Afghanistan: Sealing the deal in the "build" phase?

[MikeF]

From the conventional perspective, as far as phases of a counter-insurgency go in the lifecycle of a small war, Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer probably best defines what an external actor is trying to accomplish in supporting the host nation (SF community would take a different approach all together*). Simultaneously, the guerilla is attempting to shape, clear, hold, and build to replace the host nation in an effort to gain territory and overtime secure control. In other words, that's the rules of the game. Within this model, several decision points are reached if the insurgency is not quelled as introduced in various essays in SWJ:

1. Break Point- point at which the guerilla overtakes the gov't creating a denied area. (McCormick, NPS).

2. Tipping Point- point at which the local populace turns against the insurgency or actions/greivances of the shadow government outweigh those of the host nation. (Anbar, Maj Neil Smith, COL MacFarland).

3. Point of Intervention- External actor (US and coalition) act to retake denied area.

4. Transition Point- Point at which external actor regains control, population is effectively seperated from insurgency, and host nation is capable of retaking ownership for governance and security (A'stan RC-East, MAJ Nate Springer).

So what is build and when can we transition? The easy answer is that it depends, and it's based off METT-TC. The hard answer is that I don't know. Ultimately, this model is an untested theory, and we don't know if it will work.

Here's two remarks from guys much smarter than me that better describe the real issues in the equation.

From David Donovan's website (Once a Warrior King):

Q: Do your experiences in Vietnam speak to the counterinsurgency effort being made today in Iraq and Afghanistan?
A: Absolutely. Anyone having read OWK would have been able to anticipate the difficulties imposed by cultural and religious differences when a western country goes to war against a country in the east. They should have known that local corruption would be a cancer eating at the heart of any effort to rebuild or reconstitute such a country. They should also have known that westernized elites from those countries often over-promise the democratic tendencies of their more traditionalist countrymen. Also, the traditions of tribe or village over country are difficult for westerners to give credence to, yet they are a part of the experience discussed in OWK. On the other hand, for the soldiers, especially soldier-advisors, in the current conflicts, I hope the incidents, emotions, and methods mentioned in the book can be some sort of guide. What is now called “asymmetric war” is at its heart counterinsurgency. It is small-unit, in-the-bushes warfare conducted in an atmosphere where winning the approval, even the affection of locals is vital to success. OWK is the story of one such war in one village, but its application, I think, is much more general.

From SWC's own MarcT

Let me just make a short comment on the theoretician (social scientist) vs. practitioner (military) note. All too often, IMO, we (Anthropologists / Social Scientists) classify some entire range of action as “Bad”, so “obviously” we should have nothing to do with it. This shows up clearly in the lackm of debate and common understanding of what “Harm” means in a context of ethics. “Harm”, at least in the discursive tradition I grew up in, is not the same as “hurt”, and “critical analysis” should not be a synonym for “you hurt my feelings! Wah, wah wah!”.

I truly believe that many social scientists have lost that intimate connection both with lived reality and with a transcendent ideal that characterized Boaz. We seem to have forgotten that Boaz held “science” (actually, the Baconian ideal of a via negativa form of science) as a transcendent ideal, and that one of our “missions” as scientists and Anthropologists was to come as close to ultimate “truth” as we could, always knowing that we would fail. As scientists, at least according to my reading of Boaz, we were required to produce our best understanding of “Truth” based on what we actually observed and saw. A critical component of that lay in our own, personal development and throwing away of preconceptions. Like the military, we were supposed to take what we observed, analyze it, and come to our best “solution”; and, if that meant attacking an institution, a power broker, or whatever, we had a moral imperative to do so.

All of this is a round-about way of getting at your last comment: most of the military folks I know want to make people’s lives “better”. That may be based on screwed up assumptions of what “better” means, but I have only met one person who didn’t want to do so out of the hundreds of military folks I know.

In the end, we're testing how much we can help others. IMO, one can only help someone that asks or wants to be helped. Additionally, we have to really question whether or not we are qualified to help. Is our solution "better" than the status quo?

v/r

Mike

*Under FID and the traditional SF indirect model, they would not take control. Instead, the would only assist the Host Nation to conduct COIN.