MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Steve Blair]

The US Army picked up a number of bad habits in Viet Nam -- some of those bad habits (micromanagement and lack of trust of subordinates being two big ones, overuse of Artillery in COIN like operations and inadequate and insufficient patrolling being two more) still adversely impact the force 35 years later. In fact, the Small War in Korea still has flawed legacy problems (the one year tour, condensed and 'economical' training) 60 years later...

I would contend that these small wars simply solidified traits and trends that were first formed during the big wars (WW 1 and WW 2), and those traits in turn stem from some of Root's reforms and the historical American reliance on a very small standing army and mass militia in times of conflict (which translates after about 1916 to the draft).

Many of the bad habits the force has been saddled with came from poor planning for the next big war, not from participation in small wars. The failures and omissions run deeper than "small versus big" or caliber debates.

[Ken White]

Each generation sort of gets its own war(s) and thus learns its own lessons -- which we notoriously do not analyze well or successfully pass on to our successors.

I would contend that these small wars simply solidified traits and trends that were first formed during the big wars (WW 1 and WW 2), and those traits in turn stem from some of Root's reforms and the historical American reliance on a very small standing army and mass militia in times of conflict (which translates after about 1916 to the draft).

This is not a quibble, it is important:

Each war adds its own fillips to previously absorbed bad lessons.

Many of the bad habits the force has been saddled with came from poor planning for the next big war, not from participation in small wars.

With that I totally agree.

The failures and omissions run deeper than "small versus big" or caliber debates.

While that is true, it should not be allowed to obscure the fact that bad lessons accrue in all wars for the next one or that small anything cannot totally prepare one for a big anything. one reason for the phenomenon as you state it is that junior leaders in one war mistakenly presume their next war will be like their last where they may be far more senior and thus able to do far more damage (See again Korea and Viet Nam. See also the Powell
Doctrine...).

It is a matter of scale and that is very important. What you say is true at the macro level; at the micro or personal level it is all too easy to base ones future plans and actions -- and thus ones responses to stimuli -- on current experience.

That is rarely wise

[Steve Blair]

It is a matter of scale and that is very important. What you say is true at the macro level; at the micro or personal level it is all too easy to base ones future plans and actions -- and thus ones responses to stimuli -- on current experience.

That is rarely wise

Agree, but we also tend to obsess on the micro level without making any real attempt to fix the problem (or at least understand it) at the macro level. That's why I like dragging this old rock out from time to time. Fixing (or at least messing with) the micro also makes some people feel like they're accomplishing something, while in fact the bigger problem remains as the elephant in the corner.

When I look at how the institutions of defense respond to external stimuli (in the form of conflicts), it's interesting to see how their responses have hardened and become more strident in the years after World War II. I suspect part of that is a function of sheer size, but it has certainly allowed the macro problems to linger on and multiply at all levels.

And now I'll put the pet rock away and stop derailing the thread...

[Ken White]

Agree, but we also tend to obsess on the micro level...while in fact the bigger problem remains as the elephant in the corner.

Perhaps a bad choice of words on my part; I 've noticed one can educate the young and even the middle aged. However, old Bull elephants are not going to listen or change. So you've got to get the young to think right in hopes that when they get old, they'll be in the habit. Don Vandergriff sent me a briefing he'd presented to the Chief of Staff -- of which nothing had come -- I wrote him back and suggested he edumacate the LTs and they would change the system as the grew in it and pointed out starting at the top and working down does not work, even a really smart guy like Shy Meyer discovered that.

And now I'll put the pet rock away and stop derailing the thread...

It's not a derail, it's pertinent and you're correct that some obsess over inconsequentials.

However, the difference between low and high intensity war is quite far from being inconsequential. That point needs emphasis.

Kaur:

I don't see any spoiling effect. Your chart doesn't contradict a thing I've written here. In fact, if it does anything, it backs up my comment that "(Fuchs) is criticizing governments that engage in potentially fruitless nation building wars which rarely work and are terribly wasteful of people" and "Governments are at fault for committing their troops to poorly thought out campaigns; Armies are at fault for presuming those campaigns are the future."