WHAM in Afghanistan: a report on development aid in COIN ops

[Steve the Planner]

I know this is not being applied in the current realm of strategy but William R. Polk's recent article in The Nation speaks to the organic "governance" structure of Afghanistan---the road not travelled.

Actually, for me, and perhaps many on this site, it positively points to actual locally-appliable solutions that seem to be at odds with our confusing mumbo-jumbo about linking to, and supporting extension of a corrupt and predatory government down to the people.

Back to jirgas and shuras. (Start over)

Legitimation Crisis in Afghanistan

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100419/polk/1

[Dayuhan]

Back to jirgas and shuras. (Start over)

If only we could just start over...

The Karzai government, like the proverbial elephant in the drawing room, exists. It will seek, with a vigor worthy of a better cause, to perpetuate its existence... in fact that's probably the only thing it will do with any vigor or any efficiency. It won't vanish in a puff of smoke just because we decide that setting it up wasn't such a great idea. It will do all in its power to derail any effort that might compromise its position or profitability.

It's a problem. If we could go back and start over, we'd have an easy solution, but unless DoD has a time machine hidden somewhere, that's not an option.

[Schmedlap]

If only we could just start over...

The Karzai government, like the proverbial elephant in the drawing room, exists. It will seek, with a vigor worthy of a better cause, to perpetuate its existence... in fact that's probably the only thing it will do with any vigor or any efficiency. It won't vanish in a puff of smoke just because we decide that setting it up wasn't such a great idea. It will do all in its power to derail any effort that might compromise its position or profitability.

Cheer up. It ain't so bad.

Most, if not all, of what you typed could be said about our own government in the US. Nothing but graft and corruption to keep elected officials and bureaucrats entrenched in power and/or assured of job security and prestige. The advantage in Afghanistan is that Karzai does not have the support of nearly as many well-funded and well-connected interest groups as our elected individuals do. I'd say Afghanistan is more workable because, in ISAF, we have a comparatively large, well-funded, and comparatively efficient organization to act as a check against him.

[Dayuhan]

Cheer up. It ain't so bad.

Most, if not all, of what you typed could be said about our own government in the US. Nothing but graft and corruption to keep elected officials and bureaucrats entrenched in power and/or assured of job security and prestige. The advantage in Afghanistan is that Karzai does not have the support of nearly as many well-funded and well-connected interest groups as our elected individuals do

I'm cheerful as can be... I can afford to be, I'm not in Afghanistan!

The US Government has its share of issues; all governments do. It functions, though, and Karzai's doesn't, a substantial difference. And while the blocs supporting, manipulating, and profiting from Karzai's presence may not be nearly as large on the absolute level as American interest groups, they carry a fair bit of weight in their own pond.

I'd say Afghanistan is more workable because, in ISAF, we have a comparatively large, well-funded, and comparatively efficient organization to act as a check against him.

Kinda sucks if ISAF has to divert its resources to the task of acting as a check on the Karzai government... don't they have a few other problems they're supposed to be managing?

I do get the feeling that in creating this government we spawned a bit of a monster, that it's more a part of the problem than a part of the solution, and that we've added a major obstacle to a process that already had more than its share of obstacles.

It probably is better than I think, though that's not saying much!

[davidbfpo]

Colonel Dan Roper, US Army CAC and a sponsor of the Wilton Park conference has added his comments - via SWJ Blog - on the CAC blog:http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/co...d-in-coin.aspx

He makes an interesting comment:

After engaging with a number of conference experts, I would offer my personal perception that the term “Winning Hearts and Minds” may inadvertently hinder our efforts in counterinsurgency environments. The somewhat lofty rhetoric associated with this slogan may contribute to undisciplined application of aid in order to buy happiness and goodwill, when, at its essence, COIN is not about happiness and goodwill or people liking us; it is about trust, confidence, and legitimacy.

There is a link to a BBC radio discussion on the CAC website.

[William F. Owen]

This is painful.

• The idea that "development" is part of Irregular Warfare is rubbish and always has been. It's a POP-COIN fallacy.
• Why are we still saying "Hearts and Minds?"

Around and around.

[Chris jM]

[*]Why are we still saying "Hearts and Minds?"

Why? Because the concept of 'hearts and minds' is conventional wisdom within militaries. It is taught by the hierarchy as gospel, and very few people think through the causes and consequences of the concept.

I know that, before I started reading SWJ, I had considered it to be true and had never doubted the wisdom of the approach. It took a number of debates being read through, time spent in ISAF and participation in the argument before I changed my thoughts on the subject.

'Hearts and minds' is a concept that is easily acceptable, politically expedient (i.e. easy to sell to the media and one's own government) and sounds, on the surface at least, logical. Throw in the 'as history shows' comment by referencing success in Malaya as being brought about by a good 'hearts and minds' campaign and there is very little need to doubt or question the concept. Also, 'hearts and minds' is an exceedingly easy way of 'teaching' population-centric COIN as it currently stands in doctrine.

Rage against it, but 'hearts and minds' is a dominant (driving?) part of popular military thought right now. Rubbish it may be, but it's like that cheap and tacky paper-back author who keeps on hanging around - sometimes success is driven by appealing to the lowest common denominator.

Great find with regards to the article. I just wish that I had access to this at the very start of the year!