Wilf:

Nail on the head.

In Iraq in 2007/8 there was a simple mission with a simple objective (end our involvement/turnover to the Iraqis) pursued by two primary elements/people (Crocker/Petreaus) with a common purpose and objective.

If someone believes that the US and West have a continuing governmental interest beyond just a "graceful withdrawal" from Iraq, I would invite them to demonstrate the evidence of that. Sure, we will have some substantial interests, maybe including going in again, but not now.

If we define the mission in Afghanistan as simply to keeping the Taliban from gaining power by force of arms, perhaps we are on track---persistent, continuous deployments, drones, and "village" battles (Marjah, etc.---every six months, a new village to mow the grass in). (Note that that is a far step beyond defeating/destabilizing AQ)

Question is: Whether we can find a "sustainable" and cost-effective approach that is not grounded in huge deployments, great peril and loss of life, billions of effort, and, creates an enduring foundation for self-generated sustainment of an Afghan civilian system that does not invite support (from some population areas) for continuing Taliban-related conflict and destabilization, protects its (sometimes ill-defined) borders, and substantially "controls" its ungovernable spaces?

The confusing mission "leap" (not creep) into defining the above solution as somehow or another springing from, and dependent on, the Karzai regime, and our ability to make them a modern, effective governing regime with a full and complete "writ of government" extended down to the relevant districts, seems to be the Achilles Heel in the latest chapters in western engagement in Afghanistan.

Are there other definitions, solution boxes? Yes.

Are they in the analytical works?