew quite skeptical about the "let's select men with potential and teach them to be leaders" approach. It's slow at best.

That's where my interest in self-organisation comes from.


-------
*: And I say this based on observations among Germans who have - as I learned recently from a foreigner - the reputation that they police each other to maintain order.

[Ken White]

You can maximize effect at given cost or minimize costs at given effect.

There are others. Lot of gray out there...

There's absolutely no point in preferring effectiveness over efficiency because efficiency in achieving a desired effect (= at minimum cost) is simply unbeatable.

Unbeatable in many respects, no question -- but sometimes the desired result will require a degree of effectiveness to be achieved that is inefficient.

Effectiveness is only about one variable while efficiency considers two important variables - it's a much richer term.

It also puts the two variables in competition.

Sometimes efficiency will win, occasionally effectiveness will.

No one with a functioning brain will ever strive for the best ratio of effect and cost and willfully fail to achieve the desired level of effect by doing so.

I agree with that, however, not everyone has a functioning brain. If one has functioning brain, one may occasionally run across an opponent whose brain functions a little better, causing efficiency to take second place to effectiveness.

The damage that wasteful behaviour in the military does to the welfare of the nation is extreme.

We can agree on that as well

Many "victories" were more damaging (net) to the "victorious" nation than staying at peace would have been.

And that...

The costs of military & war suck and threaten to badly impair the Western nations in their ability to reform themselves for the future.

Probably true. Shame there are people out there who either don't realize that or don't care...

Economics is indeed the dismal science. Warfare OTOH is not a scientific endeavor -- it is the application of an art. Art is inherently inefficient.

[William F. Owen]

Based on some private e-mails from lurkers on this board, I think I can now add this,

Swarming is essentially perceived phenomena by people observing a condition and arbitrarily assigning the word "swarm" to what they see. It has no basis in tactical doctrine, other than the successful application of normal and well understood tactical applications may look like a "swarm" to the victim.

[zenpundit]

Dr. Marc,

The devil, however, is in the details and, let's face it, the details in both Iraq and Afghanistan morphed into the construction of "democracies" which was not part of the original, political calculus of cost; neither were the "insurgencies" .

Very true. Iraq was a stretch and Afghanistan morphing in under a half-century is an impossibility.

That being said, then why has the response to the economic "warfare" of various and sundry financial institutions not been dealt with in a similar manner? Why is he not advocating swarming by accountants which, IMHO, would have far more effect

Amen. For an anthropologist, you are a fine economist.

Ken,

Impressive response. You wrote:

That's merely one small point, a far larger issue is what capability those dollars bought and what combat effectiveness was or is produced. Cost effectiveness is too easily skewed to prove that money is being 'wasted.' What should be purchased for the spending is combat effectiveness. I have no doubt what so ever that the average Infantryman in Viet Nam was more capable than his WW II counterpart probably by a factor of two-- and I have no doubt that my serving Son and his contemporaries are miles ahead of us old guys, probably by another factor of at least two and quite possibly up to four. So yes, we're spending more but we're buying far more capability with fewer but considerably more expensive people.

Fuchs already carried on the discussion with you on effectiveness/efficiency, so I won't beat a dead horse.

Agree with you that combat-effectiveness per soldier has been greatly multiplied (very Cebrowskian ), and expensive technology is part of that. That's a good thing. I'm not looking for cost savings by going "cheap" on what individuals or small units use. Given pie-in-the-sky objectives by politicians, the military naturally tries to secure maximum deployment of personnel and resources when most of the realistic military objectives (as opposed to political/diplomatic/economic objectives) that can be acheived in any given situation short of a great power war require less. Sometimes much less because the military is often used as a blunt instrument for inherently political and murkily complex problems ( ex. Lebanon 1980's, Somalia and Haiti 1990's) to which they are ill-suited as the primary instrument of national policy.

I fully understand the perspective of military specialists needing to plan a campaign or a mission from the point of effectiveness over cost. They should. However, the purpose of civilian leadership in is to ensure that the war effort is sustainable over time until victory is acheived, which means setting parameters and priorities whether it is "Germany, First", "Don't go north of the Yalu" or "we're building carriers not battleships". Our national political leadership have pursued the war on terror generally in a way that maximizes expenditure without maximizing effect. As we are waging war on borrowed money, we ought to, at least, bring our strategic goals into alignment with what the military is most likely to be able to accomplish and put more heft into the activities of HUMINT operators, diplomats and economic development rather than chase diminishing returns with marginal dollars.

Wilf,

Tet was significant. It did not loose the war, or even represent a turning point. It wasn't Kursk or Stalingrad. - and was the North better of with Nixon than LBJ?

LBJ was inept in foreign affairs and Nixon was adept. After Tet both sought a negotiated settlement with North Vietnam, but the difference is LBJ had no idea even how to begin such a process and Nixon did; moreover, he intended to try and drive a hard bargain with Hanoi. Nixon's foremost worry in the summer of 1968 was that LBJ would give away the store to the Communists in order to get Humphrey elected.

Nixon had a strategy, unlike LBJ. He was no less determined to "win."

We agree that Richard Nixon had a strategy. Unfortunately, winning in Vietnam was not part of it and never was ( to use one of your phrases, such a position is "evidence-free"). In Nixon's own words he was looking for "unexplored avenues to probe" in "finding a way to end the war".

Nixon began moving beyond Vietnam as a national priority in 1967 when he penned "Asia After Vietnam" for Foreign Affairs. This position hardened after his pre-presidential campaign world tour. The idea that Nixon intended to "win" is belied by the record of Kissinger's Paris talks and numerous other documents.

Sorry but it was. It was instrumental in the coup in Cambodia and it knocked out all the major NVA base areas for two years. No single action did more military damage to the NVA than the Cambodian invasion. It was military action focussed on military forces, and yes it had strategic effect.

Sorry, it was not. With Cambodia, Nixon gave his military leaders - whom he did not trust, nor who trusted him - far more of what they had been asking to do for years but this was in part because of the demands he was imposing on them with the pace of troop withdrawals. Arguably, Cambodia bought GVN a breathing space and was the right thing to do but it was not (and did not) going to compel Hanoi to come to terms. It was on Saigon, not Hanoi that the USG ultimately imposed peace terms.

Watergate and the 73 Oil crisis doomed SVN greatly more than the very minor reversals of Tet five years before

Watergate certainly rendered Nixon and later Ford of extending air power and military assistance to GVN as the USG had promised Saigon. Tet however did not doom GVN, it changed American perceptions of the war and political support for it here at home.

[William F. Owen]

Arguably, Cambodia bought GVN a breathing space and was the right thing to do but it was not (and did not) going to compel Hanoi to come to terms. It was on Saigon, not Hanoi that the USG ultimately imposed peace terms.

So what did compel Hanoi to start peace talks?
By 1972, Nixon is sending more Carriers, mining North Vietnamese harbours and increasing the bombing. NVA desertions reach record levels. Military force is getting Nixon what Nixon wants - flawed as those desires maybe.

My point is that even as late as 1973, the Vietnam War was America's to loose. This had all moved things on a very far way from the very minor tactical effects of Tet, 4-5 Years earlier!!

[Rex Brynen]

Swarming is essentially perceived phenomena by people observing a condition and arbitrarily assigning the word "swarm" to what they see. It has no basis in tactical doctrine, other than the successful application of normal and well understood tactical applications may look like a "swarm" to the victim.

Nicely put. For example:

Hizbollah guerilla fighters "swarmed" Israeli Merkava MBTs (Main Battle Tanks)–including possibly Merkava Mk4 MBTs–and fired at the sides and rear of the tanks with multiple ATGMs simultaneously.... ATGMs placed in over-watch positions at the rear provided fire support for Hizbollah fighters in the frontline trenches and hidden bunkers, who would suddenly pop out and attack the Merkava tanks at close range with their swarm tactics, and then quickly disappear again...

Are Anti-Tank Guided Missiles the New Primary Threat in Urban Warfare/MOUT?, Defense Review, 19 August 2006.

Which shorn of the trendy "swarm" word, actually means:

Hizbullah conducted AT ambushes. Having done so, they then took cover.

Personally, I think we could go further with the application of analogies drawn from the animal kingdom to make warfare sound more avant-garde. For a start, I would suggest replacing platoon with "hunting pack," CAS with "raptor strikes," and C4I with "hive brain."

[William F. Owen]

Are Anti-Tank Guided Missiles the New Primary Threat in Urban Warfare/MOUT?, Defense Review, 19 August 2006.

Which shorn of the trendy "swarm" word, actually means:

Hizbullah conducted AT ambushes. Having done so, they then took cover.

...a good example of people looking a reports of phenomena, extrapolating and getting it wrong.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by William F. Owen
Swarming is essentially perceived phenomena by people observing a condition and arbitrarily assigning the word "swarm" to what they see. It has no basis in tactical doctrine, other than the successful application of normal and well understood tactical applications may look like a "swarm" to the victim.

Agree with you that "military" examples cited are pretty lame, and probably the result of someone asking RAND to do a study on what swarming means to the military. Every military tactic I have seen described as swarming is simply an ambush, encirclement, isolating maneuver, raid, etc. Absolutely nothing new, and largely a waste of tax payers dollars to conduct such a study.

Going back to my original post where I cited examples ranging from the activists in Iran, the Battle for Seattle, etc. as potential events that could be described as swarming (though still no utility in doing so), where you have a trigger event(s) and a spontaneous reaction that self-organizes (to some extent). Kind of like kicking a hornet's nest. The hornets don't have a plan for such an event (an assumption), but quickly react by swarming their poor attacker. Understanding it that way may have some value (the availability of information globally can lead to spontaneous swarming events, etc.), but tend to agree with the so what crowd. Need to call it what it is, but on the other hand the study of such biological phenomia is fascinating.

[zenpundit]

Wilf wrote:

So what did compel Hanoi to start peace talks?
By 1972, Nixon is sending more Carriers, mining North Vietnamese harbours and increasing the bombing. NVA desertions reach record levels. Military force is getting Nixon what Nixon wants - flawed as those desires maybe.

My point is that even as late as 1973, the Vietnam War was America's to loose.

While Richard Nixon was a complex and morally flawed man, when he was at his best as a statesman there's much there worthy of admiration and close study. Coming into office having been dealt the worst hand of any president since FDR, he played his cards shrewdly.

The negotiations began in 1968, the Paris Accords were signed in 1973. Who was most effective in using military force to acheive political ends is best judged by which side got most of what they wanted. In my view, what Nixon managed to eke out from Hanoi with punishing bombing campaigns was an unreciprocal release of American POWs and a longer "decent interval" for the GVN than Hanoi might have preferred. That's about it.

Now, Nixon was being actively undercut by liberal Democrats in Congress at every step, some of whom, IMHO, badly wanted the US to lose the war for ideological and partisan reasons and were also nasty and vindictive toward our South Vietnamese allies - a prime example being our sitting Vice-President's whose conduct as a freshman senator toward South Vietnamese refugees was a disgrace. If Nixon had popular support, he might have pressed North Vietnam still harder with military force and gotten a better deal, but his objective was always cutting a deal that could be sold at home, not a victory.

[wm]

Sorry to come late to this debate, but . . .

In WWII, the US spent approximately $ 330 billion 1940 dollars to wage war. By any standard that was a lot of money. However, for that fantastic sum, the US received a considerable strategic and tactical ROI including: contributing to the destruction, defeat and occupation of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan; the deaths of roughly 11 million Axis soldiers and civilians; according to John Keegan, producing enough equipment and munitions to outfit 1200 divisions; thousands of combatant ships; 300,000 planes and three functioning atomic bombs, two of which saw use against the enemy.

Now, taking the lower-end estimate expenditure of $ 1 trillion for the war on terror, how does the ROI today compare to the example of WWII?

We have killed or captured low thousands (less than 10k) Islamist insurgents, some of who are al Qaida (President Bush claimed 75 % of AQ leadership) but AQ has held out against the US more than twice as long as the Wehrmacht and still has refuge in Pakistan. We have occupied Afghanistan and overthrown the Taliban government that hosted AQ, but the Taliban too has a refuge in Pakistan and continues to field fighters in Afghanistan. We invaded and occupied Iraq and needed a prolonged campaign to pacify the country and managed to exterminate an AQ affiliate there ( that only appeared because of our invasion). We have circumscribed AQ's operational capacity but from 2001-2010, the group has still managed to sporadically sponsor/inspire significant acts of terrorism in allied countries.

It might be worth comparing apples to apples. The two efforts are of completely different kinds in oh so many fundamental ways. As a simple example consider constancy of purpose in the two conflicts (and that is problematic because OIF and OEF are, and were, not one conflict.) From the Allies’ perspective, World War II had a fairly constant scope. I do not think the same can be said for the efforts now categorized as overseas contingency operations in the CENTCOM AOR. When scope and requirements are not defined early and held constant, then the cost of execution rises significantly. Don’t just take my word for it; take a look at most Defense acquisition programs.

There are significant potential costs to not having big forces. Agreed. I am not interested in having a military that cannot operate large units.
That said, using big units where smaller ones work with greater efficiency and effectiveness is a poor tactical choice.
It is a poor strategic choice if you cannot afford to deploy large units in order to use them inefficiently for years on end. This too is a significant cost - a threat actually - to our overall military capabilities
We can have big units and use them where/when big units work best and select more appropriate tools or degrees of force for other tasks, husbanding our resources for larger problems when they come along.

. . .

You can only fight to the degree and for so long as you can afford to pay for the kind of fighting that you are doing. Different kinds of fighting incurs (sic) different sets of costs. Paying enormous costs for marginal strategic results is not "winning". Ignoring fundamental economic trade-offs in selecting military tactics and operational approaches is simply stupid. This is not an argument for doing nothing, but to do it with eyes open and with a long-term perspective.

The assertions made in this second set of quotations have no basis. Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario? Comparing the effort from the initial days of OEF in Afghanistan with how things happen to be proceeding on the ground today is another example of comparing apples to oranges. The thinking expressed in this combined quotation is similar to the stuff that Bentham and Mill used to justify Utilitarianism as a moral theory. One sets a problem that is impossible of solution when one tries to justify a decision by comparing its consequences to the hypothetical consequences of a decision not made or a course of action not taken. One cannot turn back the hands of time, replay the tape, and choose a different path. One can say that a given action produced more happiness, greater cost benefit, etc. than another that was not chosen but that is because the act not chosen, being unchosen, produced nothing. But, that is really the degenerate case.

[marct]

Hi Zen,

Very true. Iraq was a stretch and Afghanistan morphing in under a half-century is an impossibility.

Yeah, what more can I say on that one .

Amen. For an anthropologist, you are a fine economist.

Oi vey! I guess we never can get rid of some of our roots (I was originally accepted into university in economics .....).

[zenpundit]

Late is always better than never!

It might be worth comparing apples to apples. The two efforts are of completely different kinds in oh so many fundamental ways. As a simple example consider constancy of purpose in the two conflicts (and that is problematic because OIF and OEF are, and were, not one conflict.) From the Allies’ perspective, World War II had a fairly constant scope

Actually there's no more logical reason to keep WWII conceptually aggregated than the War on Terror. There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Were it not for Hitler's gratuitous stupidity in declaring war on the US, FDR would have faced a serious political obstacle in linking the war in Europe to America's war with Japan.

Where is the double blind test that shows that small units do better than “big battalions” in a given operational scenario? Comparing the effort from the initial days of OEF in Afghanistan with how things happen to be proceeding on the ground today is another example of comparing apples to oranges.

Having a priori ruled out using case studies, even those occurring in the same battlespace conducted by the same military within a short period of time, what is your proposal for conducting such a double-blind test of combat operations?

[wm]

Actually there's no more logical reason to keep WWII conceptually aggregated than the War on Terror. There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Were it not for Hitler's gratuitous stupidity in declaring war on the US, FDR would have faced a serious political obstacle in linking the war in Europe to America's war with Japan.

Unlike World War II, the current conflicts, OIF (soon to be Operation New Dawn or OND) and OEF, will not really matter much in the great scheme of things should the coalition's efforts be less than successful. The magnitude of evil being confronted there pales in comparison to that manifested by the opposition during WWII. (By the way, had Hitler not declared war on the US, I submit that FDR would have had little trouble getting the US involved in the ETO once the evil of the Nazi regime became apparent to Americans.) That is the connection I was trying to suggest in my early post about constancy of mission. I see the point about operational/tactical differences in different WWII theaters to be a non sequitur. Of course the techniques used varied depending on whether operations were cfonducted in CBI, North Africa, the Russian steppes or the frozen Karelian Peninsula; that is the essence of METT-TC. What did not change was the strategic mission: to compel the aggressor Axis nations to surrender unconditionally. There was no mission creep, as much as Churchill and Patton may have wanted it.

Having a priori ruled out using case studies, even those occurring in the same battlespace conducted by the same military within a short period of time, what is your proposal for conducting such a double-blind test of combat operations?

I don't think I ruled out case studies a priori. In certain circumstances, case studies would be an excellent approach. In fact I suspect that a properly constructed and presented case study approach is germane in the present analysis. I was also not proposing that we use a double blind test in combat. What I was suggesting is that an appeal to consequences as a means of comparing the goodness of alternatives is not likely to be an appropriate methodological approach for the current subject.
Instead, I would argue from analogy (which is the essence of the case study approach) and would look for data upon which to make a basis for analogy. In the case at hand, I would like to know whether you could cite some examples that are relevantly similar, examples where big battalions did not get the job done and some other examples, also relevantly similar, where small units did achieve the desired results. As part of the discussion, I think you also need to cash out what counts as desired results and justify that normative position. If neither of these pieces is missing, then I submit that your position,

using big units where smaller ones work with greater efficiency and effectiveness is a poor tactical choice.

is merely handwaving. It may in fact be the case that an effective and efficient solution is not what the national leadership is really after here, just as it may not really matter what tactical choices one makes because strategic and/or operational considerations may far outweigh the tactical ones.

[William F. Owen]

There's very little the kind of fighting Stillwell did in Burma had in common with the invasion of Sicily, strategic bombing of Germany or the Battle of the Coral Sea. The lack of constancy and magnitude of scope was itself a great challenge for Marshall and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Hmmm.... I'm not sure I get your point. In WW2, as with today, combat is combat. Sure there are theatre specific peculiarities, but so what?
Infantry men in Burma and Sicily would have a very great deal in common. Yes there are differences, but why are they relevant, beyond the obvious?

Am I missing the point?

[Rex Brynen]

To get back to Arquilla's original argument about the need for smaller/smarter/more flexible/networked forces as a necessary response to networked insurgents using a "swarm" approach, it struck me today that we actually have a paired comparison of two militaries, organized along radically different lines, faced with insurgencies in similar human and physical terrain:

1) Ba'thist Iraq versus various Kurdish insurgencies, and the 1991 uprising in the south

2) US/coalition/Iraqi forces versus various Iraqi insurgencies, 2003-present

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

The answer, as I'm sure everyone realizes, is rooted in the willingness of the Ba'th to use force in certain ways, and the balance of terror that it was thereby able to establish. Don't get me wrong--I'm not suggesting the "Roman" (or Ba'thist) model as an appropriate approach for post-Cold War Western COIN and stability operations. I am suggesting that what has changed here is not so much the rise of the "swarm" but the very much greater importance of the changing social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place.

[William F. Owen]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

Excellent point.

[Ken White]

My first thought on reading about the the swarms in the article was of a US or generally western 'swarm' element operating under western constraints confronting an opponent who did not operate under those constraints...

[Ron Humphrey]

Trying to keep up with you guys is becoming ever more difficult. Although I think I have been able to track with the majority of the conversation i have one ?

IF your looking at "swarming" in relation to war is it too much of an oversimplification to start back at square one and look for examples of swarming in other arenas first to get perspective?

I think someone else mentioned biological examples so for me that automatically brought to mind animals(Bees)(Bats) and cells(reproduction/viruses,etc)

In the former Why is it that bees however small can take down a much more robust opponent is it because even though they be outmatched in capability they out number the target. In this case doesn't the swarming relate more to the fact that no one attacks at one place at one time, but that they may repeatedly attack the same place many times. Just depends on time and space available.

One more example brought to mind was water. Why is it that something that takes a very specialized tool to breakdown(earth,rocks.etc) can be worn down by water in such fashion as it is. Is it not that the water flows to such space as it is afforded and never ceases to seek new paths . Isn't this another type of swarming.

Long and short
Is it too "simplistic" to say that the key strength in swarming might be found in its ability to recognize and act on any vacuum afforded in a given path

[wm]

The ponderous, hierarchical, Soviet-style Iraqi military was, by any possible measure, for more successful at suppressing insurgents than has been the much more flexible, modular, networked US military... quite the reverse of what Arquilla's argument would suggest.

The answer, as I'm sure everyone realizes, is rooted in the willingness of the Ba'th to use force in certain ways, and the balance of terror that it was thereby able to establish. Don't get me wrong--I'm not suggesting the "Roman" (or Ba'thist) model as an appropriate approach for post-Cold War Western COIN and stability operations. I am suggesting that what has changed here is not so much the rise of the "swarm" but the very much greater importance of the changing social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place.

Well put Rex, but I suspect that the answer is not quite as simple as tipping "the balance of terror." Neither the Ba'athists nor their opponents were fighting with home field advantage (or both were). As natives, they could be very effective because they shared the language and culture of their opposition. In contrast to that, while its opponents were able to follow Mao's precept of swimming ln the ocean of the people, the Coalition, consisting of outsiders, was not quite as lucky . The Baathists, being locals, knew what kind of bait to use to catch the fish. The coalition forces were much more like tourists on a fishing trip far from home. They weren't even sure which pools were stocked, much less what kind of tackle to use.

Furthermore, I doubt that the "importance of the . . social, political, normative, legal, and informational milieu within which COIN operations take place" has changed much since when Titus finished up the work of his father Vespasian and quashed the Jewish Revolt in 70 AD or when Marius and Sulla won the Social War of 91-88 BC. What may be different is how well various forces involved in fighting against insurgencies, insurrections, and revolts recognize and apply those parts of METT-TC (or whatever fancy acronym du jour one wishes to apply) which reflect that milieu.