Laudable goals, yes, but if we expect McChrystal's strategy to address or achieve these goals, we're expecting way too much. I can't see the logic in asking a military force and/or a military commander to create credible elections, renew the public service, empower the provinces, etc: these are matters that the Afghan Government and civilian advisers from those supporting the Afghan Government have to manage.Does the current 'new' McCrystal strategy match such aims?
All we can reasonably ask the military to do is to provide the time window for the civilian side to address these goals, and to suppress the insurgency to an extent that challenges the perception that the Taliban are ultimately going to win. Of course that's only half the battle, and to win the war the civilian side has to step up and deliver on their side as well, but it's the only half that we can reasonably expect the military force to accomplish.
Reading this gives me a feeling that I often get when reading ICG documents... they always have wonderful recommendations for all parties concerned, but you always close the document with the sense that if the parties concerned had the capacity to meet those recommendations there wouldn't be any need to make them. The problem isn't that the people involved don't know what needs to be done, the problem is that they can't or won't do it.
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