New Rules of War

[Fuchs]

I think the point wasn't about reporting, it was about propaganda and the Americans have their own Dolchstoßlegende that asserts that their own media & Jane Fonda became propagandists for the enemy.

Propaganda, of course, can influence will quite apart from real events.

[Gnaeus]

Apparently, when writing his article and proposing his theory of the "New Rules of War," Arquilla overlooked the Marine Corps' base unit for conducting war...the MAGTF. Rule 1 leads readers to the conclusion that the military has a rigid and inflexible structure that is only suited to fight using large maneuver elements such as divisions. The flaw in Rule 1 becomes especially apparent when examining it next to the MAGTF structure. Arquilla states the the military has a "scaling problem," even though the MAGTF is built around the principals of task-organizing forces based on its mission and scope of operations. The ground combat element of the MAGTF could be a division, if it was required, but the GCE could even be scaled down to company-size if the situation dictated. What I find even more misleading in this article is that Arquilla states "the Marines now routinely subdivide their forces into "expeditionary forces" of several hundred troops each." This further implies that the expeditionary construct of Marine forces was a knee jerk reaction to the current counterinsurgency environment, even though the MAGTF concept has been around and applied since the 1960s. I would think that a Naval Postgraduate School professor would have a better understanding of the composition and doctrine of the Marine Corps.

[Steve the Planner]

Foreign Policy has an interesting article: The New Rules of War.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...f_war?page=0,0

Lots of little interconnected, high-energy teams vs. big army.

Steve

[Ken White]

LINK.

Lengthy thread on the article...

[Outlaw 7]

Well welcome to the world of "open source warfare" OSW---was wondering when the rest of the world would catch up.

[Outlaw 7]

Love this---finally someone is talking about swarming attacks which have been the bread and butter of the Sunni insurgency since 2007 and which now has transitioned to the Taliban via internet battle videos.

Read "Swarming on the Battlefield" a 2000 RAND study by Sean Edwards.

Why are we doomed to literally recreate the wheel--this study was commissioned by the Army, swarm attacks have been discussed in open source warfare since 2004, and the Sunni insurgents have shown us their battle videos complete with mission briefs since 2007.

But hey all those videos were deemed to be enemy propoganda!

[Ken White]

A lot of folks have swarmed over the years. That article is not on the cutting edge of anything as a lot of folks pointed out above...

NOTE: Thread merged to preclude redundancy.

[William F. Owen]

Read "Swarming on the Battlefield" a 2000 RAND study by Sean Edwards.

If that's the study I re-read recently it's a very contestable piece of work.

Why are we doomed to literally recreate the wheel--this study was commissioned by the Army, swarm attacks have been discussed in open source warfare since 2004, and the Sunni insurgents have shown us their battle videos complete with mission briefs since 2007.

Sorry, I do not understand "open source warfare." Like Ken White says the imaginary tactic of "swarming" has been around a long time. It's a perception. It's not a doctrine.

Once you boil it down saying "Swarming" is like saying "Choo-choo train." It's OK when you're 8. It's not OK if you're a locomotive engineer.

[politicsbyothermeans]

If a swarm takes a long time, do you call it a surge?

[Outlaw 7]

Anyone here on this blog ask the 1st Cav what they thought about "swarming".

Ask about the high losses at two of their COPS in 2007/2008 and then deduce that there is nothing to swarming---it was the primary battle tactic of the IAI and AAS starting in 2007.

Ask US forces about their losses in recent COP attacks in Afghanistan.

Jesus guys do some reading and asking--- actually the article was the first sign that someone is starting to understand "open source warfare" (OSW).

I cannot believe the number of comments here that seems to wipe the concept of swarming off the table and to a degree want to negate a DoD study by RAND off the table.

[Steve Blair]

Jesus guys do some reading and asking--- actually the article was the first sign that someone is starting to understand "open source warfare" (OSW).

Many of us have, and continue to do so, and that's why some folks here are pointing out that there is nothing especially new or unique about "swarming." You might be better served asking why the professional force as a whole seems to have been so surprised by what is essentially a basic form of tribal-based warfare.

Simply creating a new acronym for a technique does not automatically make it either new or unique. Within our own military history framework, any veteran of the Indian Wars could have told you about swarming, and any helicopter pilot from Vietnam could have told you that RPGs are, in fact, a great anti-helicopter weapon. Yet we seem to have to constantly relearn lessons.

[Outlaw 7]

To all---and where you all when the discussion around "swarming" and "open source warfare" (OSW) broke in of all times 2004 WHEN it was how many months after we entered Iraq? Here is a portion of that article.

Tuesday, 18 May 2004
GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING
Swarming tactics have been used successfully in wars throughout history by a variety of organizations from the tribal Parthians (horse archers) to 20th century Germans (U-boats). Global guerrillas (next generation terrorists) will likely use swarming tactics as part of their doctrine. This technique, in combination with new market-based financing techniques is what's called a killer combo.

Definition.
A good place to start an analysis of swarming is Sean Edwards' "Swarming on the Battlefield (PDF downloads). Here's his excellent definition of swarming: a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Benefits.
It's easy to see the advantages of this type of maneuver:


•It cuts the enemy target off from supply and communications.

•It adversely impacts the moral of the target.

•It makes a coordinated defense extremely difficult (resource allocation is intensely difficult).

•It radically increases the potential of surprise.

Types.
Swarming is typically divided into two types:
Massed swarming -- Swarmers begin as a massed unit. They break apart and then swarm on target.
Dispersed swarming -- Units are dispersed (geographically) from the start. Once a target is identified, they converge to attack. This is the most difficult of the two types of swarming to defend against since the attacker never presents a massed target.

Effectiveness.
Historically, swarming is successful only when it scores high in the following areas:


•Elusiveness -- either through mobility or concealment.

•Long range firepower -- standoff capability.

•Superior situational awareness -- having more information about the enemy than they have about you.

Swarming contra infrastructure systems: guerre de course
Given this background, how will global guerrillas use swarming? First, the target for global guerrillas won't be isolated military units but rather urban infrastructure systems. The objective of these attacks will be damage that results in economic attrition. Let's examine how global guerrilla's will leverage swarming tactics to accomplish this objective.

The effectiveness of Global Guerrilla swarmers.
Global guerrilla swarmers will maintain their effectiveness across the vital swarming attributes in the following ways:


•Elusiveness. Global guerrillas attain concealment through anonymity in large urban environments. Reliance on the local population isn't necessary. High degrees of mobility are accomplished by leveraging public transportation networks.

•Superior situational awareness. Open source intelligence is easy to accomplish (via the Internet, the media, and other sources). Further, encrypted global communications, via the Internet, enables global intelligence sharing information sharing. The small size of operational cells limits the potential of discovery and counter-guerrilla intelligence development.

•Standoff attacks. Like many historical swarming attacks, global guerrillas will have significant standoff firepower potential -- the ability to attack from a distance. However, this firepower isn't a traditional weapon, rather, its the global guerrilla's ability to use attacks on infrastructure to impact downstream systems miles (perhaps hundreds of miles) distant. Attacks will be rotated among infrastructures in a modern variant of horse archer tactics.

How global guerrilla swarmers will surmount traditional limits to operations.
Historically, swarmers have been limited by terrain, logistics, and communications. Global guerrillas will not be constrained by these limits. This makes global guerrilla swarming unique to history as can be seen in the attached 2x2 matrix. The upshot is that global guerrillas will be able to conduct dispersed swarming maneuvers on the operational level. Here's how global guerrillas will surmount the traditional limits on swarming:


•Ubiquitous public transportation networks (roads to airlines) enable rapid, low-cost transportation for dispersed units.

•Logistics requirements can be met via open economic transactions and don't require population support. The requirements for operations are relatively limited (damage to infrastructure requires low-tech tools). Additionally, the small size of the cells (~5 people) requires little housing/food/etc and in most cases would fall well below the threshold of detection.

•Real-time, anonymous, wireless communications (both data and voice -- VoIP, e-mail, Web, cellphones, etc.) enable global guerrillas to coordinate dispersed operations on the operational level. Tactical operations will be of a conventional type, typically by a single unit or individual.

[Outlaw 7]

To all---a challenge to the readers here.

ASK any current BCT or BN or for that matter any Company Cmdr located currently in Iraq or Afghanistan for their definition of "swarming".

THEN wait for the blank stares and THEN listen to the comment "never heard anything about it".

AND why do we waste then massive amounts of money on CALL if we do not learn from the previous experiences of ie the 1st CAV in Diyala or the beatings we recently took on two Afghan COP attacks ALL of which were "swarming" attacks.

WHAT does it take to be recognized as a formal battle tactic with you all?

[Ken White]

'recognizing an old tactic being used currently as something that should not be a surprise...' with 'Failure to recognize a tactic.'

The two are not the same thing.

You might also search the Threads here before criticizing. John Robb and Arquila, swarming and open source warfare, generational warfare or not, have all been cussed and discussed here a good many times over the last few years. Nothing you have posted to date is particularly revelatory or new to most here. It's not that we aren't aware, it is simply that we don't agree. That should be acceptable.

[Outlaw 7]

Ken---being cussed and discussed and found of no interest is WHAT the great answer to members of Allied/US military killed or wounded by a tactic that a discussion group deems of no interest?

LOOK at any of the CTC's training scenarios since 2007---NOT a single "swarming" event--I would say that flys in the face of reality but it might seem to some here as "not deemed of interest".

I look for the open and deep discussion of what is occurring and why we are failing and we are failing in Afghanistan to occur, but maybe this location is the wrong place for that--for to look at failure means one is willing to challenge and challenge hard current doctrine but maybe that is not in the DNA of this blog site.

WHY is it that much of the latest open discussions are in fact occuring outside of blogs like this and and are not occuring inside the military or defense contracting world?

EXAMPLE: Take the Pakistani LTC article released here on SWJ which really challenges current US reporting and in fact states the country is covered by 98% of a Taliban shadow government and is fighting a phase 2/3 Mao style guerrilla war AND a massive discussion breaks out on is swarming or is it not a valid "tactic."

I can see why a large number of military personnel no longer return to this site

[politicsbyothermeans]

I'm doing about ten things at once here but I'm just thinking about it (swarming) when it really isn't a tactic at all. Specifically, I'm thinking about Mogadishu.

The concept of "flash mobs" is not new to the cultural underground in many first world countries. Flash mobs have many of the same characteristics of the "new" concept of swarming, save they generally don't result in violence.

And the things they have in common is robust and redundant communication and a lack of centralized leadership. Localized leadership, yes, but no real centralized leadership and I'm wondering if that is a vulnerability or a strength.

[William F. Owen]

To all---and where you all when the discussion around "swarming" and "open source warfare" (OSW) broke in of all times 2004 WHEN it was how many months after we entered Iraq? Here is a portion of that article.

Tuesday, 18 May 2004
GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING

...and? That article is mostly wrong.
Swarming is merely what multiple attacks looks like to an observer who has a very limited view point. Nothing new here.
The Mongols were described as "hordes" for the same reason, and they explicitly did not "swarm" or do anything like it.

[Steve Blair]

I look for the open and deep discussion of what is occurring and why we are failing and we are failing in Afghanistan to occur, but maybe this location is the wrong place for that--for to look at failure means one is willing to challenge and challenge hard current doctrine but maybe that is not in the DNA of this blog site.

WHY is it that much of the latest open discussions are in fact occuring outside of blogs like this and and are not occuring inside the military or defense contracting world?

I can see why a large number of military personnel no longer return to this site

I'd second Ken's challenge to review older threads on this site before you start accusing folks here of "not challenging current doctrine." I'd also repeat what I said earlier and what some others have said in different ways: this is nothing new. Swarming...horde tactics...flash mobs...it's nothing new and has been around for as long as there have been tribal-based groups that function in conflicts in that way. Maybe RAND has just 'discovered' it again, but that does not make it new.

What I would say, and have said before, is that the Army seems determined to relearn almost every small wars lesson the hard way...and has manifested this particular training defect since before Vietnam. It accelerated after VN to be sure, but the trend had been there before. As a student of history this particular blind spot concerns me a great deal, but it appears to be built into the institution's DNA...and has been since before the Civil War.

How do you deal with "swarms"? If our own military history is any guide, you focus on being VERY solid at the basic tactical levels and develop strong unit solidarity and integrity. Rotating units as units and not individual replacements is a good start for unit integrity, but training is a different matter.

Those are just starters.

[Fuchs]

The irritating thing about swarms is the manoeuvre à priori approach instead of manoeuvre à posteriori. This simply doesn't fit well to a new tactical fashion.

Why are swarms supposed to attack from multiple directions at once, again and again?
This adds predictability, synchronization challenges (high demand for communication) and includes multiple attacks on strong points (instead of only weak spots).

It made sense with sub wolfpacks, but it doesn't in general.

Why not all-round probing coupled with exploitation of opportunities instead? Too slow?



Btw. I still don't think that swarming theory is nothing new. The stuff has been done at times, but swarming is NOT covered by orthodox military theory. Even corps-level military theory is at most about relatively few units/formations converging - and march divided, fight united isn't a good enough match. Even the termination of pockets is no good match.



There's nothing wrong with developing some new military theories even if there's almost no historical example. It's a good idea to develop theory first before testing something in practice. The mere thought about a new theory is a worthy exercise in a time of very outdated or very limited full out modern war experiences.

On the other hand I wouldn't call every terrorist attack with more than one strike in a time window of a few minutes "swarming".

[Ron Humphrey]

The irritating thing about swarms is the manoeuvre à priori approach instead of manoeuvre à posteriori. This simply doesn't fit well to a new tactical fashion.

Why are swarms supposed to attack from multiple directions at once, again and again?
This adds predictability, synchronization challenges (high demand for communication) and includes multiple attacks on strong points (instead of only weak spots).

It made sense with sub wolfpacks, but it doesn't in general.

Why not all-round probing coupled with exploitation of opportunities instead? Too slow?

IMH Unedumacated Opine ion
Simplest answer to that is sorta what Ken said earlier in this thread in response to one of my posts

That's not to say that swarms won't work, just that the fates must be kind and the reliability of effective action is unlikely to be adequate to satisfy most commanders or politicians -- the human factor (on the part of the Swarmers, the Swarmees and their respective bosses... ).

Ill add to that that to me the probing you speak of vs. swarming in at least the full blown do it right kinda thing would be like the difference in a blind man finding the cracks through touch vs someone with sight seeking the signs of weathering which might lead to cracks.

Both very well could find,fix,and finish the key would be how to recognize which one you were doing and when.

Btw. I still don't think that swarming theory is nothing new. The stuff has been done at times, but swarming is NOT covered by orthodox military theory. Even corps-level military theory is at most about relatively few units/formations converging - and march divided, fight united isn't a good enough match. Even the termination of pockets is no good match.



There's nothing wrong with developing some new military theories even if there's almost no historical example. It's a good idea to develop theory first before testing something in practice. The mere thought about a new theory is a worthy exercise in a time of very outdated or very limited full out modern war experiences.

On the other hand I wouldn't call every terrorist attack with more than one strike in a time window of a few minutes "swarming".

The nothing new is true; however there is the context that no one ever has been where and in the circumstances of what they are now.(not exactly)

I might however be so bold as to suggest that a certain form of swarming in a somewhat germane to the discussion form has been seen recently in some of natures big blows.

Try comparing those oranges and pears
(Disasters / Wars)(recovery/response/prosecution,etc)