4GW & Other Myths

[DDilegge]

....and it took how long? - proof that the enemy has a steeper organizational learning curve(faster OODA loop). Our massive heirarchic "up the chain" command structure is vulnerable and inefficient when compaired to the enemies decentralized structure and open sourced methods. This is covered by 4GW theorists BTW.....

Who's got the bankrupt theory?

Eek, eye roll and cool avatars aside...

My experience is with USMC PME so I'll mainly address that. The Marine Corps school-houses have addressed Small Wars issues for years... This includes the captain's course (AWS – now EWS), the major’s course (CSC) and the lieutenant colonel's course (USMC War College).

I offered up the new CSC curriculum as an example of how the USMC CSC is adapting even more to our Small Wars environment. All that said, I would opine that the other services’ PME institutions have been and are currently doing the same. This last statement is based on the student papers, thesis, and monographs that these schools have produced.

Whether “good ideas” and “spot-on” research and recommendations translate to actionable items in the operating forces is another issue.

I would submit that we need to give our military professionals more credit… Small Wars, by nature, has a heavy political element that does not necessarily translate to efficiency and often puts the cabash on the “good ideas”.

[GorTex6]

The Art of War in the Western World

[Bill Moore]

I would submit that we need to give our military professionals more credit… Small Wars, by nature, has a heavy political element that does not necessarily translate to efficiency and often puts the cabash on the “good ideas”.

Your comment about our military professionals is spot on with the possible exception of Vietnam under GEN Westmoreland's lead. Undoubtedly he faced he faced an incredible challenge on the hill. Maybe his policy of total war against N. Vietnam would have worked if he wasn't impeded by President Johnson who was famously quoted they won't bomb an outhouse unless I give them permission to. While I think the war of movement in Vietnam was probably the wrong approach, and on that we can only speculate with the benefit of hindsight.

Almost all officers I have spoken with from Lts through GO's have an understanding of insurgencies and unconventional warfare. They may all have different recommendations on strategy, but as a whole they're a ray of hope. The bottom line is that the military can’t always translate bad policy into a successful mission. While I think the so called Powell Doctrine was unrealistic, I can definitely understand why many in the military embraced it. We can’t count on our nation to do well in these abstract conflicts, because we do a poor job of educating those we need support from throughout the DIME, which we can discuss in the DIME forum.

You’re right, across the board we have a very professional force that America can and should be proud of.

[Merv Benson]

After their Tet offensive failed, the communist insurgency was never able to threaten conquest of South Vietnam. It had been defeated for all practicle purposes. The Hanoi leadership recognized this and eventually won using a "convential" or combat persiting strategy that was successful when the Congress denied the South Vietnamese the air support we had earlier promised them.

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

You have provided several thought provoking ideas, and I'm undecided if I agree with your analysis on what you are calling failed attacks. I think you're right reference Vietnam, because the TET offensive was an attempt to defeat us militarily, but the enemy noted an unintended effect on the American population (eroded our will), so they kept pushing that button to pressure us out of Vietnam. What a different world we could be living in today if the press actually reported the battle results accurately as a major defeat for the communist forces. It can be argued we left Vietnam as winners with a relatively secure S. Vietnam, but one that wasn't capable of repulsing a conventional N. Vietnam offensive without our promised help. Our help didn’t arrive because their previously failed attacks effectively eroded our will to stay in the fight, so it can be argued that their failed attacks worked so in the end I still remain undecided.

In Iraq I don't think the enemy has any intention of defeating us militarily and all of their attacks are directly focused on America's will to stay in the fight, so whether they're successful from a tactical stand point or not isn't the true measure of effectiveness. Rather it is their effect on the intended audience. I think the terrorists grossly underestimate the will of the American people to stick it out, but then again that national will must be stoked by effective leadership in the White House. Our President’s recent speeches admitting mistakes seem to be working with the American public. Now he is a gladiator in the arena instead of a by stander making statements that just didn’t ring true with the American public. If he can keep rebuilding his support base, I think we’ll do fine.

[War Hammer]

Some weaknesses of 4GW are:

(1): Misrepresentation of Clausewitz and Clausewitz's followers

“Unlike Clausewitzian warfare, which envisions war as an act of policy in a contest between states, 4GW more resembles a boxer versus a viral infection.”

Clausewitz is generally depicted as describing only state vs. state conflicts. The adherents of Clausewitz are then depicted as “state-centric” warriors who only can only deal with state to state conflicts.

However many Clausewitzians believe On War is a descriptive work not a prescriptive one. It describes war as it is, in its universal nature, rather than how it ought to be. They apply Clausewitz to non-state actors as well as state actors. They argue the trinity of primordial violence, blind chance and reason are conceptual and apply to any warfighting entity (i.e. non-state actor or state). They are not focused on state vs. state wars nor do they believe that Clausewitz was focused on state vs. state conflicts.

Colin Gray being an example:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/P...pring/gray.htm

(2): Misrepresentation of Mao

If Mao is the epitome of 4GW, Eastern Warfare and Sun-Tzu why did he frame his perception of warfare within the paradigm of the Clausewitzian Trinity? Why did Mao insist that all wars were political in nature? Why did he argue that there was never a war that was not political? Mao’s insistence that war is nothing but politics with bloodshed is in stark contrast to the 4GW theory as set out by William Lind:

“Now, as then, many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war, and they will wage war for many different reasons, not just “the extension of politics by other means.”

[Merv Benson]

Bill,

I agree with you on the importance of maintaining the national will and I am glad that Bush has reengaged on this aspect of the war. I think the commanders also should be educating the public on the significance of events. If you recall during the first Gulf War, Iraq captured a small town in Saudia Arabia while the coalition was still in the "shaping the battlespace" phase, i.e. the preinvasion bombing. Gen. Schwartkoph was emphatic in stating that the attack on Kafje was not important and would not divert the plan of attack on liberating Kuwait. As I recall the Iraqis were eventually driven out by the Saudi National Guard troops, because the Saudis thought it was significant. My point is that the General did a good job of shaping perceptions and he was in a much better position to do so than the President. Unfortunately in Iraq the briefings are no longer making a splash on the news back in the states. Perhaps Gen. Pace can command a larger audience. Getting accurate information to the public is clearly an important aspect of this war and unfortunately the media is not likely to cooperate.

[DDilegge]

Kafji was insignificant to a point. The fact that the Iraqi's crossed into Saudi Arabia had the potential to influence the perceptions of the Muslim members of the coalition. The SANG took back Kafji with substantial U.S. support and went a long way in building up the confidence level of the SANG and other coaltion partners who had no previous combat experience or extensive training in the type of operations that were about to be conducted.

[Merv Benson]

It was certainly more significant than any action initiated by the enemy since the end of major combat operations in the second Gulf War. However Schwartzkoph was determined not to let it be a distraction to his plan to liberate Kuwait, and he took action with the media to make certain that they did not turn it into something it was not. I think commanders in Iraq need to be more proactive in explaining the significance and insignificance of events. It is clear to me that the media does not comprehend the difference.

[Tom Odom]

There many studies, histories, or articles written about an "American Way of War." Indeed our adherence to doctrine as a base plate for our operations documents that we as a military continually evaluate, test, and rethink how we define our approach to warfare. FM 3-0 Operations is the Army's "bible" on the conduct of warfare. But looking at this issue from a longer perspective, certain trends or characteristics emerge. I cite the following four:

· Preference for Fire Power over Manpower

· Preference for Offense over Defense

· Preference for Technologically Complex over Simple

· Preference for Speedy Resolution over Extended Operations

These four "preferences" drive our approach to military operations. Raising the idea of doing a cultural IPB on oneself, consider those four longstanding American preferences from an enemy's perspective. Then you will start to see US strategic, operational, and tactical weaknesses.

Best

Tom

[M. J. Dougherty]

Gentlemen,
I think we can all agree that 4GW does not represent the advent of a new unprecedented way of war. It is more a cyclical, evolving response by weaker adversaries and nonstate actors to the development of strategic capabilities of modern states. Yet we should conceed that modern forms of insurgency are characterized by unique trends in adversarial capabilities and TTPs that have not been seen before. Part product of technological proliferation and part product of adaptive doctrine, insurgent forces are developing tailored responses to U.S. and allied (mostly Western) global dominance. In particular, insurgent adversaries are developing longterm strategies to shape the strategic environment in their favor for a conflict with the U.S. at a particular time and place of their choosing.

[Sonny]

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.

On War, Carl von Clausewitz

I think that one of the things that can weigh us down in dealing with today's conflicts is an unnecessary attachment to a single theory or doctrine of war, be it EBO, NCW, or 4GW. No single theory or perspective can explain the totality and all the phenomena associated with what is perhaps the most complicated of human endeavors: war. In science, no single theory can't explain all aspects of a phenomenon (e.g. general relativity, quantum mechanics); the same applies for warfare. Neither the generational warfare model, nor EBO or NCW, represent, by themselves, a "theory of everything" regarding war.

It can be beneficial to study the concepts pertaining to each theory, but getting married to a single theory can prove to be detrimental. They way I see it, as warfighters we really have no dog in this academic fight. We should be fighting the war, not the doctrine. The concepts we learn studying the different theories live in our minds (not necessarily in our hearts), but ultimately when it comes time to take action we should try what suits each occasion best, regardless of whether it conforms to a theory or another. We have all this concepts in our toolkit, and that's precisely what these concepts are: tools for understanding certain aspects of warfare. No single tool is appropriate for every job.

The generational model of war, of which 4GW is a part, is more a representation of a different viewpoint than a reinvention of the wheel. What we now call insurgency has been a part of warfare since antiquity. 4 GW looks at insurgency, and war as a whole, from a different standpoint. The 4GW proponents added another layer to the discussion of war. If nothing else, they revitalized the concept. Whether you agree with 4GW or not, the discussions generated by the theory at least are getting us to talk about a topic long neglected by the military: insurgency and unconventional warfare.

Globalization has changed many aspects of our lives; commerce, politics, and or course, the way human beings wage war. Technology also changes how we fight, whether we like it or not. Even the "low-tech" insurgents and terrorists adapt technologies to their advantage.

In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman talks about the democratization of technology, finance, and information: "three fundamental changes-changes in how we communicate, how we invest and how we learn about the world."

Fareed Zakaria in The Future of Freedom adds, "We often read during the roaring 1990s that technology and information had been democratized. This is a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, technology helped reinforce centralization and hierarchy. For example, the last great information revolution--in the 1920s involving radio, television, movies, megaphones-had a centralizing effect."

The democratization of technology and information along with the weakening of the state has contributed to what Zakaria calls the democratization of violence. To those factors, I add the post-Cold War resurgence of ethnic and religious conflict. 4GW is growing on fertile ground.

Peaceful and hostile non-state actors have benefited from these democratizations. You can get in touch with anyone across the world cheaply and exchange news, make arrangements for your latest cocaine shipment, or put the finishing touches on your terrorist attack. The fact that governments can intercept some of these communications will not stop a determined adversary. They have ways to go around that.

The discussion on 4GW and insurgencies will remain front and center for a long time. Neither 4GW, NCW, or EBO deserve a blanket disapproval. Each perspective offers something useful in understanding certain, but not all, aspects of warfare.