The Wikileaks collection

[braun]

Obviously, I wasn't there. But I think this incident boils down to this:

The helos were operating in an area of Baghdad which was at the time, a hotspot of AIF activity - an insurgent safe haven is how it has been described to me by folks who were there.

Allegedly US forces had gotten into a contact earlier near the same area, and the Apaches were there for overwatch.

The Apache IDs a group of military-aged males with what appear to be weapons. Indeed, along with the camera equipment carried by the journos, I spotted at least two AKs carried by other men in the group. One of the military-aged males trains a "weapon" in the direction of US ground troops a couple of hundred metres away (and out of frame).

Apache crews ask for permission to engage. Permission is granted. The group of men is engaged.

That is how it started and up to this point IMO it was a righteous decision based on information the Apache crew had at the time. As for the excitable nature of the helo crews... they were doing their job, taking out what they thought were insurgents. They were doing exactly what they should have been doing in order to protect the groundpounders.

I'm not going to comment on the van incident where the children were wounded - that would involve looking at OPSEC material and commenting on it - a no-no regardless of whether the ROE is "historical" or not. I will ask this question - Is it worth destroying a civilian vehicle which is clearly being used to evac a wounded man simply because they MIGHT" be recovering a shot-up AK or two?

I don't like the cut in the video before the hellfire strike on the building - From the comms chatter it appears that a group of insurgents had been tracked to that building. If that's so, then who were the men who were lit up in the first part of the video? 3 missiles to take out a building in a residential area? That whole segment is out of context and proves nothing to me except that the Apache crew had no qualms about incurring collateral damage (civilians near the building).

I believe the video was suppressed by the US DoD and it is going to bite them back - big time.

Yesterday's mad scramble to post the docs up on the Centcom FOI page is clear evidence of either a culture of cover up or total bureaucratic incompetence. Once the initial investigations were over, they could have released this material along with an apology to Reuters and the families of it's employees who were killed, and avoided some of the unpleasantness.

I swear, sometimes the US (and Australian) mil headshed act like freakin' naughty children. Each time there is a backbone failure like this, the more locals get off the fence and pick up a weapon.

[Danny]

Braun makes interesting comments. I am intrigued by them. I guess I have refined my position a bit after studying this more. If it can be shown that this incident violates the ROE, I am at a loss to know why.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2010/...of-engagement/

In order to avoid the charge of driving visits to my site, I will post my position below. For links, you will have to go to my site - sorry.

Following up from the Wikileaks release of the so-called Collateral Murder video there has been a firestorm of activity over both the internet and television. One self-proclaimed intelligence expert claims that the actions of the Apache pilots violated the rules of engagement.

Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer … said that based on what he saw in the video, it appeared to be a violation of the military’s Rules of Engagement.

“First rule is, you may engage persons who commit hostile acts or show hostile intent by minimum force necessary,” he said. “Minimum force is necessary. If you see eight armed men, the first thing I would think as an intelligence officer is, ‘How can we take these guys and capture them?’ We don’t want to kill people arbitrarily; we want the intel take.

“Now, most importantly, when you see that van show up to take away the wounded, do not target or strike anyone who has surrendered or is out of combat due to sickness or wounds. So, the wound part of that I find disturbing, being that you clearly have people down, you have people on the way there. Speaking as an intelligence officer, my intent is to capture people, to recover them. That is the idea here. If you’re not really doing that, you’re not really doing precise combat.”

This is a misdirection play. The former intelligence officer was first addressing the issue of violation of the ROE, then switched to the issue of what he would like to see in order to categorize this as precise combat, i.e., capture and intelligence recovery. He offers us no evidence that the actions violated the ROE. He says it and moves on to his pet issues.

There is ample evidence that the actions did not violate the ROE. There are three categories under which these insurgents could have been targeted: (1) TIC (troops in contact) / self defense, (2) deliberate targeting, and finally (3) TST (time sensitive targets).

The AR 15-6 investigation into this incident points out that:

The cameraman raises the camera to sight through the viewfinder and his action appears prompts (sic) one of the pilots to remark “He’s getting ready to fire.” Photos later recovered from the camera show a U.S. Army HMMWV sitting at an intersection, less than 100 meters away from the camera. The digital time/date stamp on the photo indicates that these photos were the ones taken as the cameraman peered from behind the wall. Due to the furtive nature of his movements, the cameraman gave every appearance of preparing to fire an RPG on U.S. Soldiers.

So the actions meet the definition of self defense in the ROE. Next, there is an earlier version of the rules of engagement which has a larger list of potential targets in the deliberate targeting category.

There are six types of preplanned target sets: (1) Non-military elements of former regime command and control and associated facilities, (2) WMD storage facilities, (3) Iraqi infrastructure and Iraqi economic objects, (4) Terrorists, (5) Iraqi lines of communication, and (6) Facilities (associated with Designated Terrorists or Declared Hostile Forces).

But the 2007 revision of the ROE had at least the following list: members of designated terrorist organizations and facilities associated with DTOs. It goes on to list certain DTOs, and as a side bar comment, it isn’t clear to me why Ansar al Sunna isn’t specifically called out. But that has nothing per se to do with this incident, and “other groups or terrorist organizations” covers this operation.

Finally, time sensitive targets (for which there is insufficient time to gain formal authorization) covers the kills at the location of the van which showed up to recover the bodies.

To be sure, this video can be disturbing to those who do not understand that war means enacting and enforcing violence, and can be equally disturbing to those who have had to do so either in Iraq or Afghanistan. Memories can be difficult things. It’s always better in retrospect to learn that the targets you acquired and killed were indeed threats against U.S. forces. This is true in this instance except for two very stupid Reuters journalists embedded with insurgents, and two unfortunate children (who, by the way, lived) who should never have been brought into combat by some very stupid – and dead – insurgents.

[Rex Brynen]

The AR 15-6 investigation into this incident points out that:

The cameraman raises the camera to sight through the viewfinder and his action appears prompts (sic) one of the pilots to remark “He’s getting ready to fire.” Photos later recovered from the camera show a U.S. Army HMMWV sitting at an intersection, less than 100 meters away from the camera. The digital time/date stamp on the photo indicates that these photos were the ones taken as the cameraman peered from behind the wall. Due to the furtive nature of his movements, the cameraman gave every appearance of preparing to fire an RPG on U.S. Soldiers.

Danny is absolutely right to highlight this--it is the crux of any assessment of the initial decision to engage.

The helicopters had a TIC report. They had IDed weapons on the scene (in this, they were correct--although they also mistook cameras for weapons), and IDed an RPG at the scene (and again, although they misidentified the cameraman as having one, there was an RPG found on scene).

This is the photo that the cameraman was taking when the helicopter requested permission to fire:


(h/t, The Jawa Report)

Given that at the time the helicopters believed this to be an RPG, it is hard to see why they wouldn't have engaged the target--because if it had been, that could have been one dead Humvee.

As I mentioned earlier, it is the later decision to enagage the van that was problematic (IMHO)--not the initial decision to shoot.

[Steve the Planner]

In Spring 2008 in Bayji, north of Tikrit, the Salah ad Din governor's teenage son went on a sleepover with some of his frat buddies from school.

A noise was heard outside at night, so the boys grabbed the family AK and went outside---fired up and dead. Very sad.

Nobody was wrong. Everybody was right. But you mix military with civilians, and stuff is going to happen.

I was heartened by Bing West's recent NYT piece. Drop the COIN thing. Go in, clear, hold, turn over to Afghan military/police as rapidly as possible. Let Afghans build if they want to (later).

In the meantime, redirect all US aid around the central government to the places where we determine it will do good. Creating a new and better Afghanistan not part of the mission.

No mystery, no games, no nation-building. Less likelihood of soldiers doing civilian police patrols, and IEDed while doing public works projects. That's where this bad stuff can be trimmed back. WHAM-Bang (or Bing).

I was glad he got a chance to put fresh, independent eyes on Marjah.