MAJ Ehrhart - Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afgh.

[Fuchs]

The fact of the matter remains that small unit firefights of 10-40 guys in Afghanistan are much the same as they would be against a regular foe anywhere else. Small groups of guys trying to shoot, move and communicate to kill each other with crew-served weapons doing most of the killing. For me to do so, I still like light rifles, MGs and light mortars. Arty or air are just add-ons for either side; having neither air defence nor effective indirect fire is not a characteristic unique to either Afghan insurgents or irregular foes in general and CAS and indirect are not ubiquitous in Afghanistan.

OK, let's try it this way:

a) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. Your Plt is in combat with an enemy who's using agricultural walls for cover 400 m ahead of your position. You can call for mortar support.

b) You lead a TB warband in AFG. Your warband has fixed a Canadian patrol 400 m ahead, behind a wall. You have 20 minutes left till enemy air can be expected to intervene. You do not have mortar support available.

c) You are Inf Plt leader in AFG. Your Plt is in combat and fixed behind a wall. You have 20-40 minutes left till air will intervene.

d) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. You are in combat and fixed behind a wall. The Bn main fight is elsewhere and the Bde main fight isn't in your Bn area. You get no support, but you've got a couple SMK grenades and a large area with much concealment is just 100m to your south. You expect a red mortar attack ion less than two minutes.


Do you get where I see the difference?

Arty and mortars are not "add-ons". They're essential combined arms combat components. The can eradicate your small unit in minutes, something the TB didn't achieve EVER against ANY Western small unit in YEARS of warfare.

Facing such a threat and not being sure that enemy comm is interrupted, you have little other choice than to keep contacts brief and move (disappear) often - while you could sit safely behind the very same cover for hours if in combat against TB.

[kaur]

Sorry for spoiling, but I'd like to add 1 table to Ken White's comment.

It is simply a matter of scale. It is also a matter of opponent mass and capability.

Wilf, said:

I would dare, SUGGEST and without blinking. - Suggest means go work it out, do the trials and do the training. IF it does not work well, DO NOT DO IT!

Has any Red Team ever dared to test this idea?

[William F. Owen]

Has any Red Team ever dared to test this idea?

No but armies running around with STENs, MP-40's and PPSH have pretty much done a useful level of empirical testing. MP-7 is actually deployed in A'Stan, but I don't know in what form or scale.
The IDF of 1948 had predominantly STEN Guns and MG-34/BRENs and very few rifles. The Arabs in contrast had mostly rifles. Not proof in and of itself but food for thought!

....and as I said, I'd want a lot of testing before being more than provocative with such ideas

[Firn]

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Some general thoughts on automatic weapons and support weapons. The machine pistol has just as a rifle a specific set of advantages and disadvantages. One decisive factor in the far greater use and need for MPs in WWII might have been among other ones that it could greatly ease the suppression of the enemy and the employement of the crew-served weapons, tanks or hand-grenades. Soldiers mostly armed with bolt-rifles had a far harder time to suppress and silence under similar situations and had great disadvantag in many combat settings against troops with a high ratio of automatic weapons. Thus they sought to get their hands on automatic weapons. With this kind of "positive feedback" going on, the generally observed trend to increase their ratio seen in pretty much every war in the last 90 years is quite understandable. On the other hand specialists like sipers would try to shield themselve from enemy suppression by cunning, training and camouflage. (Sound suppressors on the "long range" rifles coupled with good training and tactics should lower the suppression of the sharpshooters and thus increase their effectiveness.)

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While it seems to me that the article by the MAJ outlined the current situation well, I think there could have been a greater focus on the problems of finding and Identifying the enemy at long ranges. The specific terrain and the part of the enemy tactics might favor the (greater) use the low-level use of spotting scopes, binoculars, high-powered scopes, and perhaps periscopes. Better finding and identifiying should lead to better fixing and easier destruction by the support weapons like mortars, grenades, artillery or CAS.


Firn

[Fuchs]

A bit small arms history background:

Submachineguns were an stopgap.
Semi-auto rifles and even mroe so automatic rifles weren't reliable until the 1930's (M1 Garand and Vollmer Maschinenkarabiner; the first assault rifle).
This meant that the best way to improve close combat firepower over carbines/rifles were shotguns, hand grenades, pistols and submachineguns.

Today we can easily produce automatic rifles (~M14), automatic carbines (~M4), subcarbines (rarely in military), assault rifles (~AKM) and semi-auto sniper rifles (~Dragunov).

Submachineguns are about as heavy and clumsy as assault rifles, yet vastly inferior in effective range and typically also so in regard to penetration. We don't need this stopgap anymore.

Machine pistols are even more inferior in accuracy and range, yet at least they're light and compact. Nevertheless, they're inferior to some PDWs that offer a much higher velocity bullet.


I'd treat the latter as PDWs, never as a front line infantry primary weapon. A Javelin operator, MG gunner or driver may be issued such a small weapon. They should also be issued a full weapon, such as an assault rifle (to be stored in a vehicle if not needed at the moment).

The firepower in forests and inside buildings is too weak with machine pistols and PDWs.



I'm generally OK with an assault rifle concept that's focused on 200 or 300m combat range with only tripod machine guns, AT weapons and scoped rifles shooting farther. The assault rifle / carbine should be a trust-inspiring and well-selected design, though. I consider the personal weapon to be quite important for the confidence of the individual soldier. That's why I would also consider issuing a light AT weapon and at least one hand and one smoke grenade to every soldier who doesn't use some heavy weapon.
I don't only think of infantry here!

[William F. Owen]

If someone asked me RIGHT NOW, I wouldn't touch PDWs because there simply isn't the need. They do however produce an interesting set of arguments - why I wrote the article.

I'm pretty much set in my views on platoon weapons right now, mainly because they keep getting validated, but any new information will always make me think again..... hopefully...

[carl]

The article calls as strongly for better training as it does for a new infantry rifle or calibre. Without the training no hits will be made at extended ranges no matter what kind of rifle. And improved training will improve the effectiveness of what we have now. Everybody wins, but as I have gathered from reading SWJ over the years, that might be harder to do than getting new equipment.

Also, could the XM-25, if successfully fielded, do a lot to fix the problem? Could the problem also be addressed by increasing the number of GPMGs carried (per Kaur) or 51mm type mortars or even using the M203 for indirect fire?

The above questions are actually questions, not opinions in disguise.

[Firn]

The above questions are actually questions, not opinions in disguise.

IMHO the biggest nut to crack for a dismounted patrol is to suppress the enemy mortars and their observers when they are used in competent fashion in difficult alpine terrain and if the enemy holds the high ground. A mortar hidden in a ravine or shielded by a crest is pretty much impossible to silence by patrols down in the valley or on the slopes - especially if they get also hit by suppressive AKM and RPG fire. Observers and some boys could shout corrections back to the mortar and avoid so radio chatter. The returning observation and fire effort will almost entirely be directed at the sources of direct fire! With good dispersion chances are high that the (distant) observer (higher up or on the flanks) can keep doing unhindered his job. This reverse slope harassing is easily set up in many regions of Afghanistan. I wonder how often the "reverse slope" is a hamlet.

Mortar bombs and other ammunition and weapons transported by small groups, boys with goats, etc over a long time could have been stashed in suitable places and collected at notice by the shadowing spies and observers. With enough bombs and time to fire them even lesser skilled mortar crews can be very dangerous. If done well, this tactic is, without a lot of resources, hard to tackle.

@Fuchs: I just used the machine pistols as a historic starting point for this very observed "co-evolution".


Firn

[William F. Owen]

Without the training no hits will be made at extended ranges no matter what kind of rifle. And improved training will improve the effectiveness of what we have now. Everybody wins, but as I have gathered from reading SWJ over the years, that might be harder to do than getting new equipment.

There are real limits to what you can train people to do when it comes to "skills". Some can shoot, some cannot, and some never improve. Plus almost all training is a function of quantity and quality and both of those cost money, so are the first things to get cut.

Could the problem also be addressed by increasing the number of GPMGs carried (per Kaur) or 51mm type mortars or even using the M203 for indirect fire?

If your Platoon has 2-3 GPMG, a 60mm hand-held mortar and some 6-8 M203, I cannot really think what else you can reasonably ask for, bar perhaps 66mm M72s and maybe some ATGM, dependant on need.
The simpler you make the equipment, the easier you make the training reach a higher standard.

[Fuchs]

If your Platoon has 2-3 GPMG, a 60mm hand-held mortar and some 6-8 M203, I cannot really think what else you can reasonably ask for, bar perhaps 66mm M72s and maybe some ATGM, dependant on need.
The simpler you make the equipment, the easier you make the training reach a higher standard.

It's a bit off the scope because it's just munitions, but I would keep in mind the grenade & mine repertoire.

The German army doesn't use "Claymores", for example - a serious drawback for ambushes in my opinion.

[Bob's World]

OK, let's try it this way:

a) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. Your Plt is in combat with an enemy who's using agricultural walls for cover 400 m ahead of your position. You can call for mortar support.

b) You lead a TB warband in AFG. Your warband has fixed a Canadian patrol 400 m ahead, behind a wall. You have 20 minutes left till enemy air can be expected to intervene. You do not have mortar support available.

c) You are Inf Plt leader in AFG. Your Plt is in combat and fixed behind a wall. You have 20-40 minutes left till air will intervene.

d) You are Inf Plt leader in a great war. You are in combat and fixed behind a wall. The Bn main fight is elsewhere and the Bde main fight isn't in your Bn area. You get no support, but you've got a couple SMK grenades and a large area with much concealment is just 100m to your south. You expect a red mortar attack ion less than two minutes.


Do you get where I see the difference?

Arty and mortars are not "add-ons". They're essential combined arms combat components. The can eradicate your small unit in minutes, something the TB didn't achieve EVER against ANY Western small unit in YEARS of warfare.

Facing such a threat and not being sure that enemy comm is interrupted, you have little other choice than to keep contacts brief and move (disappear) often - while you could sit safely behind the very same cover for hours if in combat against TB.

Such as the Canadian force fixed by the TB force is not authorized to employ CAS or indirect fires due to the Civilian (innocent) populace in and among the civilian (insurgent) populace he is fixed by. The location has a high number of IEDs limiting his freedom of maneuver, but they are known by his opponent so do not affect his maneuver; and because there are no front lines, he can hear over the ICOM radios being used by the insurgent that a complex attack is being pulled together that will likely have him taking fire from 270 degrees on his position with the next 15-20 minutes.

Aerial evacuation is possible, but not until sometime after sunset which is some 7 hours away. All ISR has been pulled to support higher priority operations elsewhere. Nearest QRF is 15 KM away, but will have to clear IEDs and deal with a continuous TIC to get to your location.

Meanwhile your commander is expecting you to "clear" the compounds to your front, while the compounds you "cleared" yesterday to your rear are now reoccupied by insurgents, as well as the innocent civilians who live there.

Oh yes, and your mission is not to defeat the insurgent, but to protect the populace.

It may not be graduate level war, but you better at least have your GED.

[Fuchs]

Well, we don't seem to argue about the degree of difficulty and whether the same behaviour would be suicidal in a great war anymore (my original points).

You seem to pile on points that need to be considered by a small unit leader instead, and that's really an endless game because - and I think you understand that - it would be no problem to me to add one or two forum pages of things that should be considered (but cannot all be considered) by a small unit leader in a great war.

There would be many things included that are not necessary - at times even contraproductive - in a small war environment. Like minimising the exposure to airborne sensors, radio silence, jammed radio links or being enticed to survive the war by simply becoming a POW.