Aviation in COIN (merged thread)

[Sylvan]

1. Know the ETTs and PMTs and make sure they know you.
The ANP are going to be in more TICs than anybody. If your local PMT calls and asks you to help out, try your best to do so.
2. Don't use flechettes in orchards. That where kids hide during firefights. PID PID PID PID PID PID.
3. 30mm sucks in soft dirt. Just an FYI.
4. Before laying scunion, try to ensure a ground manuever element will be able to conduct BDA on that site. Everytime you engage, mark the 10 digit grid and relay via BFT or FM to the ground manuever element.
5. Not everybody carries a compass anymore (their fault, not yours). When relaying directions to ground elements, try to orient based on their positions. "To your 3 O'Clock"
Instead of "To the Southeast"
6. Educate the people using your support. Let them know how long it takes to get a crew up and how long they can loiter in support.
7. Get some soccer balls and kick them out over kids. Make sure they are inflated, haji don't have needles.
8. Use "Wait Out" when talking with your aviation bosses on the other net or on the ground net. I would get frustrated when I couldn't talk to air because I forgot they also have more than one net to monitor.
9. I can not express to you the frustration felt when as senior ground commander I PID'd a target and relayed and the apaches didn't fire. Fire/don't fire is made by the man on scene. Your TOC rats better understand that or there will be harsh words.
10. PID again. If you are unsure, let the guy walk and let the ground manuever element deal with it.
11. Make sure you have every possible frequency for every ground element out there. Make sure that your primary command freq is known by every ground element so they can make initial contact. This was never a problem with rotary, but we sometimes couldn't establish contact with fixed.
12. In a big TIC, you will go winchester or bingo before teh fight is over. Push out the initial QRF and start prepping the next one.
13. Out of my league, but door gunners are pretty good CAS. There was a lot of hesitancy to use slicks for CAS, but blackhawks are better than nothing. The eyes in the sky at least help.
14. I honestly never had an issue with MEDEVAC. ON time and on target. Big brass ones.

[Ken White]

5. Not everybody carries a compass anymore (their fault, not yours). When relaying directions to ground elements, try to orient based on their positions. "To your 3 O'Clock"
Instead of "To the Southeast".

Totally understand the problem and where you're coming from but the far better solution is for the troops on the ground to have better situational awareness and a sense of direction. That means looking at their GPS, carrying the dumb compass, noting where the sun is (in the Stan, it'll always be south of you, comes up in the east, moves 15 degrees an hour and goes down in the west. At 1200 local standard time will be directly overhead). Stars are available at night, ridge lines are oriented in some direction. Streambeds, even if intermittent or even if the creeks are dry, are on the Map more to show you where low ground is than they are to show you water. Plenty of ways to get there. There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard...

I do know the difficulties but it's a training issue that can be easily solved. Use of "Your 3 o'clock" is better than nothing but can be disastrous if a guy is facing 180 degrees away from what looks like or should be his orientation -- or the guy hearing and reacting is not the guy you're talking to.

In this case, it's better for the Aviation support to force the cardinal directions on the ground guys. As you say, it's the ground pounders fault, not the airplane drivers...

[JMA]

Totally understand the problem and where you're coming from but the far better solution is for the troops on the ground to have better situational awareness and a sense of direction. That means looking at their GPS, carrying the dumb compass, noting where the sun is (in the Stan, it'll always be south of you, comes up in the east, moves 15 degrees an hour and goes down in the west. At 1200 local standard time will be directly overhead). Stars are available at night, ridge lines are oriented in some direction. Streambeds, even if intermittent or even if the creeks are dry, are on the Map more to show you where low ground is than they are to show you water. Plenty of ways to get there. There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard...

I do know the difficulties but it's a training issue that can be easily solved. Use of "Your 3 o'clock" is better than nothing but can be disastrous if a guy is facing 180 degrees away from what looks like or should be his orientation -- or the guy hearing and reacting is not the guy you're talking to.

In this case, it's better for the Aviation support to force the cardinal directions on the ground guys. As you say, it's the ground pounders fault, not the airplane drivers...

May I suggest that where the air support is integral to the ground force unit/formation and working with the troops everyday simple left/right and clock face directions would be fine. If the support from people you have not worked with before then standard FAC (forward air controller) procedures need to be followed if only to ensure he doesn't put his load on your head.

[Ken White]

...where the air support is integral to the ground force unit/formation and working with the troops everyday simple left/right and clock face directions would be fine.

If it were, I'd agree. Our problem is that other than the Marines who do have integral air to an extent -- but only to an extent and even they may often get support from the Dutch, the French, The British, or an unfamiliar US Army or Air Force element. Our rotation and centralized control / pooling system mean that the likelihood of dedicated or familiar support for most units most of the time is very slim.

If the support from people you have not worked with before then standard FAC (forward air controller) procedures need to be followed if only to ensure he doesn't put his load on your head.

True. However, the issue to me is not air support, it is one of training quality (and ours is poor... ). As I said "There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard." I'll add that "everyone" includes IMO Joe the rifleman with less than a year of service. People will say that's asking too much. No, it is not. And you don't ask for it, you demand it -- the vast majority of the kids are more than capable of doing it.

It's simply a matter of competence for worst case situations. Best case stuff is good but you cannot rely on it in most combat and you positively cannot in major combat operations or mobile armored or mechanized warfare.

[Bob's World]

From my recent experience the two biggest causes of innocent casualties on the battlefield are:

1. "Warning Shots/escalation of force" gone bad by soldiers manning a guardpost or rear of a convoy; and

2. Aviators cursing the roads looking for IED emplacers at night.


For the first one we really need non-lethal weapons. Knock that rider of his motorcycle with a beanbag from your 203 rather than a 3-round burst of 5.56. I don't blame these guys for these events, they have to make a snap decision that affects the lives of them and their mates, they just don't have the right tool for the job. These events happen ALL THE TIME.

For the aviators, some battle space owner or nearby ODA gets a call on the radio from the pilot that they have PID on 3 men emplacing IEDs on a road some 8 KM away from their position, can they have permission to engage. Too often that man on the ground says "yes, and thanks." Until he goes out the following morning to conduct BDA and finds an angry village and 3 dead kids. The guy on the ground gets hammered for mistake.

Changing the strategy from "defeat the insurgent" to "protect the populace" didn't make the battlefield less dangerous, but is requiring a change of mindset that slowly catching up as to what a change that significant really means. Aviation in COIN will save your life; but without proper controls is apt to create strategic setbacks that are virtually impossible to recover from. Making pilots more responsible for the results of their engagements may help; getting rid of "PID" as a green light to fire (It can mean so many things that it is more confusing than helpful), would help. Personally I like "Reasonable Suspicion" (check it out, bring assets in, etc) and "Probable Cause" (man on ground can engage; but if he wants to employ air to ground or perhaps indirect fire he needs a finding of probable cause from a commander at some pre-determined level. Just like a Cop can stop, arrest, or search based on certain assessments; but must go to the DA and a Judge if the situation requires a warrant).

There’s no easy answer. Casualties in Afghanistan currently are higher per capita of troops on the ground than they were at the peak in Iraq, and fighting season isn't here yet.

[JMA]

From my recent experience the two biggest causes of innocent casualties on the battlefield are:

1. "Warning Shots/escalation of force" gone bad by soldiers manning a guardpost or rear of a convoy; and

2. Aviators cursing the roads looking for IED emplacers at night.


For the first one we really need non-lethal weapons. Knock that rider of his motorcycle with a beanbag from your 203 rather than a 3-round burst of 5.56. I don't blame these guys for these events, they have to make a snap decision that affects the lives of them and their mates, they just don't have the right tool for the job. These events happen ALL THE TIME.

For the aviators, some battle space owner or nearby ODA gets a call on the radio from the pilot that they have PID on 3 men emplacing IEDs on a road some 8 KM away from their position, can they have permission to engage. Too often that man on the ground says "yes, and thanks." Until he goes out the following morning to conduct BDA and finds an angry village and 3 dead kids. The guy on the ground gets hammered for mistake.

Changing the strategy from "defeat the insurgent" to "protect the populace" didn't make the battlefield less dangerous, but is requiring a change of mindset that slowly catching up as to what a change that significant really means. Aviation in COIN will save your life; but without proper controls is apt to create strategic setbacks that are virtually impossible to recover from. Making pilots more responsible for the results of their engagements may help; getting rid of "PID" as a green light to fire (It can mean so many things that it is more confusing than helpful), would help. Personally I like "Reasonable Suspicion" (check it out, bring assets in, etc) and "Probable Cause" (man on ground can engage; but if he wants to employ air to ground or perhaps indirect fire he needs a finding of probable cause from a commander at some pre-determined level. Just like a Cop can stop, arrest, or search based on certain assessments; but must go to the DA and a Judge if the situation requires a warrant).

There’s no easy answer. Casualties in Afghanistan currently are higher per capita of troops on the ground than they were at the peak in Iraq, and fighting season isn't here yet.

I would have thought that given the IED threat the amount of military road movement would have been reduced considerably. If you send convoys down roads expecting to be blown up you must accept a build up of nervous 'trigger happy' energy and if provoked at the right time and place can cause significant collateral damage to achieve the Taliban aim of alienating the populace from the troops.

[JMA]

If it were, I'd agree. Our problem is that other than the Marines who do have integral air to an extent -- but only to an extent and even they may often get support from the Dutch, the French, The British, or an unfamiliar US Army or Air Force element. Our rotation and centralized control / pooling system mean that the likelihood of dedicated or familiar support for most units most of the time is very slim.

Good for the Marines. How do they do it and does it work?

How often do units in the field require or call for air support? If you can get a chopper overhead can he not talk the fixed wing on to the targets?

True. However, the issue to me is not air support, it is one of training quality (and ours is poor... ). As I said "There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard." I'll add that "everyone" includes IMO Joe the rifleman with less than a year of service. People will say that's asking too much. No, it is not. And you don't ask for it, you demand it -- the vast majority of the kids are more than capable of doing it.

It's simply a matter of competence for worst case situations. Best case stuff is good but you cannot rely on it in most combat and you positively cannot in major combat operations or mobile armored or mechanized warfare.

I suppose the sheer scale of troop deployments into Afghanistan make it near impossible to have coordinated pre deployment training in the US and/or orientation training in Afghanistan before going operational.

Then perhaps the other issue may be that rotation is by whole squadron being relieved by a fresh (completely raw) replacement squadron from the US thus ensuring there is no continuity and no means to pass on experience gained to newcomers.

Like a rotation of a battalion would be out with the one that is just starting to get the idea and in with a brand new inexperienced one with absolutely no understanding of local conditions. Now what if fate hands out a card which places a brand new company in a situation where a brand new squadron (probably from another NATO country) comes overhead to support. That is a truly worrisome situation for all concerned.

I can begin to understand why the Marines want to keep it all in the family in Helmand so to speak. It makes perfect sense.

[Ken White]

...Now what if fate hands out a card which places a brand new company in a situation where a brand new squadron (probably from another NATO country) comes overhead to support. That is a truly worrisome situation for all concerned.

Not terribly worrisome but it is a constant and it does have some minor adverse impacts.

I can begin to understand why the Marines want to keep it all in the family in Helmand so to speak. It makes perfect sense.

Yep, makes sense. Also more effective. Unfortunately, it's costly and not terribly 'efficient.' We're bigger on efficiency than we are on effectiveness.

The Marines are able to pull it off by dint of being fairly small but mostly by having a strong support group in the US Congress; the other services also have them but the Marines assiduously cultivate theirs and it has awesome power, enough to fight off those of the other forces...

I digress. Why we value efficiency over effectiveness I've never really understood.

My wife says it's about money -- but then she for some odd objects to my proposal to buy a certain additional weapon, not from any pressing current requirement but because it works really well and just in case I might need it...

[Razorback0505]

Many Air Force General Officers have a tendency to present themselves more as corporate defenders than defenders of their nation. Perhaps the author's intentions are well intentioned, but the tone of this article indicates otherwise. While I agree that the Air Force does play a critical role, and could do more, especially on the non-kinetic side, this article reads like a plea to justify their continued budget on kinetic capabilities (I support that too, but not using COIN to justify it). To accuse a muddy boots officer who was on the front lines as a division commander of ringing his hands over collateral damage clearly marks the words of someone who doesn't understand the principles of COIN, and is clearly attempting to undermine the author of the doctrine.

Hopefully the Young Turks coming up through the Air Force ranks will eventually transform a service that is badly in need of reform. This reminds me of the same mentality that General Motors's management displayed when they ignored the new competition and changes in the market, and they simply tried to discredit the truth until they were ousted.

Any concept or doctrine that does not celebrate the primacy of kinetic airpower gets this treatment. Regrettably, the USAF is run by fighter pilots. More regretable is that the true USAF heroes of OEF/OIF, the ISR bubbas, the C-130, c-17, tanker sticks, and PJs will likely never get their due because the majority of their officers are still drinking the EBO kool-aid that is the same tired Lemay-style airpower argument. The corporation sees their dreams of even more obscene budgets blowing away with the winds of national strategic and/or operational utility. The corporate air force are the ones who are wringing their hands, not General Petraeus.

[Razorback0505]

Couldn't agree more LawVol. Can anyone tell me where the USAF has "proven they can operate in a supported component role"? This is more of the same corporate spin to keep the money for fighters program going. I wish the AF was half as worried about doing the job that supported commands required as they are about protecting and expanding their own service rice bowl.

[Cliff]

Looks like the Light Attack/Armed Reconnissance program is moving along- see the Air Force News article here.

The Air National Guard / Air Force Reserve Test Center (AATC) is working testing right now. I'll be curious to see what happens... for a while it sounded like LAAR was going to be procured for the SOF/building partner capacity role and for organic light attack use as well. This article pushes that aspect a bit, but I've heard that it will only be bought for use with partners.

V/R,

Cliff

[SethB]

"Updating Close Air Support," by LT. COL PAUL DARLING AND LT. JUSTIN LAWLOR.

When Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of Afghanistan, one of his first orders severely restricted the use of fixed-wing strike assets in support of combat operations. The newly appointed commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. David Petraeus, has been reluctant to change the order.

The order received much criticism, with many complaining that restricting strike assets posed too great a danger to soldiers on the ground. The order, however, reflected an unspoken reality, namely that the doctrine, structure and airframes currently used for close-air support (CAS) are fundamentally flawed and are an expensive and ineffective framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Our current CAS structure is hampering our mission in Afghanistan and reflects a reversal of lessons learned not only by U.S. forces in Vietnam but also by countries around the world engaged in COIN for the past 40 years.

How did we get to the point where the one area where we have unquestioned dominance is deliberately neutered to the point of irrelevance? It wasn’t easy, but fixing it can be. We can not only dominate the air, but effectively use it to our advantage as long as the military acknowledges our current failures, uses an analysis of our successful past and encourages an effort by all service branches to adjust to a post-Cold War environment. We can fight better, cheaper and more effectively only when we understand where we are and from where we came.

"Reality Check," by MAJ. AARON W. CLARK AND LT. COL. J. BRAD REEVES.

Misperceptions about close-air support (CAS) continue to plague the relationship between ground and air forces. CAS is a mission area where myth and reality often coexist.

The article by Lt. Col. Paul Darling and Lt. Justin Lawlor is a striking example of this mix. The authors claim that CAS doctrine and operational practices have not evolved sufficiently to meet today’s needs, especially in Afghanistan. Their assertion is unsupportable, and the mischaracterizations in the article do a disservice to the coalition forces putting their lives on the line every day using these highly evolved procedures. Contrary to points made in the article, joint CAS doctrine has changed dramatically since the Cold War, and especially since the first operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Command and control structures, tactics and systems have all undergone major adaptations that were either misrepresented or missed entirely in the article, leading to flawed prescriptions. We intend to set the record straight.

The "counterpoint" is hopeless, but I thought that it served as a useful illustration of the points that LTC Darling and Lt. Lawlor made.

[Cliff]

"Updating Close Air Support," by LT. COL PAUL DARLING AND LT. JUSTIN LAWLOR.

"Reality Check," by MAJ. AARON W. CLARK AND LT. COL. J. BRAD REEVES.

The "counterpoint" is hopeless, but I thought that it served as a useful illustration of the points that LTC Darling and Lt. Lawlor made.

OK, so why is the counterpoint hopeless? Can you offer some of your arguments or rationale?

The counterpoint points out several factual errors in the first article- especially the fact that CAS doctrine hasn't changed since the Cold War.

For instance, I find it ironic that LtCol Darling and Lt Lawlor's article uses kill boxes as an example of "cold war doctrine", since it dates to well after the Cold War. Ironically kill boxes are actually one of the most flexible ways of conducting CAS or AI that exist - even in a COIN environment.

One of the other major problems with the "Updating CAS" article is that it confuses platforms with effects. The authors assert that USAF fighters cannot communicate with them, and that they are unable to sufficiently identify targets on the ground and sort insurgents from civilians. They claim that an OV-10 aircraft would be better able to do this. They fail to consider that it is the effects that matter and not the platform... in fact, most single seat fighters now carry the Sniper pod which is ROVER compatible and can offer the ISR that the authors desire. They also can accomplish the FAC-A mission - the limitation here is not the aircraft, but the training for the aircrew, as regardless of the platform the crew must accomplish the extensive FAC-A training (it is one of the most intensive upgrades aircrew can undergo). As for precise effects, all USAF and USN fighters carry an internal gun, which is just as accurate as a minigun pod. (The authors argue that a 20mm minigun is ideal - the M61A1 20MM cannon is precisely the weapon carried by the fighters they scoff). Most could carry rockets as well as desired by the authors- they don't simply because rockets are actually relatively inaccurate and are less reliable than PGMs. The Small Diameter Bomb gives single seat fighters a low-CD weapon that is relatively accurate. The author's last requirement is for "availability", which they define as "There must be enough of them to provide support to multiple engagements simultaneously and remain overhead for several hours without allowing a break in aerial coverage or support." Unfortunately, even if the USAF were to buy AT-6s or OV-10s we would not be able to buy enough of them to give every platoon in the Army their own CAS 24-7. The advantage of single seat fighters is that they have the speed to get to the fight quickly and support the troops. The authors fail to consider that in a country like Afghanistan, where there are limited places to base even rough-field capable aircraft, the faster aircraft are important in giving them the availability they desire. In short, they are centered on the platform that supports them and not the effects they want.

Another big problem with the "Updating CAS" article is that it implies a JTAC is required for weapons release. While doctrinally a JTAC is highly desired, according to joint doctrine "The authority and responsibility for the expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander." (JP3-09.3, 8 Jul 09, pg V-18). In other words, the ground commander can decide to call for ordnance even if a FAC is not present. As the counterpoint highlights, the USAF and Army are attempting to make this unnecessary by providing Joint Fires Observers (JFOs) to aid in terminal guidance operations (TGO) during Type 2 or 3 CAS (IE where a JTAC cannot see the aircraft and target). Yet the authors of "Updating CAS" fail to consider this important doctrinal update. I also am not sure how they think a slower aircraft will make a difference in telling friend (or non-combatant) from foe during CAS in a COIN environment - that will always be up to the ground commander to decide.

I find the Army stereotypes of CAS, and especially USAF CAS to be amusing. I personally have been asked questions like "why is CAS not important to the USAF", or my personal favorite "why does the USAF hate the A-10 and want to get rid of it?" These views (in my experience) usually seem to stem from a bad experience with CAS, or from stereotypes that date back to Vietnam and have been perpetuated by the outright hatred many in the Army seem to feel towards the USAF. Many times folks don't realize that if their CAS was taken away it wasn't by the USAF but by their own higher echelon ground commanders.

The days when we could value service parochialism over jointness are gone. Our country's current financial situation will not allow us to buy every system we feel we need for every situation regardless of cost. We are going to have to learn to use a few systems over a large range of operations, and do so jointly to maximize our strengths and minimize weaknesses. We will not be able to afford to have a different aircraft for every single mission - sad but true. Even with the cheaper cost the of a LAAR type aircraft the fact that they are only useful in a COIN environment means that they will likely be limited in number due to austerity- the benefits don't outweigh the costs. I won't even get into the fact that our country's political will to do a large COIN operation is pretty much 0, meaning that the planned limited number of LAAR aircraft for USAF Special Operations Command will probably be adequate. With proper training, current US fighters can do a pretty good job of providing the accurate and proportional firepower the authors want.

The services have all placed a high priority on supporting the current fight. Numerous USAF units have spent a lot of time training to provide CAS to the ground components, at the expense of their other missions. The USAF has upgraded the A-10 and re-winged them, prioritizing this effort over several other fighter upgrades. It also has worked with the Army to try and be more responsive with both ISR and CAS, to include signficantly expanding the number of JTACs, ALOs, and RPAs by cutting fighter aircraft to free up bodies. That doesn't sound like a service that is still focused on the Cold War or doesn't care about CAS.

Allright, I know that my arguments will likely not be well received, but I've made them just the same. I look forward to hearing your support for the "hopelessness" of the "Reality Check" article.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

and agree that the Darling-Lawlor article is quite parochial and has some flaws while the Clark-Reeves article is not "hopeless" IMO (and I'm unsure why it was so tagged...). I further agree the Army can get rather dumb on the subject of CAS. However, in defense of that Army attitude you note, I would submit three points for your consideration.

- The strong USAF push for centralized control of ALL air in a theater. Yes, that's a Viet Nam legacy and Momyer didn't do the AF any favors but Horner also tried to do it Desert Shield / Desert Storm and Dave Deptula has his ideas (and not just on UAV control or ownership). While the underlying logic is understood and accepted, it is but one approach and needs can vary by theater and war. While the single manager idea is efficient, it may not always be the most effective employment and the very significant downside is that a message of an excessive control fetish is sent...

- The USAF has -- deserved or not -- a reputation as an organization (with acknowledgement that there are individuals and units that do not subscribe to the organizational models) for being excessively safety conscious, avoiding extreme low level CAS (pods not withstanding; the issue is attitude, not altitude... ) and generally not favoring CAS as important to the service. This translates into a perception that it is as a mission not given adequate priority. Clark and Reeves address that issue and acknowledge the USAF could do more to eliminate that perception. Their comment about AGOS (I thought it was now JAGOG ) is noted but that does not affect the vast majority of Army people who do not go to Nellis or the clones at Ramstein and Sill.

Part of the problem is shown here:

Air Force Doctrine: Air Force Manual 1-1, Mar 92, Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, outlines the Air Force's framework for understanding how to apply CAS. Understanding the Air Force doctrine will greatly enhance our CAS operations. This doctrine states: "Close air support is the application of aerospace forces in support of the land component commander's objectives.... Close air support produces the most focused and briefest effects of any force application mission; consequently, close air support rarely creates campaign-level effects. Although close air support is the least efficient application of aerospace forces, at times, it may be the most critical by ensuring the success and survival of surface forces. " (emphasis added /kw)

My emphasis is to illustrate that, as we know, people tend to take away from the written word exactly what they wish to take away. The psychological impact of those words is beyond this non-psychologist but I bet it does little good for USAF internal 'support' of CAS...

- This attitude of distrust of the USAF by the Army is a result of the two foregoing items and is further evinced by the fact that the USAF did over several years for various reasons related to AF funding priorities attempt to get rid of the A-10. That bird was designed and optimized for CAS, it does it better than any other (with the possible exception of the SU-25) and it has the GAU-8 which makes the M61 truly look like the minigun you erroneously called it ( -- sorry 'bout that, too good to pass up... ). Recent improvements to make A-10Cs a bird to be reckoned with but it is a fact that many fighter jocks originally (and allegedly still) vociferously objected to flying the 'mud mover' and that had Desert Storm not come along, the USAF probably would have gotten rid of all of them. Though the 95+ % OR rate did look good to Congress.

The issue is that the USAF had a dedicated CAS bird, that the service wanted to discard it and the perception thus arose that they wished to second rate the mission. To say that an F-16 can do the job of an A-10 'as well or better' simply does not pass the basic credibility test and the USAF lost cred in the process over the years.

None of this intended as AF bashing -- I'm a Grunt who supports and has a vague understanding of air dominance (or air superiority...) and appreciation for the fact that in several wars, I got strafed and bombed only very seldom and a long time ago. Rather it is intended to illustrate that much the nominal "outright hatred many in the Army seem to feel towards the USAF" has a basis in demonstrated or perceived USAF attitudes and parochiality as well as in Army parochiality and stupidity [NOTE to Army persons: I use the word "stupidity" advisedly because parochiality is stupid; unwillingness to use the skills and knowledges of others to enhance ones own capability is stupid and the US Army is king of the 'not invented by me' syndrome].

Ignorance plays a strong role on both sides...

[SethB]

One of the other major problems with the "Updating CAS" article is that it confuses platforms with effects. The authors assert that USAF fighters cannot communicate with them, and that they are unable to sufficiently identify targets on the ground and sort insurgents from civilians.

I keep hearing the USAF tell me how great their ISR capabilities are, but in practice, the one time that I tried it, the pilot couldn't locate anything that I could on the ground, before he had to leave for lack of fuel.

They claim that an OV-10 aircraft would be better able to do this. They fail to consider that it is the effects that matter and not the platform... in fact, most single seat fighters now carry the Sniper pod which is ROVER compatible and can offer the ISR that the authors desire.

That isn't a 100% solution, and you'll find that not every maneuver element is equipped with ROVER. And ROVER is great, by the way.

As for precise effects, all USAF and USN fighters carry an internal gun, which is just as accurate as a minigun pod. (The authors argue that a 20mm minigun is ideal - the M61A1 20MM cannon is precisely the weapon carried by the fighters they scoff). Most could carry rockets as well as desired by the authors- they don't simply because rockets are actually relatively inaccurate and are less reliable than PGMs.

Unfortunately I haven't posted for you the original 6,000 word article. Darling and Lawlor actually favor a rifle caliber minigun.

The Small Diameter Bomb gives single seat fighters a low-CD weapon that is relatively accurate. The author's last requirement is for "availability", which they define as "There must be enough of them to provide support to multiple engagements simultaneously and remain overhead for several hours without allowing a break in aerial coverage or support."

An SDB was designed for standoff engagement and can take quite a while to arrive on target.

Unfortunately, even if the USAF were to buy AT-6s or OV-10s we would not be able to buy enough of them to give every platoon in the Army their own CAS 24-7. The advantage of single seat fighters is that they have the speed to get to the fight quickly and support the troops. The authors fail to consider that in a country like Afghanistan, where there are limited places to base even rough-field capable aircraft, the faster aircraft are important in giving them the availability they desire. In short, they are centered on the platform that supports them and not the effects they want.

Because they believe that the platform is part of the problem. Darling found the B1 to provide the best CAS but he got the most out of CCA from Apaches. They worked with him, rather well, in fact.

Another big problem with the "Updating CAS" article is that it implies a JTAC is required for weapons release. While doctrinally a JTAC is highly desired, according to joint doctrine "The authority and responsibility for the expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander." (JP3-09.3, 8 Jul 09, pg V-18). In other words, the ground commander can decide to call for ordnance even if a FAC is not present. As the counterpoint highlights, the USAF and Army are attempting to make this unnecessary by providing Joint Fires Observers (JFOs) to aid in terminal guidance operations (TGO) during Type 2 or 3 CAS (IE where a JTAC cannot see the aircraft and target). Yet the authors of "Updating CAS" fail to consider this important doctrinal update.

It isn't that important. The are only 2,000 JFOs at this point, and with requirements for continual certification... The most important phrase that I've learned, with regards to airpower, is "I am not a JTAC."

So while you can call for air support, you may or may not get it.

The days when we could value service parochialism over jointness are gone. Our country's current financial situation will not allow us to buy every system we feel we need for every situation regardless of cost. We are going to have to learn to use a few systems over a large range of operations, and do so jointly to maximize our strengths and minimize weaknesses. We will not be able to afford to have a different aircraft for every single mission - sad but true. Even with the cheaper cost the of a LAAR type aircraft the fact that they are only useful in a COIN environment means that they will likely be limited in number due to austerity- the benefits don't outweigh the costs. I won't even get into the fact that our country's political will to do a large COIN operation is pretty much 0, meaning that the planned limited number of LAAR aircraft for USAF Special Operations Command will probably be adequate. With proper training, current US fighters can do a pretty good job of providing the accurate and proportional firepower the authors want.

I've been told that LAAR was cancelled, and there is a quote floating around from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force about how LAAR was only for training missions with other militaries. I also fail to see how it could be cheaper to operate B1s and other expensive aircraft (including tanker support) than it is to buy cheap, essentially disposable aircraft t use for the next few years.

A Super Tucano is several times cheaper than an Apache, for instance.

The services have all placed a high priority on supporting the current fight. Numerous USAF units have spent a lot of time training to provide CAS to the ground components, at the expense of their other missions. The USAF has upgraded the A-10 and re-winged them, prioritizing this effort over several other fighter upgrades. It also has worked with the Army to try and be more responsive with both ISR and CAS, to include signficantly expanding the number of JTACs, ALOs, and RPAs by cutting fighter aircraft to free up bodies. That doesn't sound like a service that is still focused on the Cold War or doesn't care about CAS.

Forgive us, but most of the Soldiers I talk to feel that the Air Force is trying to win the budget war, rather than the Afghan war.

Allright, I know that my arguments will likely not be well received, but I've made them just the same. I look forward to hearing your support for the "hopelessness" of the "Reality Check" article.

What I didn't like about it was that it essentially said that Darling and Lawlor are incapable of understanding how great CAS is, then it provided a number of points that were, frankly, irrelevant.

I can work with CCA quite easily. If I was in combat with Apaches overhead I could talk to the pilot and we could come up with something quickly. An IZLID and the radio in my HMMWV is all I would need.

In order to effectively use CAS I'd need a JTAC at BN and a JFO at a lower unit. Then I'd have to hope that someone could talk the pilot onto the target.

Which doesn't mean CAS for every PLT. We haven't reached the point where every PLT can use CAS, let alone have it.

Which is why Darling quit using fixed wing during his tour in Afghanistan.

[El Cid]

A friend of mine pointed me to this thread of comments with respect to CAS in Afghanistan. I have read and re-read this group of comments, and decided, probably unwisely, to add my own. I flew close air support for most of my 25+ years in the AF, and no one knows better than my Hog brothers and I that this was not THE AF mission. Having said that, the AF has come along way in the last several years. I would sumbit that the AF has moved towards the Army more than the Army has moved towards the AF.

With respect to the threads, I agree that the Darling article was trying to point out issues with CAS, and suggest the LAAR as a solution. However, many of the facts in the article are clearly wrong. Calling a rebuttal of the incorrect facts "hopeless", is something that I would expect to see at the UN with the Iranian President speaking, and not here on a blog where we hopefully deal in facts not emotion. CAS doctrine, TTP, manning, communications, weapons, and equippment have all changed since drastically since the cold war--for the better! The lack of change was the premiss for the Darling article. If the LAAR is a solution, then supporting it with the correct facts is the way to get it.

I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. If he was part of a PRT or other non maneuver unit, then he would not have had a TACP. This is the wide area security issue the Army is struggling with right now. Right or wrong, the AF agreed to functionally align TACPs and JTACs with the units the Army asked them to--the manuever units. The Joint Force is making an effort to make more Joint Fires available to Army units at lower echelons, but this remains an issue, especially for units that do not technically own AOs as per Army doctrine. Since 2005 the intent has been to train JFOs to pick up the slack for the units that do not have TACPs.

The idea that 2000 JFOs is not that important when there were zero JFOs six years ago, may be part of the problem. A collective effort by the insitutional Army and Air Force created this new joint capability from scratch. Unfortunately JFO usage has been inconsistant across the force as this new capability hit the theater. If the deployed Army believes the JFOs are not important, then they will not be employed.

As for the LAAR, it has the potential to be part of the solution, just like JFO, TACP-CASS, Rover, Predator, Reaper, PSS-SOF, and training more Army youngsters in CAS without a Qualified JTAC.

I will be the first to say the AF needs to conitinue to focus on supporting the Army, particularly in AFG. Having flown A-10s in combat, including operation Anaconda, I have also seen first hand how these journal wars distort what happens in the AO. I have yet to meet a soldier who was on the floor of the Sha-E-Kot who has a negative thing to say about the A-10 performance during Anaconda (to my face), yet in the post event journal wars the AF was risk averse, would not go below 10K, etc. If the AF guys have thin skin about incorrect facts in journals, it is not without precidence.

I read Ken White's post with interest. Ken has obvisouly been around the block and I agreed with most of what he said. He was correct when he pointed out that cold war CAS doctrine stated that CAS was the least efficient use of airpower. In a target rich environment with thousands of enemy tanks, it made sense to presume that CAS would slow down the targetting process used in the classic AirLand Battle Doctrine because each flight would have to get a nine-line and clearance. When compared to an interdiction mission focused on massed enemy forces, CAS was probably less efficient.

Personally, I never liked the way that sounded because it gave the impression that it was a math problem and not a mission to save soldiers on the ground. In any case, when the fixed piece battles of the Cold War went away AF doctrine changed. Since 2003 AIr Force Doctrine Document (AFDD (1)) says this.

"CAS can provide a tremendous tactical advantage when supporting
ground forces. Although in isolation it rarely achieves campaign-level
objectives, at times it may be the more critical mission due to its contribution
to campaign objectives. CAS should be planned to prepare the conditions
for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. CAS can
halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, cover retreats, and guard flanks.
To be most effective, however, CAS should be used at decisive points in a
battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated combat power
and saturate defenses." (AFDD 1, 17 Nov 2003, p 45)

If the AF Doctrine of 1992 is still driving the Army perception of the service, then the AF does not have a CAS problem, but a PR issue.

I suspect that my thoughts will not change the negative opinion's of those who have made up their minds about the AF, CAS, and the percieved lack of support to the Army. For those who are undecided, know that there are thousands of airmen who train hard every day with the sole purpose of supporting our brothers in the Army.

[Ken White]

Good to know the change in wording occurred. As you say, at the time the item I quoted was written, it made sense. While logically agreeing with its premise, my fear was that it, like a lot of 'doctrine,' could be misinterpreted or misused.

FWIW, One of my sons just finished his recent fourth tour in his second war as a leader of Grunts and he has nothing but high praise for the AF, JTACs and JFOs -- and he is particularly in love with the Hog, says it is hands down the bird most appreciated and is tied with or ahead of the Apache in the eyes of most. He puts the British Harriers way up there as well but goes to great lengths to say they all do good work.

I like to remind people that both Iraq and Afghanistan are relatively benign combat environments, that air superiority is really, really, nice -- but is emphatically not guaranteed. In a major war against a near peer opponent folks are likely to notice different things and have a quite different attitude.

Great catch this:

I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level.

I missed that -- but then, I'm old. I did read the blurb on the AFJ Article:""Lt. Col Paul Darling is an infantry officer serving with the Alaska Army National Guard. He recently served as the provincial lead mentor with the Afghan National Police in Zabul, Afghanistan"" but had forgotten it when I read of the lack of FAC prob...

I think you're probably correct that the bulk of the USAF has moved closer to the Army while the far larger Army has not reciprocated too well; part of that problem is, IMO, unrealistic expectations (and lack of knowledge...) about what air can and cannot do. That is IMO the Army's fault. Sometimes being the biggest kid on the block means you tend to ignore all the other kids. That's usually not smart.

The aforementioned Son, BTW has called in and successfully employed USAF/USN CAS without a FAC, JTAC or JFO. As have I. What is written is not what is war...

[SethB]

A friend of mine pointed me to this thread of comments with respect to CAS in Afghanistan. I have read and re-read this group of comments, and decided, probably unwisely, to add my own. I flew close air support for most of my 25+ years in the AF, and no one knows better than my Hog brothers and I that this was not THE AF mission. Having said that, the AF has come along way in the last several years. I would sumbit that the AF has moved towards the Army more than the Army has moved towards the AF.

I appreciate your comments.

I value LtCol Darling's opinion, however, I suspect he was not a MVR Cdr, or he would have had a TACP available at least down to BN level. If he was part of a PRT or other non maneuver unit, then he would not have had a TACP. This is the wide area security issue the Army is struggling with right now. Right or wrong, the AF agreed to functionally align TACPs and JTACs with the units the Army asked them to--the manuever units. The Joint Force is making an effort to make more Joint Fires available to Army units at lower echelons, but this remains an issue, especially for units that do not technically own AOs as per Army doctrine. Since 2005 the intent has been to train JFOs to pick up the slack for the units that do not have TACPs.

You are correct, he was an advisor. Saying that that wasn't a maneuver unit is incorrect, though. They were a maneuver unit, just not an American one. The USAF cannot produce enough JTACs to insert them into American units, let alone indigenous units. And unless I am mistaken (or, more accurately, was misinformed by the JFO cadre) a JTAC is a key part of the CAS process.

The idea that 2000 JFOs is not that important when there were zero JFOs six years ago, may be part of the problem. A collective effort by the insitutional Army and Air Force created this new joint capability from scratch. Unfortunately JFO usage has been inconsistant across the force as this new capability hit the theater. If the deployed Army believes the JFOs are not important, then they will not be employed.

JFOs are important, but I don't think a JFO knows anything that a 13F from 30 years ago didn't. Somewhere along the line, calling in CAS was taken from the 13Fs and given to the JTACs. JFO is a matter of reinserting that knowledge.

Also, I've been told that there have been issues with getting the Air Force on the same page, both with the creation of JTACs and JFOs.

As for the LAAR, it has the potential to be part of the solution, just like JFO, TACP-CASS, Rover, Predator, Reaper, PSS-SOF, and training more Army youngsters in CAS without a Qualified JTAC.

All great things, especially PSS-SOF and Rover! Rover makes target talk ons easy, and PSS-SOF enables GMLRS strikes.

I read Ken White's post with interest. Ken has obvisouly been around the block and I agreed with most of what he said. He was correct when he pointed out that cold war CAS doctrine stated that CAS was the least efficient use of airpower. In a target rich environment with thousands of enemy tanks, it made sense to presume that CAS would slow down the targetting process used in the classic AirLand Battle Doctrine because each flight would have to get a nine-line and clearance. When compared to an interdiction mission focused on massed enemy forces, CAS was probably less efficient.

That's not just it. When you had DIVARTY and MLRS to kill a grid square at a time you didn't need CAS. But what LTC Darling isn't talking about is killing the enemy. Not necessarily.

He wants equipment and doctrine that forces the enemy to choose between moving and being killed by air power, and staying still and being killed by infantry. He can find and finish, but he can't fix.

He doesn't need a B1 to do that, he needs a 30MM cannon that can loiter for a few hours.

For those who are undecided, know that there are thousands of airmen who train hard every day with the sole purpose of supporting our brothers in the Army.

I appreciate that.

I was raised to love the Air Force, and nearly gave my grandad a heart attack when I joined the Army!

[Entropy]

A couple of interesting, if predictable articles. Some thoughts:

Risk aversion. Ken is right, the AF has it in spades. So does the Army IMO, though the AF is probably worse (I was also in the Navy and the AF is worse than the Navy in that regard). It's part of the mentality of mid-grade and senior officers and it's the same mentality that causes some commanders to micromanage platoon leaders in the field. Ken should, at this point, link back to one of his many cogent arguments about the inadequacies of personnel systems across the DoD.

Platoon-level support. This is partly related to the above. Although the intent is for the AF to provide enough JTAC's to have them at the company level, raising numbers is proving difficult. JTACs have a high attrition rate and there isn't, as of yet, a big enough training pipeline to create a lot of them quickly. Then there's the problem of the aforementioned personnel system as well as the AVF which makes it more difficult to force people into certain jobs. The Army always has the option of creating it's own JTACs but opted not to because it's already short of personnel, which is completely understandable. Even with the structural issues, I think the AF isn't doing enough to get more JTAC's trained.

Additionally, in my experience with ISR, the Army likes to keep control of CAS and UAV's at the battalion or brigade level. I've seen first-hand the frustration from units when their ISR support is pulled for someone else but such decisions are not made at the CAOC or by those flying the aircraft. Most often such decisions are made at the brigade level. That's not a problem that Air Force doctrine can solve.

"COIN" Aircraft: The Super Tucano and similar aircraft are certainly impressive. But advocates for them seem compelled to exaggerate their perceived advantages. Just as one example, the article states the Tucano's endurance is 6 hours with internal fuel, yet the manufacturer's own literature states 3.4 hours with internal fuel. Once you add in weapons load-outs, extra weight for all the gizmo's required by the US Military, the high-hot operating environment of Afghanistan, transit times, etc. that ideal number goes down even further. It's still likely to be 2-3 times the 30-45minutes typically seen with something like an F-16, but six hours is simply not a credible figure.

Secondly there is cost. These aircraft are supposedly "cheap" and even "disposable." My economics is a bit rusty, but I'm not sure how buying new a aircraft is inherently cheaper than using aircraft that are already bought and paid for. I know, for example, that I could trade in my paid-for minivan for a new sedan, and I recognize that buying a new sedan is cheaper than buying a new minivan, but I am certainly not "saving money" by buying a smaller, less-capable vehicle to replace what I already own.

I do agree that the operating costs for a Tucano are likely to be less, even after factoring in the extra logistics tail to operate these aircraft at many dispersed locations in Afghanistan, but those savings will take some amount of time before they begin to offset all the up-front costs associated with procurement, training, personnel, parts, etc. I'd like to see an analysis of that, but so far I haven't found one.

Regardless, Tucano's would probably end up costing about $10-15 million an airframe which is close to what an Apache costs and hardly makes the aircraft "disposable" (The version Columbia purchased was about $9 million an aircraft). By contrast, the A-10C upgrade was about $12 million per airframe including re-winging the aircraft. Personally, I would rather see more A-10's than a Tucano because I think the A-10 is clearly the superior aircraft and there are clearly advantages to getting more of an aircraft you've already got than getting something new. One option that should be examined is refurbishing additional A-10's.

Still, given 20/20 hindsight, I do think that purchase of some Tucano-type aircraft back in the early ought's would have been worth it. I think they would fill a real capabilities gap between RW CAS and most FW CAS provided by today's platforms, specifically more precise guns. I am, however, skeptical that purchasing them today would be worth it. Even with an accelerated procurement (something like the MC-12 Liberty) we wouldn't see significant numbers for a couple of years - about the time when our mission in Afghanistan will start to wind down.

Radios. Tactical radios seem like a no-brainer. I don't know why they haven't been installed on many aircraft.

To conclude, there are legitimate arguments that the Air Force is currently not supporting CAS adequately and that Air Force (and joint) doctrine and training are likewise inadequate. There is also a legitimate argument that today's fleet of AF (and Navy, and Marine, and Coalition) platforms are not optimized to support the kinds of wars we are currently fighting. Of course, that isn't a unique problem - much of the Army's equipment isn't optimized for a distributed COIN campaign in a land-locked central Asian country (and then there's the Navy...). Given all the legitimate room for criticism of the Air Force in particular, it's perplexing to me why critics, as seen with the Darling/Lawlor article and many like it, continue to make exaggerated and easily falsifiable assertions in their arguments. It's not like Cold-War CAS doctrine or the endurance of a particular aircraft are difficult research problems. At best such mistakes are simply sloppy, but they end up undercutting arguments rather than supporting them.

[Ken White]

Platoon-level support... Although the intent is for the AF to provide enough JTAC's to have them at the company level, raising numbers is proving difficult...The Army always has the option of creating it's own JTACs but opted not to because it's already short of personnel...

IMO the Army is not short of personnel, it just woefully misuses those it has. I'd also suggest that any competent Infantry Squad Leader should be able to call in Air -- it was so with Marines in Korea and in at least some Army units in Viet Nam (in fairness, that get the job done attitude gets replaced in the following period of peace with the bureaucratic parochial and risk averse "Safety uber alles" rulings...). With all respect to those who do the job, it is not rocket science -- I'd also note that few who elect to join the USAF do so with a goal and desire to serve in the mud with the Army. If the Army wants support, it should do its share. It does not and that's due to both Army and AF parochialism...

Additionally, in my experience with ISR, the Army likes to keep control of CAS and UAV's at the battalion or brigade level... such decisions are not made at the CAOC or by those flying the aircraft. Most often such decisions are made at the brigade level. That's not a problem that Air Force doctrine can solve.

My observation has been that the diversion or denial of CAS is a mixed bag as far as who makes the decision. That applies to both who makes the decision and whether that decision was justified or not. I'm not sure there is much that can be done to remedy that, it's a human foible thing all too often...

"COIN" Aircraft: The Super Tucano and similar aircraft are certainly impressive... but six hours is simply not a credible figure.

Having actually been supported by Mohawks (illegally armed..,), A-37s, AT-28s, F-5s --plus O-1, O-2, OV-10 and A1 birds -- as well as sundry prop jobs, everything from F4U / F-51 up through F-4 / B-57 / B-52, I am not a fan of or advocate for so-called COIN aircreft. They have no stamina or staying power, they can't carry much and IMO are waste of time and money. Plus they're too easily shot down (my attitude may be colored by crawling through too much jungle to try fruitlessly to get dead bodies out of crashed airplanes -- to include Army Helicopters...). When you get to the A-1 / A-4 and A-7 level you're talking more sensibly and you aren't wasting money on one trick ponies. There is a place for a multi use a/c like the OV-10 but one does not need many of them and the CAS function is not their strong point.

One option that should be examined is refurbishing additional A-10's.

Yes!

...
I do think that purchase of some Tucano-type aircraft back in the early ought's would have been worth it... I am, however, skeptical that purchasing them today would be worth it.

No and yes. Er, no and no. Uh-uh...Umm - never, not then not now...

Given all the legitimate room for criticism of the Air Force in particular, it's perplexing to me why critics, as seen with the Darling/Lawlor article and many like it, continue to make exaggerated and easily falsifiable assertions in their arguments. It's not like Cold-War CAS doctrine or the endurance of a particular aircraft are difficult research problems. At best such mistakes are simply sloppy, but they end up undercutting arguments rather than supporting them.

Exactly. It's okay to be ignorant -- we all have gaps -- but it isn't terribly wise to expose undue ignorance that can be largely attributed to relatively unthinking bias or putting excessive faith in writing one has apparently not even attempted to verify...